THE
NEW YORK REVIEW

VOL. II MAY–JUNE, 1907 NO. 6

A NEW THEORY OF MIRACLES

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It is due to the author whom I am about to criticise to say that he does not regard his theory as new. Quite the contrary: it is, in his opinion, the only theory that fits in with the oldest and best apologetical tradition, and if not explicitly formulated by the Fathers and theologians, is implied by the greatest of them in the best of their works.

The author of this theory, old or new, is M. Le Roy, one of the ablest of that cultured band of French Catholics whose almost professed aim it has been for some years to revolutionise theology, by wedding it to the critical philosophy, somewhat as St. Thomas revolutionised it in his day by wedding it to the philosophy of Aristotle. I know that some of these reformers—the term is to be understood in the sense in which St. Thomas was a reformer—profess no special allegiance to Kant; nor do I suppose they would accept any doctrine merely because it was proposed by him or any other master. They would be likely to claim, moreover, that the critical philosophy is now very different from what it was at the beginning of the last century. I do not think, however, they can have any reasonable objection to be called Kantians, in the sense that their philosophy in the main is that of the critical school, of which Kant is the most notable representative if he was not even its originator.

M. Le Roy's theory of miracles is set forth in an Essay[1] which appeared in the *Annales de Philosophie Chrétienne*, for October, November, and December of last year, The October part deals with

[1] "Essai sur la notion du miracle." M. Le Roy, it may be said, is the author of the article "Qu'est-ce qu'un dogme?" which was published in the *Quinzaine* of April, 1905, and which had such a *retentissement*.

the definition of miracle. In this connection the author discusses the arguments for and against the possibility of the miraculous, as the notion of miracle has been explained for some time, by unbelievers as well as by Christians. In the second article (November) he takes up the question of evidence; whether, that is, even though it were admitted that miracles are possible, it can be proved that such an event ever took place. In both these articles he agrees—practically—with the unbelievers; for, though he maintains that their arguments against miracles are as much beside the question, and therefore worthless, as those of the Christian apologists, he holds with the unbelievers that the arguments of the apologists are worthless—which most Christians will regard as the main point. He holds, that is, that miracle being taken to be what it is usually represented to be, the weight of argument is against its possibility, as also against its demonstrability. This looks serious—from the Christian point of view.

Accordingly, in the last of the three articles (December) he explains his own idea of miracle; as also how, according to this notion, there can be no doubt as to the possibility, and very little as to the fact or the apologetical value, of the occurrence.

I have thought it well to submit the Essay to some criticism, principally because it is intended (Dec. p. 258) as an illustration and proof of one of the conclusions formulated by those apologists who rely on the Method of Immanence. As a concrete example of that method, which so many find elusive and intangible, it may help us to a clear concept and just appreciation of the whole. Unfortunately, that elusiveness which characterises so much of the critical philosophy is not altogether absent from M. Le Roy's Essay, so that one cannot be quite sure that one has done full justice to his arguments. I shall not consciously diminish the force with which he presents them; not, at least, more than is made necessary by the process of condensation to which I shall have to submit them. It is not always that an argument gains in strength by compression.

I

Taking the critical part of the essay, it may be well to state at once that I stand by the notion of miracle current in the Catholic schools,—that I am content to regard it as a sensible phenomenon at once striking and supernatural

By supernatural I mean: not due to Nature; or, if you will, beyond the reach of Nature's powers. By Nature I mean the entire

universe of matter with all its energies; as well as all embodied spirits of men, which operate in and through the material organs with which they are hypostatically united; but not those which have been disembodied. External interference, of God, good or bad angels, or disembodied spirits, I regard as supernatural, whenever it is not regular or due.

In explanation of the last clause I may say that I agree with M. Le Roy (Oct. p. 11) in regarding all existence, whether of matter or of its energies or motions, as the result of continuous active divine interference, known in theology as conservation. This continuous conserving process is regular, in the sense that it takes place along definite lines, which it is the object of natural science to discover, and which, when discovered, are known as laws. The laws of Motion are an illustration. Should God depart from these lines, interfering, as it were, from outside with the regular plan on which He has been working; or allowing an angel, good or bad, so to interfere; such an outside irregular interference I should consider undue or supernatural—a violation of or departure from some regular course of material operation. Should this take place in circumstances wherein it is seen at once to be irregular, it would be deemed strange, and the strange phenomenon would cause surprise and be called miraculous. The external agent, whose ordinary conserving action may, perhaps, have been philosophically deduced, would stand revealed, as it were, in a flash, by this irregular interference.

Or you may abstract altogether from divine conservation and regard the material universe with its energies as continuing to exist of its very nature and without external help. It is, in my opinion, undeniable that all motions of matter take place along certain lines, conformably to certain laws, as we call them, which are reducible ultimately to the Laws of Motion. Should any agent external to this material system interfere to change the quantity either of its matter or of its energy, or even the direction of its resulting motions, such interference would be irregular, undue, supernatural. If sudden and striking, it would be miraculous.

All this, M. Le Roy objects, is based on Cartesian science—physics and metaphysics—now exploded. Your notion of miracle implies law, in the sense of necessity really found as such in things themselves; whereby you imply that one must conceive miracle as a kind of creation *ex nihilo*, intervening in the very midst of the series of phenomena. How can I conceive anything so contradictory? Is not the reality

of a phenomenon defined by its insertion in a series; that is, by the relations which it bears to the series as a whole,—relations which must be abolished to make way for your insertion? The most recent science knows of no such necessity as you postulate by your laws—of Motion and of Conservation; it knows not your determinism, except, perhaps, as something pliable, as a form officially imposed upon at least as much as found in Nature, which lends itself to the impression but does not bear the form ontologically actualised in its bosom. Determinism, or necessity, or law, is now perceived to be nothing—or at least not quite—external; it is at least in part mental, the result of compromise or collaboration between the mind and its object (Oct. pp. 8-10).

Should the reader find this vague or elusive, let him not blame me altogether, who have done my very best to get out of M. Le Roy's utterance what sense I can; translating literally wherever possible, which is not very often. If the argument does not appeal to you, it will be said that perhaps the reason is that you have not been educated to appreciate the style and method of the critical school of philosophy.

Do we, then, know of law or necessity as found in things themselves and not resulting from some form of mental compromise on our part? Are the Laws of Conservation and of Motion something which we have imposed on Nature, not derived from her? May it be that other minds, constituted differently or less disposed to compromise, see things in another light; that for them matter is not inert, or tends to move in a curve, or begins and ceases to exist and energise at its own sweet will and independently of what we are wont to conceive as the influence of external agents? Is it true not only that things real are related to the whole universe, but that their reality consists in this relation, not in something which is related? Even so, is it inconceivable that the relations should be changed, under the influence, say, of an external agent such as God? Is it inconceivable that He should so act from outside on the series or system as to change, let us say, the direction of its motions—a thing which any agent can do to any system outside of which it is placed and which its energies can reach?

As long as science is what it is, a study of law; nay, as long as there is any science worthy of the name—knowledge of Nature, derived from study of its operations and not a mere projection of subjectivity dignified with the name of compromise between mind and object—we must hold to law, necessity, objectively existing; given

or found in things, not imposed on them by our mental efforts. So long will sensible men not be disturbed by this first line of argument of the critical school.

II

The supernatural is beyond the power of Nature, however you conceive that power to operate. Suppose Nature to act of itself and not merely as an instrument in God's hands, then a miracle is something which it cannot do unless it has been moved by God or some other agent acting from without. Should nature, on the other hand, be of itself merely passive; that is, capable of acting, as of existing, only as long as it is moved by God to act; then miracle is beyond the reach of any motion that He is bound to give it; of any motion, that is, which He arranged to give it when He formed the plan,—if we may say so—on which it should exist and move. Such is my theory of the supernatural.

To this M. Le Roy objects:—How can we know what does or does not exceed the powers of Nature? Who has knowledge so exhaustive? Every day brings new discoveries of things done by Nature which no one had dreamed it could do. Think of the marvels of radio-activity; of recent advances in biology, in the pathology of the nervous system, in the psychology of the unconscious. What man of science would now be so rash as to set limits to the energies of simple inorganic matter? In what must now be called old times men who deemed themselves philosophers spoke, in their jargon, of "natures," which they fancied they could define, circumscribing once for all their powers of action and development. The lesson of Evolution has been learned; no man of science ever now sets limits beyond which phenomena may not go. We find no difficulty in supposing life to have originated from inorganic matter,—that it may, perhaps, have been latent in matter from the beginning, matter being of its very essence relative to mind; so that Bartimeus may have been made to see and even Lazarus restored to life, not by any external interference on the part of God, but by "psychic tension" and "exaltation of faith" on the part of the crowd or the Son of David (Oct. pp. 12-14).

All this is not new, nor was it left to the critical school to discover. If it should be deemed worth while to criticise, in turn, what has been criticised so often, one would like to ask whether men of science have really come to believe that there are no bounds set to any of the capacities of matter; whether, for instance, they think

it possible for a body to get into motion without being moved from without, or to move out of the straight line except when attracted or pushed, or to cease to move without communicating its motion. Can gravitation fail to operate or magnets to attract? Can a great but remote star exercise as much influence on the tides as does the little moon? Can chemical and physical agents retain their structure but cease to operate as they have been wont to do? What a humbug it all is, this talk of setting no limits to the capacity of Nature. What is science but knowledge of the limits that have been set?

As for radio-activity, that was bound to come up in any modern discussion on miracles; it is too recent a discovery not to be used as a bogey to scare those who have begun to lose faith in the Schoolmen. As if they—the Schoolmen—had not some form of emission theory, to which, it would seem, we are now returning, in part, under pressure of this new radio-activity. I cannot see what reason there is to be disturbed.

These recent discoveries have made us almost sure of what was long suspected—that immense forces are at work around us, possibly in the luminiferous ether; that these forces can be harnessed to grained matter, such as molecules, atoms, and ions; that coal and gunpowder acquire their heating and exploding force from that great store of energy; and that in a five-pound-note there may be ions enough to catch as much of the ether-power as would propel the Dreadnought. Only the ions in your five-pound-note must be properly set—wherein is the difficulty. Were I sworn on a jury to try one who is accused of stealing such a piece of paper, should I hesitate to return a verdict of "Guilty" merely on the ground that it was the note, possibly, that ran away with the accused? I know enough of the nature of notes and men to be sure that such was not the case. Not that under another set the note could not gather sufficient energy to move the man; as coal, which has lain long inert in the mine, may come to move leviathans; but that, to do this, coal and note must change their structure; which unfortunately for our thief, the note may be shown not to have done. I believe that sheets of paper, while they remain paper, cannot run away with men; that gunpowder, while it retains its structure, cannot speed a bullet; that we know enough of "natures" to justify us in saying this, as also in saying that the paper or the powder has not actually ceased to be what it was; that this is the faith of all true men of science. I am not going to give up this old science for any new theory, that the law of inertia, to which I conceive

coal and paper subject, is imposed on these objects rather than given or found in them; that paper and coal are merely relative to my own mind, and therefore subject to its domination whenever it may rise to a condition of psychic tension or exalted faith.

III

I conceive miracle as an interruption of the regular course in which the material universe moves or is made to move,—a change of direction, if not an increase or diminution, of its energies. And I ask why may not such a change take place, God willing, whether the material system be conceived to move of itself or only as it is moved by God.

M. Le Roy (Oct. p. 21) smiles at the "anthropomorphisme si naif" that would make God interfere in this way, and reminds us of Auguste Comte and his age theological,—a bogey of which we formed our own notions long ago.

There is more, however; perhaps miracle is a contradiction: a question which can be resolved only by experience, not by dialectic. And there can possibly be no experience of a miracle; for has not the latest development of the critical philosophy shown that no experience is possible without an *a priori* theory to direct and unify it—to set it in its proper place in relation to other experiences? Facts are without meaning and do not exist until they have been set into a system; phenomena are linked together, correlated, conditioning one another; they constitute an organic whole, whose parts are complementary and determined one by another; otherwise they are not *given*. Whereas miracle, as you represent it, is absolute, not relative; it is self-determined, independent of other facts, which are juxtaposed but not linked to it. It is not any mere focus or centre of intersection of relations, but a pre-existent nucleus to which these relations come and by which they are borne,—a thing-in-itself juxtaposed to other things-in-themselves; something inconceivable—to any one versed in the critical philosophy (pp. 21-24, 28).

Lest we should miss the point, two Notes are added (p. 23):—(1) "Do not forget that thought is immanent to facts, the most objective of which are not things radically heterogeneous to thought." (2) "A fact gradually disengaged from all its relations vanishes, dissolves *pari passu* with the relations, and at the end there is nothing: as must be if we are not to regard separateness (morcelage) as an absolute truth."

All of which, I humbly submit, may be deemed sufficient to justify me in classing M. Le Roy among the followers of Kant.[2]

One does not know where to take this jumble. Of course it is true that every fact, of its nature, has relations—to causes, effects, surroundings; every fact, that is, with one exception, the Absolute, which, though now related, as first cause, to all other facts, need not have been so related to anything, but might have stood completely—absolutely—alone. Every other fact is related of necessity; a centre of relations, which radiate from it in all directions, round about in space, back and forward in time. How, though, does it appear that it is *composed* of those relations—a mere focus of them or centre of intersection; so that if they were to disappear it would dissolve *pari passu*. May not one abstract from the relations and regard the fact absolutely as a fact? Not, of course, if the most objective fact is not something radically heterogeneous to—does not differ in kind from—one's thought of it; but is that what you mean by history with its new scientific methods; or by the study of Nature with its object-lessons, handling, and the rest?

That, however, is psychology, a science which has been darkened by verbiage and speculation. But even though facts were mere centres of intersection of relations, what is there to show that such a centre may not be miraculous? Had not the wine made from water its cause, as also its effect; a definite position in time and space; and so on? It was not, indeed, caused like other wine; the set of the molecules of which it was composed was not the term or result of material energies acting regularly till then; there was an outside or at least an irregular—extraordinary—interference on God's part; but is not He also a possible term of relations? And why may not the miracle be deemed a fact as being in relation to Him?

Anthropomorphism! you cry; to which the believer in miracle may respond with a smile.

IV

In the November number of the *Annales* M. Le Roy discusses the question of evidence and demonstrability; with regard to which, I am happy to say, I am somewhat more in agreement with him.

Take, first, some miraculous event of the past, as to which we must depend on the witness of others; how difficult it is to feel reasonably sure that they may not have been victims of prejudice. Even

[2]Further evidence to the same effect will be submitted later on (Sect. vi).

contemporary witnesses are so unreliable; they may have seen the phenomenon, but what is it to see? To construct a theory: every observer constructs his own theory. And then their story: it is impossible, practically, to narrate the simplest occurrence without falling into explanations; so that your narrative takes and must take a tinge from your psychology. Hence the necessity, on the historian's part, of appreciating duly the mentality of the age—the sentiments, passions, desires, beliefs, of the spectators; of making allowance for contagious auto-suggestion and those involuntary impulses to which crowds are subject. Moreover, there is in the collective memory so much gradual transformation and tendency to run into legend and myth.

No doubt, all this notwithstanding, history is reliable, to some extent; but how far? At most it can establish probability; or if it ever produces certainty, this is altogether of a low grade, the intersection merely of a number of convergent probabilities, a centre of attraction where conjectures meet, explain, and support one another. In ancient history, and above all in that of the Bible, it is those links, interrelations, this adjustability to beliefs and prejudice, that weigh with us; hence pious Christians will believe almost anything of Christ or St. Peter, but nothing of Mahomet or Buddha; will not deem it worth while to pay even a little attention to the evidence of miracles said to have been performed by men like them. But whereas the ordinary events of profane history, such as deaths and battles, fit in with our expectations and so may be taken as probable; miracles, of their nature, are abnormal, unlikely, to be received with suspicion and prudent delay of assent. May there not be another explanation? And is it not common prudence to stand in all such cases by the ordinary law; unless, indeed, you can show that the miracle is not abnormal, —that, perhaps, it is in accordance with the laws of spiritual, religious, and therefore superior agents? So far M. Le Roy (pp. 167-170).

I do not care to discuss the propriety of mere terms; whether, for instance, it is probability, not certainty, that we reach by means of the testimony of others. Judges in our criminal courts are wont, in their charges to juries, to instruct them to return a verdict of "Guilty" only when they are certain of the guilt; whereby it is implied that certainty is attainable on historical evidence. The same, I fancy, applies all round, in commerce and social relations of every kind. It is in that way I suppose it possible to be certain of a miracle;

should any one prefer to call it probability, let him do so, provided only he retain the thing—the unwavering assent.

Moreover, it is no part of my contention that historical events are not believed more reasonably if they fit in with surroundings—antecedents and consequents—and in proportion to the ease with which they do so; or that the evidence for miracles is equally credible no matter how, when, or by whom they may be said to have been performed. I have no difficulty in believing on the single testimony of a friend, who says he saw it in the newspaper, that ten persons were killed last night in a railway accident somewhere; whereas if I were told that ten lions or kangaroos were shot in a battue at Galway, very strong suspicion would be at once awakened. I do not think it worth while to look up the evidence for the miracles ascribed to Mahomet or Buddha, because the acts as well as the antecedents and consequents of these men make it so improbable that they ever wrought miracles, as to justify, in my opinion, a demand for much greater evidence than any one pretends to supply. Of their very nature miracles are abnormal, irregular, objects of suspicion; unless, perhaps, the whole series of phenomena into which they are set should itself prove abnormal, wonderful, such as nought else but miracles may explain or befit. That is why I am wont to attach so much importance to the extraordinary development of religion among the Jewish people from the time of Abraham to the prophecies that foretold the advent of the Messiah, His character, and the extent and quality of His kingdom; to the character of Christ, the works that are ascribed to Him, and the nature of His Gospel; to the sort of men whom He chose His apostles and their effect on the world down to the present day. Miracles are abnormal, but may they not also be con-natural,—normal, that is, to a series of events which are all abnormal? May they not fit into such a series; not, perhaps, as demanded, but as becoming; as explaining in what seems the most natural way what is otherwise almost if not quite inexplicable?

M. Le Roy should be the last to object to this way of appreciating evidence, seeing that he himself lays so much emphasis on the teaching of the critical school, that facts are given and have meaning according as they fit into, supplement, and support one another. To him also miracles are not so very abnormal; how he makes this out we shall see as we proceed. I will merely add here that I quite agree with him as to the possibility of auto-suggestion and other forms of nervous influence, the impulses to which crowds are subject, and the tendency

of primitive history to run into legend and myth. In dealing with supernatural phenomena alleged in support of, or at least found in connection with, Mahometanism, Buddhism, and other forms of religion, all theologians throw out similar suggestions. If they refuse to allow the miracles of Christ to be explained away similarly, it is not, I fancy, from lack of consistency, but because they are influenced, consciously or subconsciously, by the principles of criticism so ably set forth by M. Le Roy; that the value of evidence for facts depends so much upon the setting—the intersection—of relations. It is the principle on which advocates are wont to proceed when they make out motives for a crime, or the reverse; thus setting the fact into, or out of, relation with the antecedent and subsequent acts of the accused. That the principle is valuable is no reason for pushing it to extremes.

V

In the latter part of his second article (Nov. pp. 173-191), M. Le Roy goes over practically the old ground, quoting and pressing home the arguments of M. Anatole France, which, as they have been already given in substance, need not be repeated. The only new suggestion is that, perhaps, miracle is the natural, though not the ordinary, effect of spirit on matter. This is worked out in accordance with the philosophy of M. Bergson—of which more anon; it is a protest against the domination in science of what M. Le Roy calls mechanism or determinism.

Since the time of Newton and Descartes, he argues, theologians and men of science alike have been slaves of definitions. They define matter as something that has weight, and are thereby forced to the belief that every body is of necessity subject to gravity; whereas the laws of gravitation are at best but general formulæ, not absolute necessities whether of thought or of objective reality. "M. Bergson has told us of certain spontaneous symbols, of utilitarian origin, which misrepresent the real, but with which, for all that, it would be wrong for us to dispense, save in the exceptional case in which we speculate on the inmost nature of action, that is to say, in the theory of liberty." Perhaps miracle is something analogous. Free-will is irreconcilable with the symbols or formulæ in which what we call general laws are expressed; yet free-will is a fact. Similarly, perhaps miracle would present no difficulty if it were acknowledged that Nature is not an absolute mechanism which does not admit of exceptions.

By considerations such as these M. Le Roy satisfies himself of the futility of the method whereby theologians have been wont to prove by miracles the truth of the Christian religion. I note, however, that he supposes throughout that the method of apologetics in vogue pretends to supply what he calls scientific proof; by which he means absolute evidence (p. 188), proof irrefragable (p. 189), such as compels assent, engendering faith *ex opere operato* (p. 237) and leaving no room for liberty in the process (p. 187). As against this, what he would have us seek is "moral certainty, an essential requirement of which is moral liberty" (pp. 182, 255); thereby implying—what, indeed, as we have seen, has been repeatedly stated in formal terms—that it is not moral but some form of compulsory certainty that is sought by theologians ordinarily. They do not, of course, avow this purpose in so many words, but they entertain it all the same (p. 187).

This very grave accusation is not supported by a tittle of evidence other than the assumption that scientific proof leaves no room for freedom. As if the authenticity of texts and the credibility of witnesses were questions for science alone; and as if laboratory experiment and even mathematical speculation were not prolific of rash conclusions. If M. Le Roy would think out how a conclusion may be rash, yet leave no room for liberty, perhaps he would have more respect for the method of apologetics which he condemns.

As to this aspect of the question,—which might be said to be fundamental if M. Le Roy had not, as we shall see, gone still deeper,—we cannot be content with mere assertion or declamation, from him or any one else. Let us see the proofs. Why may one not be justified in regarding a miraculous interference as warrant for the truth of a certain doctrine? Why, I say, may not this be regarded as proved, not to demonstration so as to compel assent, but to the satisfaction of a prudent man; so that the prudent will accept it, the imprudent reject it, both being capable of either accepting or rejecting? Is not freedom in this sense characteristic of prudence as distinguished from science? Do jurymen, for instance, never return a verdict of "Guilty" unless when they are compelled to do so by the evidence? This does not imply, as M. Le Roy supposes (p. 187), that the evidence for a miracle cannot be rejected except in bad faith. It cannot be rejected without imprudence whenever it is sufficient to make acceptance prudent—for the man who rejects it; where this is not so, it may well be deemed a duty not to accept.

M. Le Roy himself, as we have seen, insists that it is only moral certainty that can be generated by evidence such as that for miracles; but his idea of moral certainty, I fear, is not the same as mine. By moral certainty I understand that which justifies assent in practical matters, as when a juryman is called upon to return a verdict of "Guilty." To Mr. Le Roy, I fancy, it means certainty acquired by what he calls (p. 234) moral proofs; which, as he gives us to understand, are those only which appeal to the will or the heart:—"Aucune condition morale ne serait requise, aucune bonne volonté! L'action divine serait là sous notre main comme une chose. Ce ne serait plus Dieu sensible au cœur, mais Dieu sensible aux appareils de laboratoire!...[Un miracle] est un fait *religieux*. Il doit donc supposer des conditions religieuses pour se produire et pour être perçu. En d'autres termes il n'y a de miracle que par et pour la foi, sinon la foi entière, au moins une foi naissante" (pp. 182 -3). I am rationalist enough to deny the right of any man to assent, on mere heart or will motives, to any proposition which he does not *see* to be prudently credible at least.

Here again, perhaps, it may be to some extent a question of terms; very possibly M. Le Roy thinks he sees with his heart or will. My terminology is different; and I suspect it is a question of more than terminology. In the spiritual matters with which faith deals, what we see by I call reason or intellect; with the heart or will we can but love the good which we see.

VI

Having exhausted criticism in his first two articles, in the third (December) M. Le Roy essays the work of construction. He believes not only in the possibility but in the actuality and in the apologetic value of miracles; though his notions on these matters are not those of modern theology, to say the least.

Distinguishing between matter and form in the miraculous, he defines the matter as a sense phenomenon which both astonishes by its unusual character and may not be repeated at will. It is not in any strict sense a violation of law, for in reality there is no such thing as a law of Nature; it is a breach of custom merely, and, as such, may not become an art or be repeated at will.

How is the breach of custom effected? By the action on matter of spirit raised to an unusually high degree of psychic tension (p. 242).

For matter exists only in relation to spirit. Not that it is a mental delusion; it is a product of spirit, which turns on its producer, subjecting it to the customs and mechanical arrangements which we call laws of Nature. Under a certain aspect matter may even be regarded as interspiritual,—a group, that is, of hereditary or traditional customs and dead weight of the past pressing on the race. In certain states of exaltation the spirit bursts its bonds, resuming its self-control as also its power over matter, which, while the exaltation lasts, may be and is fashioned by the spirit as it wills. This exercise of control over matter is not so much a breach of law as the original birth-right of the spirit; so that it is not the resumption of the right but its limitation—in the ordinary condition of the spirit—that needs to be explained. Nor is it by miracles only that spirits manifest this native control over matter, but also by strokes of genius, subconscious activity, and the phenomena that are wont to accompany what we call abnormal states. Among these the miraculous is conspicuous only by its eminence (pp. 238-242, 245).

All this might seem at first sight to take from the value of miracle as proof of the truth of a doctrine; for if power over matter is the natural or native endowment of spirit, the restoration of sight or even the raising of the dead must be regarded as a purely natural phenomenon—natural, that is, to spirits that have been raised to this high degree of tension.

The reply of M. Le Roy, if I understand him rightly—for his language in this connection is somewhat more nebulous than usual—is, that the proof lies not in the miracle so much as in the faith by which it is invariably accompanied and conditioned; faith being always supernatural and requiring the co-operation of divine grace.

This reply might be deemed satisfactory if only we had means of discerning the true miracle, accompanied and conditioned by supernatural faith, from the mere stroke of genius or the marvel, which, perhaps, may result from superstition. For it is not true faith alone, as we have seen, that raises spirit to that state of tension in which it resumes its native control over matter. We are assured, moreover (p. 249), that the control may result from faith of any kind, even illusory, provided only it reaches a certain pitch of intensity. Of course it is open to you to say, as M. Le Roy does, on reflection (*Ibid.* Note 2), that no faith that rises to the requisite pitch of intensity can be quite illusory; that all religions are true under one aspect or another. The obvious reply is: seeing that the power of a spirit over matter is restored

whenever and however the spirit comes to act with special intensity, how am I to know that it is in pursuit of truth alone that the requisite degree of intensity can be reached? Is not religious history full of intense pursuit of illusions?

M. Le Roy suggests, finally (p. 254), that it is open to us to fall back on tests similar to those employed by the Church in the canonisation of saints: the moral results and the circumstances of the miracle; how it fits in with the religious system of which we may be already convinced. For all men are plunged from birth into a current of revelation and grace, which each may follow or resist, but which no one ever initiated. Each, accordingly, has his own religious tradition, whereby he unconsciously tests any event that may claim to be miraculous; that being adjudged the truest miracle which adapts itself to the tradition which is most durable and most conducive to religious progress. And considering the wonderful development of the religion first practised in Judea, with its incomparable effect on morals, its riches, vital force, spiritual efficacy, ever-growing purity and beneficence, who can doubt that the faith from which it sprung is the truest and best—the freest from illusion because most adapted to the inmost needs or nature of man; and that the control over matter with which it endowed and still endows his spirit, is not merely marvelous but supernatural and truly divine? (p. 256).

The gist of which is, as M. Le Roy confesses (pp. 257-8), that it is not doctrine which is proved by miracle so much as it is miracle that is proved by doctrine; which does not take us very far on the way of apologetics. Not as if the immoral or irreligious character of a doctrine may not serve as a negative test; God cannot interfere supernaturally to work out untruth or iniquity. That is how the test is applied by the Church in the process of canonisation: to determine what is not genuine sanctity rather than what is. M. Le Roy would make it a test positive, judging that faith to be most true which manifests in its working the most perfect conformity with the nature, the law, and the needs of the spirit (p. 256)[3]; so that, to prove that God became man, let us say, it would suffice to show that the doctrine of the Incarnation is calculated to inspire us with a high sense of religion, and has done so wherever it has been believed with lively faith.

[3]There is a well-known aspect under which the sublimity of the Christian faith is regarded as a test positive—as something which could not result, in the circumstances, by way of development, from the play of the natural forces at work. If this were what M. Le Roy meant, it would not call for special comment.

I believe all that and more of the Incarnation, regarded as a possibility; but, unfortunately, I cannot deem it sufficient proof of the fact—that God actually became man. Moreover, as I read in the Bible of the Resurrection of Christ and the purpose which it was made by the apostles to serve, I am forced to the conviction that the miracle was used to prove the reality of His divine mission and the truth of His doctrine, not the reverse. No doubt, faith was required, and a supernatural exercise of free-will; but in this connection may not faith mean, not so much actual belief, as a habit or tendency to believe on reasonable grounds, such as in this case were supplied by the miracles; not so, however, as to force conviction on those who, through cowardice or some other passion, were unwilling to assent?

VII

It is, however, in his doctrine as to the relation between matter and spirit that M. Le Roy is most vulnerable. Is it true that "matter is a reality only in relation to spirit;" that it "does not exist independently of spirit;" that it is merely a law of action, or the "fact that the spirit acts and lives only by contracting habits and setting up mechanisms," whose inertia presses on it and tends to drag it along; that "it is our subconscious activity which has constructed our bodies;" and that these—our bodies—"are in reality the entire universe, the visible organism being for each one merely the region of least unconsciousness?" No wonder, if all this were so, that the spirit should be able to work miracles, within its own body and without—if there is to be such distinction, which M. Le Roy denounces as *morcelage*. But is religion likely to gain by fantasies such as these?

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A PLEA FOR A MORE COMPREHENSIVE DEFINITION OF THE CHURCH

David Barry, S. T. L.

A good deal of the misrepresentation that the Catholic doctrine of exclusive salvation has suffered at the hands of non-Catholics, as well as the domestic confusion that prevails amongst ourselves as to whether certain classes, e. g. occult heretics, belong to the Catholic body, is to be set down, to a large extent, in my opinion, to the inadequate, one-sided definition of the Church that has been widely accepted in our schools since the time of the Reformation. It is of importance then to consider this definition, not only for the purpose of securing scientific accuracy in the Church tract, but for the purpose also of removing the reproach of bigotry and intolerance which a misapprehension of our position is so apt to provoke in these days of much vaunted Liberalism and broad-minded tolerance.

I

The definition of the Church that I have alluded to, that is, of the kingdom of heaven that Christ founded on earth, owes its origin to Bellarmine and is in substance as follows:

"The congregation of men who are united by the profession of the same Christian faith, by participation in the same sacraments, and by obedience to the Vicar of Christ on earth, the Roman Pontiff."[1]

Now, before criticising this definition, it may be well to remark that the organization and shape of every society are determined, in their general characteristics, by the special end that the society is destined to compass; and so it is that a steamship company is of necessity very differently equipped from a railway company, and a banking concern from either. But it is obvious that this is true only in a general way, and many societies, having exactly the same ends, are designed to attain them by means that differ vitally in detail. It is this divergence in detail that gives each society its specific character;

[1]Bellarmine, *De Eccl.* L. 3, c. 2. It is adopted by Billuart, vol. 7, d. iii, a. 1; Murray, *De Eccl.* d. II, s. iii; Mazzella, etc. It is also I think the prevalent one among the ordinary faithful, as it is found in catechisms and works of instruction, e. g. Maynooth catechism, Butler's catechism, *Companion to the Catechism*, etc.

and it is this diversity in unity that renders possible the varied and beautiful organization of the great human family.

In the same way, the Christian Church and the Jewish, having the same end—the supernatural salvation of their members—, the essential means at the disposal of both, viz.—sanctifying grace—must necessarily be the same. But the means of obtaining grace in each is very different, owing to the fact that in the one case they are meant to remind us of the benefits actually conferred by the Redeemer, and in the other they were meant to stimulate faith in the Messiah to come. And it is this special equipment for the sanctification of souls, which it possesses, that differentiates the Catholic Church from its Jewish prototype as well as from the minor societies within its own fold, whose aim, as far as their members are concerned, is identical with that of the parent society itself.

From what I have said, it is clear that an adequate conception of any society postulates a knowledge both of the end that it is proposed to attain, and also of the means that are considered most suitable for its achievement, the first being in the language of logicians the *genus proximum* and the second the *differentia ultima*. Neither of these considerations can be excluded from our purview in considering the character of a particular society, and in a properly formulated definition of it, it is essential to mention both.

Now, in the definition I have given above, the characteristic features of the Catholic Church are particularised with tolerable accuracy; though, even from this point of view, the definition is not unexceptionable, for Sanctity, which is one of the most striking features even of the external Church, and, as such, is assigned to it both in the Apostle's and the Nicene creeds, is not included. In it, however, we have expressed the threefold bond by which Catholics are united, viz.—the bond of the profession of the same faith, the bond of one worship, and the bond of submission to the same supreme authority, and these sufficiently discriminate it from all other societies that claimed in the past, or now claim the same divine mission; in a word, therefore, we have expressed in this definition the *differentia ultima* of the Church. We have also the *genus remotum* given, namely that it is a congregation of men, to put us on our guard, no doubt, against confounding it with the Church Suffering or the Church Triumphant. But, strange to say (and this is the burden of my complaint against the definition) the *genus proximum* is entirely ignored; in other words, the community of end that the Catholic Church has with every other church of legiti-

mate institution, such as the Mosaic and pre-Mosaic and the national churches of the New Dispensation. This common end is the acquiring for its members of the grace of God. And its omission from the definition is to be deprecated, not so much as a technical defect, but because it is responsible for the fact that what is known as the soul of the Church, and those persons who belong to the soul exclusively, are lost sight of, and membership is made co-existent with the threefold bond that Catholics possess. The visible element of the Church is brought out very clearly, but not I think without some prejudice to its invisible, supernatural principle. It is as misleading, in fact, as to say merely, in defining a man, that he is a body with a certain characteristic configuration.

The true being of the Church consists both in its external characteristics and its unseen life, but in the Church as everywhere else it is the spirit that vivifies. "Omnis gloria ejus filii regis ab intus." The beautiful external organization of the Church indeed is one of the greatest gifts that Christ has left us. It is a beacon—a lighthouse—beckoning the poor traveler, tossed about by every wind of doctrine, to the harbor of salvation—the hospitable, all-embracing city seated on the rock, round which the waves of error and heresy spend their strength in vain. But it is, after all, only ancillary and complementary to the inner spiritual life of the Church which is the pursuit and possession of sanctifying grace.

The body is the channel by which grace is poured copiously into the soul, and the soul in turn permeates, as it were, the body, and by its divine effulgence begets one of the notes of the visible Church—its pre-eminent sanctity. The connection then between the body and soul being so intimate, it is no matter for wonder that a definition, aiming at giving the characteristics of the body merely, should be inadequate, even from this point of view; and in fact, as I remarked already, the great note of sanctity is entirely absent from the definition.

The external ministrations of the Church were with Christ only a means to an end; the end was the begetting in all men of the divine life of grace; and hence it is that the Church is so often referred to in the New Testament as the Kingdom of heaven, for there is an intrinsic and necessary connection between the participation of the divine nature that the just are blessed with here, and the eternal possession of God that we hope for in heaven. The existence then of a a true kingdom of heaven on earth was the end our Lord had in view when He founded the Church, and the means—the external profession of one

faith and of one worship, and the bond of a common obedience—are merely wonderful contrivances of divine condescension to the waywardness and fickleness of fallen human nature.

From these considerations it follows at once that a definition ignoring the soul of the Church, and concentrating all our attention on the body, cannot be accepted. It follows also that a person having sanctifying grace, even though he has not acquired it through the ordinary means, has an indefeasible right to membership with the Church. The special privations and hardships incidental to his case, instead of being a disability, will but give him a more honored place in the mystic body, and a closer connection with Christ its head, just as "the servant who knoweth the will of the Master and does not do it, will get double stripes." It is, of course, quite true that the number of those who obtain grace without the assistance of the visible Church is much smaller than the number of those who obtain it by availing of the ordinary means, but that *some* are saved outside the Catholic fold by the uncovenanted mercies of Christ was never denied, and certainly is in complete harmony with the belief of the Church at present. But still, in the definition that we have under consideration, their existence is ignored, and indeed positively denied, when taken in connection with the doctrine of exclusive salvation in the Church.

Though these are aliens and children of the bondwoman, still by their virtues and obedience they put to shame some of the children of the household—some of those who have been nourished at the bosom of the external Church. They are only like the wild olive grafted on the vine tree; but they cannot bring forth fruit except through the vivifying sap that flows from the Divine Head and permeates His mystical body, for no one can have God for his Father who has not the Spouse of God—the Church—for his mother.

II

The far-reaching importance of including its invisible element in our concept of the Church is shown by several utterances of Pope Pius IX, notably, where he says in the Bull *Ineffabilis Deus* that a person, who *in his heart* does not admit the dogma of the Immaculate Conception of the Blessed Virgin, has fallen away from the unity of the Church and has forfeited membership with it; and yet such a person may possess the threefold bond that is the test of membership according to Bellarmine.

Again, the same Pontiff[2] condemned the doctrine that salvation is possible outside the Church. This shows, unequivocally, that the external profession of Catholicity is not essential to union with the Church, because no one, having any knowledge at all of our views, would suggest that the Pope meant to convey that none but professing Catholics could be saved.

The Fathers of the Church bear testimony to the same effect, as appears from the fact that they used to compare the Church to the Ark, thereby asserting in the most striking way the absolute necessity of membership with it. And inasmuch as the view is altogether unwarranted that Christian theology, even in its most rudimentary stages of development,[3] limited salvation to those who are in external conformity with the Church, it is obvious that these Fathers taught that real, true membership is quite compatible with material contumacy to ecclesiastical authority.

"Extra Ecclesiam nulla salus" is a hallowed axiom of antiquity, and those who do anything to restrict our notion of the Church to the external body tarnish the honor due to the Church by the suggestion that some of the children of God, perhaps a considerable proportion of them, are outside it.

The inexpedience of confusing the Church with what is merely its externals is also clear from a consideration of the Catholic doctrine that God gives to everyone, except through his own default, sufficient grace to be saved. For it is obvious that many who have followed the glimmering of reason in pagan lands, where the Christian missionary has never penetrated, cannot be brought into the external pale of the Church, and can be reached indeed only by the interior inspiration that St. Thomas supposes in such cases.

III

In fact, until the time of Bellarmine the Church was never identified with the external body; why it was so then can be explained I think by a phenomenon common enough in theological controversy. In some cases when doctrines are assailed, the champions of orthodoxy, actuated principally by a laudable zeal to defend the doctrine,

[2]Cf. Conc. Lat. IV, Cap. i: "Una est fidelium universalis Ecclesia, extra quam nullus omnino salvatur."

[3]See Clement of Alexandria and Justin Martyr apud Fessler-Jungmann, *Patrology*, I. 228. St. Justin is almost too optimistic as to the prospects of salvation for the heathen. See also St. Augustine apud Walsh's *Saved and Lost*, p. 150.

but no doubt, to some extent too, by the natural spirit of obstinacy aroused by contradiction, take up a rather extreme position. Even those who are defending the right sometimes lose their sense of perspective in the exigencies of controversy, and are inclined to give an undue importance in the economy of salvation to the doctrine that has been called in question. In the case of Manichaeism, for instance, an intemperate presentment of the true doctrine developed into Pelagianism,[4] and the extreme opponents of Nestorianism became Eutychians; and more recently, many would say that extreme opposition to the Reformers' theories of Grace has occasioned a recrudescence of Pelagianism.

If controversy subserves the ends of faith by developing doctrine, it is detrimental to them in this, that it tends to make us ignore the residuum of truth in the adversary's system. Of course, in the case of obedient Catholics, the Infallibility of the Church is a sure touchstone by which they can test whether the views they hold are of sterling worth, and to be persevered in, or a base counterfeit—mere dross, and to be summarily abandoned; but even in their case, when the smoke of battle has cleared away, it will be found, not infrequently, that in their zeal to take up the strongest and most uncompromising position, they have shifted somewhat the theological centre of gravity.

This propensity sufficiently explains the great stress that is laid on the visible element in the Church in the definition of Bellarmine—a prominence which is apt to give a superficial observer a distorted and inadequate idea of our doctrine. This definition admirably served its purpose at a time of difficulty and doubt, but now, when there is no danger of misconception as to the importance we attach to union with the visible Church, I think it would be of advantage to give more prominence to the soul of the Church.

IV

Hence I would suggest some such definition as the following—the Church consists of those, still in this life, who are in the state of grace, and of those who are trying to obtain it through the ordinary means appointed by Christ.

In this definition the note of sanctity is brought out prominently; the existence of a true kingdom of heaven on earth is made the keystone of the entire ecclesiastical structure. It gives the soul of the

[4]Pesch, *De Gratia*, n. 73.

Church, as the dominant element, its true place of consequence, without compromising the importance of the body, or minimising the necessity for union with it, as being the divinely appointed, and in ordinary circumstances, the only possible medium of participation in the life of the Church; and herein consists one element of the vital and organic connection of the body and soul. It cannot be insisted on too often that the importance of the external bonds is not derived from anything intrinsic to themselves, but from their adaptability as means of grace, without which they would be nothing but weak and beggarly elements.

This definition includes all children of God—all those who worship Him in spirit and truth according to their lights—as well those who are not Catholics, as those who are; and the right of all these to be included I have endeavored to vindicate already.

It also includes Catholics who are not in the state of grace, and for the reason that though they are not actually in union with the soul, they are nevertheless *in via salutis*; they have so many opportunities of being united to it, that nothing but a deep-rooted obstinacy can defeat the divine beneficence in their regard. Being amenable to the sacred influences of the external Church, there is incomparably greater hope of their getting an acceptable time and a day of salvation, than those who are denied access to the copious channels of grace that lead to union with the soul of the Church, and who have but as little chance of escaping the destroyer of souls as the ears of corn to escape the reapers or the grapes to remain on the vine after a careful vintage. For a similar reason, occult heretics, i. e. those who have lost the faith, and are Catholics merely in external profession, cannot be said to belong to the Church.

Such a definition, I believe, would explain away our seeming irreconcilability, it would conciliate a hearing for us with those who are repelled by a false view of the doctrine of exclusive salvation in the Church; it would, moreover, be a continual reminder for ourselves, that the threefold bond of union with the external Church will avail us nothing if we be not joined in a closer and more organic union with Christ, her head.

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CONSTANTIUS AND ATHANASIUS

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At the death of Constantine the Great[1] (May 22, 337) the Arian party, under the able but unscrupulous leadership of Eusebius of Nicomedia, stood in the position of victors over the exiled defenders of orthodoxy. Eusebius himself, very probably, had had the honor of baptizing the dying Emperor in his episcopal city of Nicomedia. By the will of Constantine the Empire was to be partitioned between his three sons and two nephews; would it be possible for the court ecclesiastics to maintain their ascendency in the Empire thus subdivided? But again fortune favored them. The assassination of Dalmatius and Annibalianus, the nephews of Constantine, necessitated a new division of the Empire between his three sons, and in this division the Orient remained to Constantius, who very soon espoused the Arian cause.

Constantius, second of the surviving sons of Constantine, seems to have been the favorite of his father. Like his father he ascended the throne in early manhood. In some less important points of character also he bore a certain resemblance to the young Constantine of a quarter of a century before. But Constantius possessed none of the great qualities of the daring fugitive who fled from the court of a suspicious tyrant to begin the long contest which ended in his triumph over all his foes. The beginnings of Constantius were very different. The suspicion of having been privy to the plots which, immediately after the interment of his father, resulted in the death of his cousins Dalmatius and Annibalianus, of his uncle Julius Constantius and several other relatives, rests on his memory. He inherited his father's taste for military exercises but not his talent for generalship. His character wanted in decision, and he was easily influenced by the class of flatterers who thrive in the atmosphere of a court. Like his father he had some pretensions to oratorical ability, and he also inherited the paternal taste for theological controversy which was to be so fruitful of discord during his reign.

Such was the man with whom the clever Eusebians had to deal: they must have rejoiced at their good fortune. Heretical Bishops

[1]See "Constantine the Great and the Church" in the *Catholic University Bulletin*, Jan. 1906.

who for years had been able to keep in the good graces of the orthodox Constantine, and drive the defenders of the Nicene faith into exile, would find the task of leading Constantius the merest child's play.

The opening of the new reigns did not, however, give promise of a continuance of the triumph which the Eusebian party had long enjoyed. A month after the death of his father (June, 337), Constantine II. sent Athanasius back to Alexandria with a letter to his flock in which he characterized the Eusebians as the savage and bloodthirsty enemies of their Bishop.[2] Later on also it was decided at a meeting of the three Emperors, that all the exiled Bishops should be restored to their sees.

These significant acts were not at all calculated to reassure the Eusebians, whose only hope of success lay in the support of the civil authorities. It was all important, therefore, from their point of view, to secure the aid of the Emperor of the Orient, the young Constantius. In this they experienced little difficulty. A valuable ally presented himself in the person of the mysterious Arian priest who had already exercised so great influence over the wife of Licinius, Constantia, and subsequently over Constantine himself. So great, indeed, was the late Emperor's confidence in this personage that he entrusted him with his will which he was to deliver to Constantius. The fulfilment of a charge so important and confidential at once secured him the favor of the new Emperor, and he employed his influence to win Constantius, the Empress, and the all powerful chamberlain, the eunuch Eusebius, to the side of the Arians. The arguments which had convinced Constantine were equally strong in his son's eyes: Athanasius and his party were blindly obstinate, and the existing troubles of the Church were wholly attributable to their retention of the term consubstantial.[3]

After this preliminary success the campaign opened agatsni Athanasius, who personified the Nicene doctrine. The old accusations on which he had already been exiled were furbished up, and a new one, that of taking possession of his see without an ecclesiastical decision, brought forward. These charges were laid before the three Emperors. Realizing also the importance of having the Roman Church on their side the Eusebians sent an embassy to Rome to obtain recognition for the recently appointed Arian Bishop of Alexandria,

[2] *Apol. contra Arian.* c. 87.

[3] Theodoret, *Hist. Eccl.* II, 2; Socrates, *Hist. Eccl.* II, 2; Sozomen, *Hist. Eccl,* III, 1.

Pistus, and to deliver to Pope Julius the acts of the Mareotic investigation. But Roman procedure differed from oriental in that an accused person was not condemned unheard. The Pope, to the discomfiture of the indignant Eusebians, communicated the Mareotic acts to Athanasius who thus for the first time learned their contents. The Bishop of Alexandria took immediate steps to defend himself. At his call a hundred Bishops of Egypt, Libya, Thebes and Pentapolis assembled in Alexandria, and these, in a letter addressed "to the Bishops of the Catholic Church everywhere," completely disproved the accusations against their Patriarch.

From this letter we learn that the orthodox members of the Eastern hierarchy were already fully alive to the dangers of a union which would make the Church the slave of the State. Referring to the procedure at the synod of Tyre, the Egyptian Bishops say: "How can they have the boldness to call that a council at which a Count presided, which an executioner attended, and where an usher, instead of the deacons of the Church, introduced us into court; and where the Count only spoke and all present held their peace, or rather obeyed his directions?" The Eusebians directed the proceedings and the Count carried out their wishes; failure to acquiesce in their decisions was liable to the punishment of exile or death.[4]

To meet his accusers face to face Athanasius despatched two embassies, one to refute the charges presented to Constantine II and Constans, and one to Rome. Both were completely successful. The Emperors drove his calumniators "with shame" from their presence, while at Rome so easily were the Eusebian envoys confounded that, to gain time, they were compelled to ask Pope Julius to convene a synod at which both parties would appear. The Pope took them at their word, and wrote to Athanasius and his opponents inviting them to attend a synod at a time and place which they were left to choose.

But the Eusebians had no intention of submitting their case to an impartial synod. A synod of their own members, on the contrary, met at Constantinople in the year 339 and deposed Paul, the orthodox Bishop of the Eastern capital. This gave the ambitious Eusebius of Nicomedia a long wished for opportunity; for the second time, against the strict prohibition of the canons, he changed his see and became Bishop of Constantinople. About this time the historian Eusebius of Cæsarea, who belonged to the party of his namesake of Nicomedia, died and was succeeded by the Arian Acacius. Athana-

[4] *Apol. contra Arian.* c. 8.

sius, shortly before this date, probably, had been deposed by the Eusebians, in a synod at Antioch, and Gregory of Cappadocia, an embezzler and fugitive from justice, was appointed in his place.[5] Evidently this strange selection is attributable to the need in the circumstances of a man devoid of scruples and ready to adopt any measures that would lead to success. Gregory did not disappoint expectations. This Bishop "from the court" signalized his entrance to Alexandria, in company with the apostate Prefect Philagrius, by a series of violent outrages.[6] But before these events Athanasius, in response to the invitation of Pope Julius, had left for Rome, where he arrived about Easter 339. Several other deposed Eastern Bishops, victims of Arian outrages, had also come to Rome to participate in the council, but none of the Eusebians appeared.

Notwithstanding this tacit admission on the part of the accusers of Athanasius that they could not successfully defend their acts before impartial judges, the Pope sent two of his priests, Elpidius and Philoxenus, to invite them personally to Rome. But after detaining the legates at Antioch a considerable time they sent them away with a letter to Julius which reveals the growing arrogance of the Eastern Church in its relations with the West. The Council of Tyre, they maintained, settled once and for all the case of Athanasius, yet the Pope preferred communion with him to communion with them. Moreover, they affirmed, forgetting that they had themselves asked the Pope's intervention, all Bishops have equal authority, and this authority does not depend on the civil importance of their sees. Finally, the time set for the Roman council was too near, and on account of the Persian war they were unable to leave their homes.[7]

This letter was written about the beginning of the year 340, and in October or November of the same year the Roman council took place without the Eusebians. The fathers of the council, after an examination of the testimony against Athanasius and another deposed Bishop, Marcellus, decided that the charges against them were unfounded and both were restored to communion. This decision was communicated to the Eusebians by Pope Julius in a letter remarkable for its calm dignity, in contrast with the impertinent epistle in which the chiefs of the Eastern party declined to attend the Roman assembly.

[5] *Hist. Arian.* c. 75; *Epist. Encyc.* c. 2; *Apol.* 19, 30.
[6] *Epist. Encyc.* c. 3.
[7] *S. Athan. Apol.* c. 25.

The reply to the letter of Pope Julius was drawn up at a synod of 97 Eastern Bishops held at Antioch between May and September 341, the so called Dedication Synod (*in encoeniis*). Most of the Bishops composing this assemblage were orthodox, and hence the majority of the canons then enacted were in after ages held in the greatest respect. But while the Eusebians were in the minority their influence was sufficient to have two canons adopted which were especially aimed at Athanasius. The first of these (canon 4) decreed that a Bishop deposed by a synod who should afterwards presume to perform any function of his office could no longer hope to be reinstated; those who continued to hold communion with such a person incurred the penalty of excommunication. The other canon (12) prescribed that if a Bishop deposed by a synod should appeal to the civil power for restoration, instead of to a higher synod, he thereby lost all right of appeal forever. This legislation, good in itself, was based on older canons, but its revival in the present instance bears the ear-marks of special legislation. Athanasius had appealed to Constantine the Great when no hope of obtaining justice from the iniquitous synod of Tyre remained, and he had returned from Treves to Alexandria after the death of this Emperor without asking leave of the Eusebians. Therefore his case was settled forever, in the oriental view, by these two canons of the synod of Antioch. And not only this, but the Pope and the other Western Bishops who held communion with him were excommunicated.

The inconsistency of the Eusebians in forbidding appeals to the civil power, by means of which they had long maintained their ascendency, is of course obvious. Knowing that they could expect no aid from the imperial authorities in the West they had refused to attend the Roman synod, which their representatives had demanded; and now in the East they disposed of the whole question at issue in the one-sided manner to which they had grown accustomed. The Bishops concluded their labors at Antioch by the formulation of four creeds, which protested against Arianism but omitted the term ὁμοούσιος.

Shortly after the synod of Antioch, Eusebius of Constantinople (formerly of Nicomedia) died. Taking advantage of the vacancy, the orthodox of the capital at once recalled and reinstated the exiled Bishop Paul, while the Arians elected Macedonius. Constantius was then at Antioch, and, on hearing of the troubles that followed the double election, he commissioned the General Hermogenes to expel Paul. But the imperial emissary was unable to carry out his orders

and lost his life in a popular outbreak. This brought the Emperor himself to the capital; Paul was banished and the people were punished by deprivation of part of their food allowance.[8] Some time later Paul again returned to Constantinople, and was a second time banished, after which Macedonius was enthroned by force as Bishop of Constantinople.

In the civil war between Constantine II and Constans the former lost his life at Aquileia (341), and thus Constans remained sole ruler in the West. Realizing the value of his support, the Eusebians, after the synod of Antioch, sent four delegates to this Emperor to secure his approval of one of their newly made creeds. But Constans was friendly to Athanasius, and their mission failed. However, at the suggestion of Pope Julius, Hosius of Cordova and Maximin of Treves, the Western Emperor arranged with his brother for the convocation of a general council of the Bishops of the Empire for the settlement of all questions in dispute between the East and the West. The place selected for the council was Sardica, (Sophia in Bulgaria) and the time of its meeting the Summer or Autumn of 343.

The East was represented in the council by about 76 Bishops, the West by 94, making a total of 170. Two papal legates, Archidamus and Philoxenus, were present; Hosius of Cordova acted as president.

The Orientals quickly realized that they were in a minority and therefore that things were not likely to go as they desired. To offset this serious disadvantage they proposed that Athanasius, Marcellus of Ancyra and other deposed Bishops should be regarded as excommunicated, and not allowed to take part in the proceedings, on the ground that their participation would be disrespectful to the Eastern synods and against the canons. The Western Bishops, however, rejected this proposal. The Eusebians next proposed that a new commission of enquiry, composed of representatives of both parties, should proceed to Mareotis to make a new investigation of the accusations against Athanasius. This, like the previous proposal, was of course a transparent attempt to obtain an excuse for withdrawal. The acts of the former investigation, as well as five of the six Bishops who made it, were present at Sardica; but the commissioners refused to disprove before an oecumenical council, the charge of Athanasius that these acts were not impartial. A new investigation would cause months of delay and compel the Western Bishops to

[8]Soc. *H. E.* II, 12, 13; *H. E.* III, 7.

return to their dioceses, which was just what the Eusebians wanted. Yet, while rejecting this unreasonable demand, Hosius made every possible effort to induce the Eastern Bishops to sit in the Synod. In a letter to the Emperor Constantius on this subject he says: "When the enemies of Athanasius came to me in the church, where I generally was, I requested them to bring forward their proofs against Athanasius, and promised them all possible security and justice, observing that in case they did not bring their proofs before the whole synod, they should at least communicate them to me alone. I even added a promise that if Athanasius was proved guilty, he should be rejected by us all; but if he were innocent and could convict them of slander, and still they would not hold communion with him, I would induce him to travel with me to Spain."[9] This extraordinary compromise was accepted by Athanasius, but the Eusebians rejected it. Flight was now their only resort to escape conviction as malicious slanderers, and accordingly they left Sardica at night, leaving word that Constantius had sent them news of his victory over the Persians, which made their immediate departure necessary. It would tax even their ingenuity to explain the connection between the two events, but their history as a party readily accounted for their resolution to seek protection at the imperial court. In fact they came to Sardica accompanied by the Count Musonianus, under the impression that by his authority things would go as at Tyre. But the orthodox Emperor Constans was still alive, and the council in consequence was to be entirely free in its deliberations. Two Eastern Bishops, Arius and Asterius, who remained at Sardica, told of the plots concocted by the Eusebians, and it is probably from them that Athanasius obtained the information contained in the statement which he places in the mouths of the Eusebians: "We came hither for one result, and we see another. We arrive in company with counts, and the trial is proceeding without them. We are certainly condemned."[10]

The flight of the Eusebians made no change in the program of the council. The accusations against Athanasius and the other deposed Bishops were examined and pronounced wholly unfounded, while the leaders of the heretical party, including Ursacius of Singidunum and Valens of Mursa, who were afterwards to distinguish themselves, were deposed and excommunicated. After this matter had been disposed of, several canons relative to appeals were enacted,

[9] *Ad Monachos*, c. 44.
[10] *Ibid.* 15.

with a view to preventing occurrences like those which had necessitated the calling of the council of Sardica. The latter part of canon 3 on this subject is interpreted by Hefele as meaning that "if a Bishop is condemned, but thinks his case a good one, so that a fresh sentence should be pronounced, then out of respect to the memory of the Apostle Peter, a letter shall be addressed to Rome, to Pope Julius, so that if necessary he may appoint a new court composed of the Bishops near the province in question, and may himself appoint the judges. If it is not proved, however, that the affair requires a fresh inquiry, then the first sentence shall not be annulled, but confirmed by the Pope." The fourth canon, according to this author also, decrees that "if a Bishop deposed by the court of first appeal adopt the course indicated in the previous canon, his see may not be given to another Bishop until the Pope has either confirmed the sentence of the court of first appeal or has instituted a second."[11]

This canon was evidently intended to prevent a repetition of the action of the synod of Antioch (341) which appointed Gregory of Cappadocia to the see of Alexandria pending the appeal of Athanasius. The fifth canon adds that the appellant may ask the Pope to send delegates to preside over the court of second instance. The growing abuse, particularly in the East, of Bishops relying on court favor to attain party ends is censured and forbidden in the seventh, eighth and ninth canons. "Our troublesome and oft-repeated importunities and unjust petitions have caused us to stand less in favor and hindered our being able to be as free-spoken as ought to be the case. For many Bishops are in the habit of coming to the imperial court, especially the Africans." Henceforth, "no Bishop shall come to court with the exception of those whom our pious Emperor summons thither" (can. 7). The eighth and ninth canons regulate the manner in which petitions in behalf of members of their flock are to be placed by Bishops before the Emperor. A proposal to formulate a new creed was rejected on the ground that the creed of Nice was wholly satisfactory.

The acts of the council of Sardica were communicated to the Catholic world in the form of three letters addressed to the Church of Alexandria, the Bishops of Christendom and Pope Julius. Two legates, Vincent of Capua and Euphrates of Cologne, were sent to Constantius to obtain his consent to the return of Athanasius and the other rehabilitated Bishops to their dioceses. An officer of the Emperor Constans accompanied them and they bore a letter from the

[11]Hefele, *History of the Councils*, II, 114, 117. Edinburgh, 1876.

Western Emperor to his brother threatening war if he did not restore Paul of Constantinople and Athanasius.[12]

Meanwhile, on their side, the Eusebians were not idle. After leaving Sardica they halted at Philippopolis, and drew up an encyclical letter addressed to Gregory of Cappadocia, at Alexandria, Donatus, the schismatic Bishop of Carthage, Amphion of Nicomedia, and in general to all Christendom. In this document they repeat the old charges against Athanasius which they refused to substantiate at Sardica. They insist that a Bishop once deposed by a synod cannot be restored. Pope Julius and the Roman council had been imposed upon by false evidence and now rather than admit that they had been deceived they continue to support Athanasius. It is contrary to all precedent that Oriental Bishops should be judged by Western Bishops. They conclude by declaring Hosius, Athanasius, Pope Julius and several other Bishops excommunicated.[13]

Thus the council of Sardica, from which so much was hoped, failed to accomplish the main thing for which it was convened. The responsibility for this outcome, as the facts recorded clearly show, rests with the Eastern Bishops, who regarded a council as an assembly of Bishops carrying out their wishes by imperial direction. How little troubled with scruples these prelates were as to the manner of attaining their end is further shown by their acts after leaving Philippopolis. On arriving at Adrianople Lucius, Bishop of this city, and his people refused to admit them to communion, and they, as usual, immediately turned for redress to the civil power. Ten of the laity of Adrianople paid with their lives for their rashness, and Bishop Lucius was "bound with iron on the neck and hands and driven into banishment where he died." The Eastern Bishops, Arius and Asterius, who had taken part in the council of Sardica were exiled to Libya. Orders were sent to Alexandria to watch for the return of Athanasius and certain of his priests; the magistrates, according to Athanasius, were empowered "to behead those who were discovered."[14] All, in a word, who did not side with the Eusebians were treated in the most arbitrary manner. Those who dared reproach them with their flight from Sardica were scourged and banished. One of their adherents, Stephen, Bishop of Antioch, was guilty of an outrage particularly infamous, against the two legates of Sardica to the Em-

[12]Soc. *H. E.* II, 22; Theod. *H. E.* II, 6.
[13]S. Hilarius, *Frag.* III, (*P. L.* vol. x, 658 sq.)
[14]*Hist. Arian.* c. 19.

peror Constantius. An agent of Stephen's named Onager introduced at night a prostitute into the chamber of one of the sleeping Bishops, and then with a band of witnesses arrived on the scene. But the legates, supported by the officer of Constans who accompanied them, insisted on an investigation. The woman herself, it turned out, was duped, and the whole plot was traced to Stephen, who was deposed and excommunicated.[15]

This incident served to open the eyes of Constantius to the character of the men whom he had supported by his authority and brought about a reaction. His first act of reparation was the recall of Athanasius, who, after seven years of exile, re-entered Alexandria in October 346. The other banished Bishops also were recalled and a few years of comparative peace followed. The time-serving Ursacius and Valens, whose sees were in the jurisdiction of Constans, made their submission to Pope Julius and were restored to communion by the synod of Milan in 347.

The three years following his return to Alexandria were employed by Athanasius in repairing the mischief wrought by Gregory of Cappadocia in his patriarchate. By conciliatory measures he gradually succeeded in winning over his opponents and those of the Nicene faith. Such achievements were not of a kind to endear him to the Eusebians, who, however, had to bide their time. But once more fortune favored these politic prelates. The protector of Western Christianity, Constans, was assassinated in 350, and in September 351 the defeat of the usurper Magnentius at Mursa united the whole empire under the rule of Constantius. This was the signal for a renewal of the struggle between the orthodox West and the unorthodox East. Among the first in the breach were Valens, Bishop of Mursa, (near which city the decisive battle was fought between Constantius and Magnentius) and Ursacius of Singidunum. Valens, according to the story told by Sulpicius Severus,[16] brought the news of the victory to Constantius, who was not present at the battle, and gained credit with the Emperor by pretending that he had received his information from an Angel. A synod was held by the Eastern party at Sirmium in the Winter of 351 or 352, which deposed several Bishops and issued a creed of the same tenor as the fourth symbol of Antioch. A fresh attempt was made to discredit Athanasius with Constantius, as well as with Pope Liberius, who succedeed Julius

[15] *Ad. Monachos*, c. 20; Theod. II, 7ss.

[16] *Hist. Sacra*, II, 38.

in 352. A spurious letter was presented to the Emperor, in the name of Athanasius, asking leave to come to court, and Constantius, not doubting the genuineness of the document, granted the required permission. The surprised Bishop thereupon informed the Emperor of the true state of the case; he had not made the request attributed to him, but if Constantius commanded he would appear at court. This response was interpreted as a new offence which gave his enemies the opportunity of accusing Athanasius of disobeying an imperial order.[17] He was also accused of having caused the trouble between the late Emperor Constans and his brother, and of having written respectfully to the usurper Magnentius.[18] To defend himself against these grave charges, Athanasius sent an embassy of five Bishops and three priests to Milan; their mission was, however, a failure. At the same time, Athanasius sent to Rome a letter drawn up by eighty Egyptian Bishops vigorously defending their chief.[19] After holding a synod at Rome to discuss the matter Pope Liberius sent the Emperor the documents for and against Athanasius and proposed the convocation of a council at Aquileia. To this proposal Constantius agreed, but he selected Arles, where he then was, as the place of meeting.

But the council of Arles (353) proved a total misnomer. No discussion was permitted. A document condemning Athanasius, drawn up by Valens and Ursacius, was merely presented to the hitherto orthodox Bishops of the West for their signatures. The papal legates tried as a preliminary to this procedure to obtain a condemnation of Arianism, which was refused; and, yielding to threats, all but one of the Bishops present ended by signing.[20] The exception was St. Paulinus, Bishop of Treves, who, for his non-compliance with the imperial wishes, was exiled to Phrygia, where he died in 358.

The news from Arles caused consternation in Italy. Pope Liberius was intensely grieved at the fall of his representatives, and again besought the Emperor to convene a new synod. Constantius readily assented and invited the Bishops to Milan where he then resided. More than three hundred western Bishops, besides a few Eastern prelates arrived in answer to this summons, in the Spring of the year 355. But the synod of Milan was destined to be a repetition of the

[17] *Apol. ad Constantium*, c. 19.

[18] *Ibid.* cc. 2-6.

[19] S. Hilarii *Frag.* V, 2 (P. L. vol. x, 683).

[20] *Apol. ad Constant.* c. 27; Sulp. *Hist. Sac.* II. 39; S. Hilarii *Frag.* V, VI (*P. L.* 682ss).

synod of Arles. No discussion was permitted; the Bishops were merely asked to sign a condemnation of Athanasius and to receive the Arians into communion. Their protests that such a course was uncanonical were of no avail; the imperial Pontifex Maximus informed them that his will was the canon which they must obey, or take the road into exile.[21] Eusebius of Vercelli, the leader of the Western Bishops, with Lucifer of Cagliari and Dionysius of Milan called attention to the unworthiness of such accusers as Valens and Ursacius; but Constantius answered this objection by proclaiming himself the accuser of the Bishop of Alexandria. The unequal contest ended in general submission to the dictation of the Emperor: all but the three Bishops named above, and the papal legates, who this time proved worthy of their office, signed the condemnation of Athanasius, and the persecuted champion of orthodoxy was deserted by practically the whole hierarchy of the Church. The five recalcitrants were sent in chains to remote provinces of the Empire as exiles, and the Arian Auxentius, a former abettor of Gregory of Cappadocia, was installed as Bishop of Milan.

Persecution of the orthodox was now the order of the day. Messengers were sent to the provinces with orders to the Bishops who were not present at the synod of Milan to enter into communion with the Arians; disobedience was punished with exile. The court eunuch Eusebius was delegated to win over Liberius, but, at this time, blandishments and threats alike failed to move the Pope. Let the Emperor call a council, he advised the eunuch, at which neither he nor a count shall be present, "nor magistrate to threaten us, but where only the fear of God and the Apostolic rule shall prevail."[22] The discomfited eunuch, whose presents were cast after him by the Pope's orders, returned to Milan, and with the co-operation of his fellow eunuchs of the court used every opportunity of arousing their master's anger against Liberius.

In this they were wholly successful. The Pope was seized at Rome and brought before the Emperor at Milan, where the famous dialogue between the Chiefs of the Church and the State, recorded by Theodoret, took place. The Emperor began by admonishing the Pope to abjure all connections with the "impious Athanasius;" to which Liberius replied by renewing his demand for a free council.

[21] S. Athan. *Ad. Monachos*, 33, 34

[22] *Ibid.* c. 36.

To the objection of Bishop Epictetus anent the difficulty of finding conveyances for the Bishops, Liberius replied: "Ecclesiastical affairs can be transacted without post-carriages. The churches are able to provide means for the conveyance of their respective Bishops to the sea coast."[23] This retort clearly enough indicates that the Pope would be very well satisfied to forego the advantage of imperial favor in exchange for a full recognition on the part of the State of the Church's right to regulate her own affairs.

The conference of the Pope and the Emperor ended with the banishment of the former to Beroea in Thrace. The centenarian Hosius of Cordova was also banished, and Athanasius escaped the same fate only by taking refuge with the solitaries in the desert of Egypt. The see of Alexandria was entrusted to George of Cappadocia—Cappadocians at this time seem to have formed the militant wing of the Arian party—who resumed the reign of violence against the orthodox discontinued since the death of Gregory. Finally, Hilary of Poitiers, the acknowledged leader of the Gallic Bishops, and Rodanus of Toulouse were banished (356) to Phrygia.

The Nicean or orthodox party being thus disposed of, dissensions among their opponents, kept in the background for the moment, at once broke out. The primitive Arians formed a party under the leadership of Eunomius, after whom they were known as Eunomians. A second group, the Semi-Arians, rejected the ὁμοούσιος, which they regarded as equivocal and savoring of Sabelliani m. The more moderate members of this party afterwards returned to the ranks of the orthodox, while the extremists either fell back into Arianism proper, or affiliated with the new heretical sect of the Macedonians. Finally, the court Bishops, represented in the West by Valens and Ursacius, and in the East by Acacius of Cæsarea and his followers, formed a third party whose first principle was to retain the favor of the Emperor.

Under the influence of the Western section of this third party was held in the summer of 357 the second synod of Sirmium, composed of Western Bishops only. A creed known as the second Sirmian, was drawn up. It avoided both the terms which were the watchwords of the Orthodox and the Semi-Arians (ὁμοούσιος and ὁμοιούσιος), but was pronouncedly Arian in tenor. Hosius of Cordova was forced to sign this formula, but soon afterwards, shortly before his death,

[23]Theod. *H. E.* II, 13.

the veteran Bishop made reparation for his momentary fall by anathematizing Arianism.

The Eunomians (or Anomœans) in the East were greatly pleased with the new creed, which met their views exactly, and hastened to congratulate its authors on winning the West to what they styled "orthodoxy." But the Semi-Arians, in a council held at Ancyra (358) under the presidency of Basil, Bishop of this city, strongly protested against the Anomœan formula, and deputed Basil, with two other Bishops, to place their remonstrance before the Emperor. The delegation met with greater success than, perhaps, they had expected. Constantius at once recalled his letters approving the second Sirmian creed and espoused the cause of the Semi-Arians. A new synod was convened at Sirmium in which Semi-Arian influence was preponderant; and the third Sirmian formula, borrowed from the synod of Antioch (341) was adopted. In tenor the new creed is regarded as orthodox; but, from the point of view of those who stood for the Nicean formula, it was objectionable, because of the omission of the word ὁμοούσιος. This is the famous formula which was subscribed by Pope Liberuis, who allowed himself to be persuaded that the term ὁμοούσιος was a cloak for Sabellianism. At the same time, however, the Pope drew up a second profession of faith "in which he declared that those who affirm that the Son is not like the Father in substance and in all other respects, are excommunicated."[24]

But the triumph of the Semi-Arians was short-lived. At the instance of their chief, Basil of Ancyra, they used their newly acquired influence at court for the wholesale deposition of their Anomœan opponents. These protested vigorously, and with effect. The Emperor recalled the deposed Bishops, and, in the hope of settling the whole controversy which divided the Church, determined to call a general council.

A general council, however, was not at all desirable from the point of view of the court party and the Anomœans, who feared that in such an assembly the Semi-Arians of the East might arrive at an understanding with the orthodox Bishops of the West. The Emperor was easily persuaded to adopt the suggestion that two councils should be held, one in the East and one in the West; and to save the Bishops of both assemblies all trouble the Anomœans obligingly drew up a new profession of faith for their acceptance. The author of this production, Bishop Mark of Arethusa, succeeded in formulating

[24]Sozomen, *H. E.* IV, 15.

a creed which, on the one hand, was acceptable to the Anomœans, and on the other, to the Semi-Arians and the Emperor. This creed, known as the fourth Sirmian, was subscribed to by all the Bishops of both parties then at the court of Sirmium. Yet, Basil of Ancyra seems to have regarded it with some suspicion: he added a clause to his signature which comes very close to strict orthodoxy.

This preliminary work accomplished, letters of instruction were sent by Constantius to the Fathers of both councils. The Eastern Bishops, who met at Seleucia, were directed to examine contested points of doctrine, as well as complaints against certain Bishops accused of crimes against the law, like George of Cappadocia in Alexandria, and the deposition of Bishops who, like Cyril of Jerusalem, claimed to have been unjustly treated.[25] The Bishops of the West, who assembled at Rimini, were instructed to confine their efforts to the question of faith, and they were ordered under no account to meddle with questions that concerned the East.[26] Finally, the councils were directed to inform the Emperor of the results of their deliberation, so that, in case of disagreement, the imperial theologian might assist then in coming to an understanding. Thus the western Bishops had really nothing to do but to sign the court-manufactured creed, while the powers of the Eastern prelates included in addition the investigation of alleged abuses. The Emperor and his court advisers constituted themselves the real governing body within the Church.

The synod of Rimini met in May 359. More than four hundred Bishops were present, three-fourths of whom were orthodox; the Anomœan minority consisted of eighty Bishops under the leadership of Valens of Mursa and Ursacius of Singidunum. These court prelates, however, had no fears, owing to the presence of the imperial "Protector" of the council, the prefect Taurus. But greatly to their surprise, things did not go so harmoniously as they had expected. An interesting sign of independence, in the first place, was the refusal of all but three poor British Bishops to allow the imperial treasurer to defray their expenses. Restitutus of Carthage, probably, presided—Pope Liberius was not represented. The court-made creed presented by Valens and Ursacius was rejected by the council; their business, the Fathers declared, was not to make new creeds but to guard that of Nice which alone was necessary. Arianism was condemned; and Valens, Ursacius, and the other leading Arians were pronounced heretics and deposed.

[25]Soz. *H. E.* IV, 17.

[26]S. Hilar. *Frag.* VII. 1, 2 (*P. L.* vol. X, 695ss).

Both parties now sent deputies to the Emperor, but those of the Anomœans reached Constantinople first, and explained the situation to Constantius. When the orthodox representatives arrived the Emperor refused to see them. After a tedious delay, they were ordered first to Adrianople, afterwards to Niké in Thrace, until the imperial reply to their synodal letter would be ready. At length worn out by threats, by actual violence and deception, they were induced to sign a creed substantially the same as the fourth of Sirmium. The fallen deputies then returned to Sirmium, accompanied by the triumphant Valens and Ursacius, to make their report. The indignant fathers of the council regarded them as traitors, but it was only a question of time till the Emperor would have his way with them also. The prefect-protector Taurus received orders to allow no Bishop to depart from Rimini until he had signed the official creed. For a time the Fathers remained firm, but as in the case of the deputies, threats, persuasions and all manner of discomforts ultimately broke down this resistance and they signed the Anomœan formula. About a score of them, however, headed by Phebadius of Agen, added clauses to their signatures condemning Arius, and proclaiming the equality of the Father and the Son.

The Eastern council met at Seleucia in September of the same year (359). It was composed of about 160 Bishops, 110 of whom were Semi-Arians, 30 or 40 Anomœans, while not more than a dozen Bishops, friends of Athanasius from Egypt, were strict Niceans. St. Hilary of Poitiers took an active part in the council, and did not hesitate to enter into communion with Basil of Ancyra and his followers. This party, which at that date included St. Cyril of Jerusalem, differed in little from the strictly orthodox; their main objection was to the word ὁμοούσιος, a term which even St. Cyril regarded with distrust.

In accordance with the Emperor's orders to discuss first of all the question of a creed, Acacius of Cæsarea proposed the adoption of the fourth Sirmian formula. The Semi-Arians rejected this proposition, on the ground that a new creed was wholly unnecessary, and on their part proposed that one of the creeds of the synod of Antioch (*in encæniis*) should be confirmed. Acacius and his followers would not agree to this and left the assembly.

The following day the Antiochian creed was adopted by the majority. At the third session Acacius appeared with a new formula, which omitted both the contentious terms ὁμοούσιος and ὁμοιούσιος,

and anathematized the term from which his own party derived one of its names, ἀνομοίος. This departure gave rise to a new party, called after its founder the Acacian party, which endeavored to occupy a middle position between the Anomœans or strict Arians and the Semi-Arians. After a day's debate without result the imperial protector Leonas, at the instance apaprently of Acacius, declared the synod at an end; but the majority paid no attention to this pronouncement, and continued their labors. The question of the deposed Bishops was next taken up. Acacius was summoned to answer in the case of St. Cyril, but, as he and his party refused to appear, the principal among them, including Acacius and George of Alexandria, were deposed. A new Bishop, Arianus, was appointed in the place of Eudoxius of Antioch, but after his consecration he was arrested by Leonas and exiled.

Ten representatives, at their head Basil of Ancyra, and accompanied by Hilary of Poitiers, were deputed at the close of the council to report to the Emperor. But, as in the case of Rimini, the Acacians also sent a deputation to the court which was the first to reach Constantius. Valens and Ursacius arrived at Constantinople about this time with the signatures of the Bishops of the Western council attached to the creed of Niké (in Thrace), and they at once took sides with Acacius. The result of this combination, which had the support of Constantius, was that the deputies of Seleucia were forced to subscribe the same formula as the Western Bishops and thus the Christian world had thrust upon it, through the arbitrary act of a Christian Emperor, a creed which its authors interpreted openly in an Arian sense (December, 359).

Within a month after these events the Acacians held a synod in Constantinople which confirmed the new creed, but without the additions of Phebadius of Agen and his companions of Rimini. Then began a wholesale deposition of Semi-Arian Bishops, not, however, on a question of faith, but on various disciplinary charges. The deposed prelates were at once exiled and their places given to good Acacians. St. Hilary of Poitiers who had in vain sought permission to take part in the synod, was ordered by Constantius to return to Gaul. The Acacian creed was then forwarded to all the Bishops of Christendom for their signatures, and the majority of them yielded to the threat of exile with which it was accompanied. The Bishops of Gaul, however, formed an honorable exception; on hearing of the events that had taken place in the East they met at Paris and drew

up a synodal letter addressed to the Eastern Bishops, which affirmed the orthodox doctrine emphatically.[27] Under the leadership of the returned Hilary other synods were held in Gaul, at which the Bishops who had yielded to force or deception at Rimini assisted and publicly renounced their involuntary error.[28] In the East, however, the Acacians met with little resistance, and maintained their ascendency until the death of Constantius, which occurred on the third of November 361, shortly after he had been baptized by the Arian Bishop, Euzoius of Antioch.

Thus the second Christian ruler of the Roman Empire, like the first, died surrounded by Arians. But the conflict between the champions of spiritual freedom on the one side, and those on the other who regarded the civil ruler as the final arbiter in matters of faith was much more acute in 361 than in 337. Constantine in his best moments regarded himself as a sort of divinely commissioned protector of the Church, and if he now and then claimed authority much more extensive than this character justified, his action must be attributed largely to his desire for unity and to the misrepresentations of his Eusebian advisers. These same advisers and their legitimate heretical successors exercised a still greater influence over Constantius, whose feeble character and foolish vanity rendered him an easy victim of clever men, who were much better courtiers than Bishops. That these Bishops did not scruple to use their influence over the Emperor to the utmost limit the facts related above clearly show. The Arian party, and the Semi-Arian party also during the short time it enjoyed the imperial favor, disregarded all ecclesiastical laws, and by a combination of fraud and force succeeded before the death of Constantius in forcing their views upon the Christian world. Their instrument in this, Constantius, had advanced far beyond the theory of his father as to the duties of the civil ruler in relation to the Church. Constantine regarded the decision of the Bishops at Nice as divinely inspired, and consequently final, and to the end he was not conscious that his conduct towards the orthodox was in conflict with this view. But Constantius regarded his position very differently. Councils, in his view, consisted of Christian Bishops who would receive and subscribe with gladness of heart the creeds manufactured, with his approval, by court intriguers: eunuchs, women and servile Bishops. "My will is your canon" expressed his thought in this regard excel-

[27] S. Hilar. *Frag.* XI (*P. L.* vol. x. 710).

[28] Sulp. Sev. *Hist. Sac.* II, 45.

lently; the Christian Emperor is already the Christian Pontifex Maximus.

But the great majority of Christians were not disposed to surrender to a Christian Emperor what they had victoriously defended against a long line of pagan princes. The cry for freedom of action in all that concerned the spiritual domain, faintly heard under Constantine, grows daily more loud and emphatic under his son and successor. For the first time the Bishops begin to formulate a theory of the relations of the Church and the State based on the principle, "Render to Cæsar what belongs to Cæsar"—but no more. The Bishops of Egypt in their famous letter in defence of Athanasius call attention with scorn to the absurdity of naming that a true council of the Church the proceedings of which were directed by an imperial count.[29] St. Athanasius styles Constantius, whom he regarded as Anti-Christ, "the most irreligious Augustus",[30] because of his support of heresy, his war against the Church and his banishment of Bishops.[31] The champion of the Nicene doctrine protests strongly also against the claim of the Emperor to decide ecclesiastical causes "which he refers to the court instead of to the Church, and presides at them in person." He demands for the Church complete freedom of action, and for himself that his trial "be conducted on equal terms both to the accuser and to the accused."[32] The Emperor has no concern with a judgment freely pronounced by Bishops, for "when did a judgment of the Church receive its validity from the Emperor?"[33]

Hosius of Cordova also, in a letter to Constantius, protests with vigor against the Emperor's arbitrary meddling in the affairs of the Church. "Intrude not yourself into ecclesiastical matters," he advises, "neither give commands to us concerning them; but learn them from us." He then defines what the relations of the spiritual and temporal rulers ought to be: "God has put into your hands the kingdom; to us He has entrusted the affairs of His Church. And as he who would steal the Empire from you would resist the ordinance of God, so, likewise fear on your part, lest by taking on yourself the government of the Church, you may be guilty of a great offence. It is written 'Render unto Cæsar the things that are Cæsar's, and unto God the things that are God's.' Neither therefore is it permitted

[29] S. Ath. *Apol. contra Arianos*, c. 8.
[30] *De synodis*, c. 12.
[31] S. Athan. *Hist. Arian.* c. 74.
[32] *Hist. Arian.* c. 76.
[33] *Ibid.* 52.

unto us to exercise an earthly rule, nor have you, sire, any authority to burn incense.'"[34] A clearer statement than this of what the relations of Church and State ought to be, it would be difficult to make; the veteran President of the first general council maintains that each power is supreme in its own sphere, and that neither has any right to interfere in the concerns of the other.

The warm-tempered Lucifer of Cagliari, in his defence of Athanasius, affirms the same principle in language more than emphatic, and the reverse of complimentary to the Emperor, whom he regards as a particular friend of the devil.[35] St. Hilary of Poiters addresses Constantius in language scarcely less strong. For him, as for Athanasius, the Emperor is Anti-Christ, a tyrant no whit better than a Nero, a Decius or a Maximian.[36] In his interview at Milan with Constantius Pope Liberius calmly and forcibly pleads the cause of spiritual freedom with special relation to the unjust condemnation of Athanasius. Liberius demands as a right that the case of Athanasius should be examined by Bishops, in a free assembly, and he boldly tells Constantius that he is endeavoring to make the Bishops of the Church the instruments of his personal hatred against the Bishop of Alexandria. If he desires harmony in the Church the way to secure it is to restore the exiled Bishops, and then bring accuser and accused face to face in a general council of the Church.[37] Thus we see that the Bishops who best realized the responsibilities of their office, during the reign of Constantius, began to perceive that the Church was in danger of losing more than she gained by her union with the State. The Christian Emperor was still the pagan Pontifex Maximus; why, suggested his flatterers, in act if not in word, should he not exercise supreme authority in the Church also? From the conversion of Constantine the most influential members of the Eastern episcopate, who were also abettors of heresy, openly invited the Emperor to assume the role, not merely of "exterior Bishop," but of supreme judge even in the Church's exclusive domain. The Eusebians, consequently, and their heretical and semi-heretical successors, are directly responsible for the establishment of Cæsaropapism. These parties were ever ready to accept the authority of the State in the spiritual sphere,

[34] S. Ath. *Hist. Arian.* c. 44.

[35] *Pro S. Athanasio*, I (P. L., XIII. 826). "Proba te super nos factum judicem, proba ad hoc te constitutum imperatorem, ut nos armis tuis ad omnem implendam amici tui diaboli perduceres, etc."

[36] *Contra Constan.* I, 1-7.

[37] Theod. *H. E.* II, 13.

knowing as they did that this would be exercised in accordance with their views. But, on the other hand, they refused on every occasion to submit to lawful ecclesiastical authority.

The Eusebians are also responsible for the introduction of the principle of nationalism into the Church Universal. The haughty Greek churchmen of the fourth century early resolved not to brook Latin interference in their affairs. What they decided in the East must be final; not even to a general council would they concede the right to re-examine their judgments. The political authority of Rome was now exercised from the new capital on the Bosphorus; why should not the religious supremacy of Rome also be transferred to the city of Constantine? This thought seems to have been at all times present in the minds of Eastern churchmen, from the reign of the first Constantine to that of the last. We have seen several evidences of its existence in the reign of Constantius: for example, in the letter of the synod of Antioch to Pope Julius, and in the Emperor's order to the Bishops of the council of Rimini not to interfere in Eastern affairs. But while refusing to obey the legitimate authority of the Church the prelates of the Orient were almost always willing to wear the golden chains which bound them to the State.

The Bishops of the Western Church, during the reign of Constantine, took no very active part in the controversies of the East. They were on the side of orthodoxy, indeed, but they left the defence of their position in the able hands of Athanasius. The visits of Athanasius to Rome and his subsequent residence in Gaul, together with the means taken by Constantius to bring about unanimity in the Church, aroused them to a realization of the principles at stake. Few of them, it is true, had the spirit of the martyrs, and almost all of them yielded to imperial coercion. But they quickly repented of their falls, and at the close of the reign of Constantius they unanimously stood for the principle: Render to Cæsar the things that are of Cæsar, and to God the things that are of God.

MAURICE M. HASSETT.

ORIENTAL ARCHEOLOGY AND HIGHER CRITICISM

Gabriel Oussani, D. D.

The problem suggested by the above title may be fairly stated as follows: Have Oriental Archeological discoveries offset in any way the accepted results and conclusions of the modern school of Old Testament criticism? Or still clearer: Have the various archeological discoveries, made during the last half-century in Egypt, Assyria, Babylonia, Palestine, Arabia and Elam, confirmed in any way or favored in any measure the traditional theories and conclusions of the conservative school of Old Testament history and exegesis, as many conservative theologians claim? In other words: Have Assyriology, Egyptology and the other branches of Biblico-Oriental archeology contradicted, on the one hand, the results of the Higher Criticism, and vindicated, on the other, the traditional theories of Old Testament history and exegesis?

I.

The Higher Criticism of the Old Testament, which has rendered so many valuable services to the correct understanding of the religious ,historical and prophetical literature of the ancient Hebrews, has been denounced, from its very beginning and ever since, by the ultra-conservative school of theology and apologetics, as the greatest enemy of the Christian religion and theology. It has been unfairly represented to the public, by both Catholic and Protestant conservative theologians, as being a recent invention, and that it is arrogant to pretend that it has reached any final or even approximate results; that it was purely of German origin, rationalistic in spirit and principle, destructive in its aim, entirely subjective in its methods, fanciful in its deductions and absurd in its conclusions. By some it has been represented as a synonym of atheism, rationalism and positivism, and it is inferred that to be a Higher Critic and a true Christian or Catholic is as impossible as to serve God and Mammon. By others it is accused of having a reckless disregard and contempt for tradition, while by some it is earnestly denounced as destroying the credibility of the Bible. We are often told by these anti-Higher Critics that the atti-

tude of the Higher Criticism towards the explicit language and testimony of the New Testament and of our Lord Himself is irreverent and incompatible with our Christian doctrine concerning the divine person of Christ, His divine nature and authority.[1] These and similar unfair accusations have been, indeed, rehearsed and re-hashed *usque ad nauseam*.[2] Among the more recent sweeping pronouncements on the subject is the somewhat captious and unexpected assertion that the modern archeological discoveries made in Egypt Assyria, Babylonia and other Bible-lands, have vindicated the historical accuracy of the Old Testament and have demolished the fabric constructed by the modern school of biblical criticism.[3] The promoters of this anti-Higher Critical propaganda are certain biblical scholars and archeologists, whose otherwise valuable services and contributions to the advancement of Oriental and biblical studies are to be highly recommended. Principal among these are in England, the late G. Rawlinson, brother of the famous decipherer of the Behistun inscription,[4] Colonel Conder, of the Palestine Exploration

[1]Cf. the writer's article "Is the Bible in Danger," in the *Open Court*, Chicago, 1905, p. 641 ff. See also Dr. Gigot's articles on the "Higher Criticism" in the *New York Review*, vol. I. (1905), and vol. II. (1906). For more general works on the same topic, the reader may consult with profit the following: J. E. MacFadyen, *Old Testament Criticism and the Christian Church*, New York, 1903; Ch. Briggs, *General Introduction to the Study of Holy Scriptures*, New York, 1899; L. W. Batten, *The Old Testament from the Modern Point of View*, 2d ed., New York, 1901; R. L. Ottley, *Aspects of the Old Testament*, (Bampton Lectures), 1898; Ch. F. Kent, *The Origin and Permanent Value of the Old Testament*, 1906; T. K. Cheyne, *Founders of Old Testament Criticism*, 1893; J. M. Lagrange, *Historical Criticism and the Old Testament*, (Eng. trans.) 1905; Ch. Briggs, *The Bible, the Church and Reason*, 1892; H. E. Ryle, *The Bible and Criticism*, 1904; and *The Early Narratives of Genesis*, 1900; G. A. Smith, *Modern Criticism and the Preaching of the Old Testament*, 1902; W. Sanday, *Inspiration* (Bampton Lectures), 1903; A. F. Kirkpatrick, *The Divine Library of the Old Testament*, 1901.

[2]Comp. Cheyne's remarks in his *Founders of Old Testament Criticism*, London, 1893, pp. v-vi; MacFadyen, *op. cit.* chaps. I. and II;. Cheyne, *The Origin and Religious Contents of the Psalter* (Bampton Lectures), London-New York, 1895, pp. ix-xxxiv.; W. R. Smith, *The Old Testament in the Jewish Church*, London, 1892, (2d edition), pp. 1-21.

[3]See Driver, *Introduction to the Literature of the Old Testament*, 7th ed., 1897, pp. xvii ff; and the same author's *Commentary on Genesis*, London, 1904. Introduction and *passim*. See also G. A. Smith, *Modern Criticism and the Preaching of the Old Testament*, New York, 1902, pp. 99, ff.; W. H. Bennett, "Archeology and Criticism," in the *Contemporary Review*, 1906, April, pp. 518-527; John P. Peters, *The Old Testament and the New Scholarship*, London, 1902, pp. 237-317, as well as the numerous works and articles mentioned in the present study.

[4]In his still very useful work, *The Five Great Monarchies of the Ancient Eastern World*, London, 1873, (3 vols.), and *History of Herodotus*, 4th ed., London, 1880,

Fund,[5] Urquahart,[6] Emil Reich[7] ,and especially Prof. H. Sayce of Oxford;[8] in Germany, Neteler,[9] Bickell,[10] Fischer,[11] and especially Prof. Fritz Hommel of the University of Munich;[12] in Belgium, the late Charles de Harlez, the great Catholic Avestan scholar of Louvain,[13] Th. Lamy,[14] Delattre, S. J.[15] and Brucker, S. J.;[16] in France, the late

in 4 vols; as well as in several popular and apologetic books on Assyria, Babylonia, Egypt and the Old Testament, such as *The Historical Evidences of the Truth of the Scripture Records, etc.*, London, 1870.

[5]*The Bible and the East*, Edinburgh-London, 1896; and *Syrian Stone-Lore*, London, 1886.

[6]*The New Biblical Guide*, in 8 vols., London, 1904; see especially vols. I and VIII; also *Inspiration and Accuracy of the Holy Scriptures*, London, 1903; *Modern Discoveries and the Bible*, London, 1901; and his many other popular books and pamphlets, written in the same spirit.

[7]*The Failure of the Higher Criticism of the Bible*, New York, 1905; the first two chapters of which appeared first in the *Contemporary Review* for February and April, 1905, under the title "The Bankruptcy of the Higher Criticism." Dr. Reich's claims to biblical scholarship as well as his unwarranted denunciations of the Higher Critics have been aptly criticised and refuted by scholars like Driver, Cheyne, Cameron, Margoliouth, and others.

[8]In his numerous books and articles such as *The Higher Criticism and the Verdict of the Monuments*, London, 5th ed., 1894; *Patriarchal Palestine*, London, 1895; *The Early History of the Hebrews*, New York, 1897; *Fresh Light From the Ancient Monuments*, London, 1888; *The Egypt of the Hebrews and Herodotus*, London, 2d. ed., 1895; *Early Israel and the Surrounding Nations*, London, 1899; *Monument Facts and Higher Critical Fancies*, New York, 1904; as well as in his numerous articles in the *Expository Times*; the *Homiletic Review*; the *Sunday School Times* of Philadelphia; and other theological Reviews of England and America, where his apologetico-archeological books are popular and very often quoted by preachers and theologians.

[9]*Das Buch Isaias*, Berlin, 1876; and in his *Stellung der Alttestamentlichen Zeitrechnung in der Altorientalischen Geschichte*, Münster, published in various parts and pamphlets, each dealing with a particular Old Testament topic.

[10]In the *Zeitschrift für Katholische Theologie*, 1877, p. 131 ff. See, however, note (32) in the present study.

[11]*Heidenthum und Offenbarung. Religionsgeschichtliche Studien über die Berhürungspunkte der altesten heiligen Schriften der Inder, Perser, Babylonier, Assyrer und Aegypter mit der Bibel, auf Grund der neuesten Forschungen*, Mayen, 1878, (Translated into French).

[12]*Ancient Hebrew Tradition Illustrated by the Monuments*, London, 1897, and in many other books and articles contributed to English and American reviews. Prof. Hommel is really a higher critic of the moderate school, but with strong conservative tendencies in matters of biblical literary criticism, and steadily opposed to the views of Wellhausen.

[13]In several articles contributed to the *Muséon*, of Louvain, the *Revue Catholique*, of Lille, and to *La Science Catholique*, of Arras, France.

[14]In his *Introductio in Sacram Scripturam*, 1880; *Commentaire sur la Génèse*, 1888, and in several articles in the *Revue de Science Catholique*, *Le Prêtre*, etc. Monsignor Lamy's death, which occurred less than a year ago, has been greatly regretted by all Syriac scholars by whom he was greatly honored and esteemed. His magnifi-

Fr. Lenormant,[17] Ch. Schöbel,[18] Abbé de Moore,[19] Pisani,[20] Halévy,[21] and especially F. Vigouroux, secretary of the Pontifical biblical commission;[22] in Italy, U. Ubaldi,[23] Brunengo, S. J.,[24] De Cara, S. J.[25] and

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cent edition of the *Chronicon* of Bar-Hebræus, of the Hymns and Homiliees of St. Ephrem and other Syriac texts are a monument to the learning of this eminent scholar of Louvain.

[15]"Le Plan de la Génsèe," in the *Revue des Questions Historiques*, 1876; but especially in his recent reactionary book entitled *Autour de la Question Biblique*, Liege, 1904.

[16]*Questions Actuelles d' Ecriture Sainte*, Paris, 1896, and in many articles contributed to the well-known Jesuit Review, the *Etudes Relgieuses*.

[17]In his *Les Origines de l' histoire*, Paris, 1882, (3 vols). It must be noted, however, that this eminent Catholic scholar had accepted, on the whole, the critical analysis of Genesis of the modern school of biblical criticism. Comp. his *La Génèse, traduction d'après l'hebreu avec distinction des éléments constitutifs du texte, suivie, d'un essai de restitution des livres primitifs dont s'est servi le dernier redacteur*, Paris, 1883; and *Essai de Commentaire de fragments cosmogoniques de Bérose, etc.*, Paris,1872.

[18]"L' Authenticité Mosaique de la Génèse défendue contre les attaques du rationalisme Allemand," in the *Annales de Philosophie Chrétienne*, 1877.

[19]In several important articles and studies in the *Science Catholique* of Arras.

[20]In many articles and studies contributed to various French Catholic magazines.

[21]In his *Recherches Bibliques*, Paris, 1895-1901, in 2 vols., as well as in numerous studies on Biblico-Oriental archeology and exegesis, most of which appeared in the *Revue Sémitique*, founded and edited by him, Paris, 1893. Halévy's position in regard to the Mosaic authorship of the Pentateuch is conservative, although in many other biblical questions he is quite in accord with the modern schools.

[22]*La Bible et les découvertes modernes*, 6th ed., Paris, 1896, in 4 vols (Translated into German and Italian). *Manuel Biblique*, Paris, 10th ed., 1899, in 4 vols; *Les Lives Saints et la critique rationaliste*, 3d ed. in 5 vols., Paris, 1898; *Mélanges bibliques*, Paris, 2d ed., 1889. Abbe Vigouroux's works have always been, and are still to a certain extent, considered as the standard authority on the subject by the conservative Catholic school in France and Italy.

[23]*Introductio in Sacram Scripturam*, Rome, 1883, in 3 vols., and several articles contributed to the *Scienza Italiana*, of Bologna.

[24]*L'impero di Babilonia e di Ninive secondo i monumenti Cuneiformi comparati colla Bibbia*, Proat, 1885, in 2 vols. (originally published in form of articles in the *Civilta Cattolica*, 1878-1884). This was the first and is still the best and, indeed, practically the only work in Italian on the subject. (Except the Italian version of Hommel's *Geschichte Babyloniens und Assyriens*, by Diego Valbusa, Milano, 1895). It is cleverly written and well documented, but apologetic in character, and nowadays somewhat out of date.

[25]In several articles in the *Civilta Cattolica*, of Rome, and in his *Esame critico del sistema filologico e linguistico applicato alla storia ed alla scienza delle religioni*, Rome, 1889; *Gli Hettei-Pelasgi e le loro migrazioni*. A monumental work in 3 vols., full of new and original suggestions in which the distinguished author († Jan., 1906) proposes to identify the earliest inhabitants and colonies of Greece and Italy with the Hittites of Northern Syria and Asia Minor. The work was pronounced by Prof. Sayce, in the London *Academy*, as an "epoch-making book," and much commended by Prof. Reinach, of Paris.

others; in America, W. H. Green,[26] F. Wright,[27] Chambers,[28] Price,[29] Bissell[30] and others.

"God," says Abbé Vigouroux, "has resuscitated Egyptians and Assyrians in a most opportune time. He has revived Christian exegesis and apologetics just in time when Rationalism was inventing new weapons to disregard and degrade His own divine work.... Who can contain himself from wondering and admiring how the Divine Providence resuscitated those nations from their eternal graves so that they may render justice and witness to the veracity of the Sacred Historians, just in the time when German Criticism was raising its voice in defiance, and pretending to discover in the Sacred Books nothing but legends and myths?"[31].

The late Dr. Gustavus Bickell, a Catholic exegete of the first rank, and one of the most distinguished Hebrew and Syriac scholars, wrote in 1877 that

"The Mosaic origin of the Pentateuch as well as its authenticity, so fiercely attacked by modern German Criticism, have found in the two great historical discoveries of our age two invincible champions and defenders. Egyptology, from the one hand, in revealing to us the ancient empires of Egypt in the most particular and minute details, has compelled us to believe that the author of the Pentateuch must have lived, as in fact Moses did, in the Valley of the Nile; for his description of that country and nation is so wonderfully accurate and correct as to compel us to believe in the authenticity and authorship of his book. Assyriology, from the other hand, having demonstrated as false the hypothesis that the Pentateuch is a composite structure from various original sources, has admirably proved its unity.."[32]

Prof. Sayce, in his well-known book, *The Higher Criticism and the Verdict of the Monuments*, after summarising the result of his conclusions, comes out with the following statement:

"In glancing over the preceding pages we cannot fail to be struck by the fact that the evidence of Oriental Archeology is on the whole distinctly unfavorable to the pretensions of the Higher Criticism. The apologist may lose something, but the Higher Critic loses much more"[33].

[26] *The Unity of the Book of Genesis*, New York, 1895; *The Higher Criticism of the Pentateuch*, New York, 1900; and other works.

[27] In several articles in the *Bibliotheca Sacra*, of Oberlin Seminary.

[28] *Moses and his Recent Critics*, New York, 1889.

[29] *The Monuments and the Old Testament*, Chicago, 1902; and in many other valuable articles in the *Biblical World*, the *American Journal of Theology*, the *Baptist Theological Review*, etc.

[30] *The Pentateuch, its Origin and Structure*, New York, 1885; *Historical Origin and Value of the Old Testament*, New York, 1887, etc.

[31] *La Bible et les découvertes modernes*, 6th ed., Paris, 1896, vol. I, p. 202; (p, 123 of the first edition, Paris, 1877).

[32] *Zeitschrift für Katholische Theologie*, 1877, p. 131. Since the above article was written (1877), this distinguished Syriac scholar and biblical critic greatly modified his views concerning the Mosaic authorship of the Pentateuch.

[33] *Op. cit.* p. 561.

Again, in his *Patriarchal Palestine*, we meet with the following statement:

"The Archeological facts support the traditional rather than the so-called 'critical' view of the age and authority of the Pentateuch, and tend to show that we have in it not only a historical monument whose statements can be trusted, but also that is substantially a work of the great Hebrew Legislator himself."[34]

And in his recent little book, which bears the title *Monument Facts and Higher Critical Fancies*, he says:

"In dealing with the history of the past we are thus confronted with two utterly opposed methods, one objective, the other subjective; one resting on a basis of verifiable facts, the other on the unsupported and unsupportable assumptions of the modern scholar; the one is the method of archeology, the other of the so-called higher criticism. Between the two the scientifically trained mind can have no hesitation in choosing. The value, indeed, of the method of the Higher Criticism can be easily tested. We may know the tree by its fruits, and nowhere is this truer than in the domain of science. There is a very simple test which can be applied to the pretentions of the 'Higher Critic.' More than once I have challenged the advocates of the 'Critical Method' to meet it, but the challenge has never been accepted";[35] and If there be one fact which above all other physical science is constantly inpressing on us, it is how little we know of the material universe wherein we live; and the same lesson is taught by archeology in regard to the history of the past. Time after time the most positive assertions of a sceptical criticism have been disproved by archeological discoveries, events and personages that were confidently pronounced to be mythical have been shown to be historical, and the older writers have turned out to have been better acquainted with what they were describing that the modern critic who has flouted them."[36]

And at the end of his book he triumphantly exclaims:

"The awakening has come with a vengeance. The scepticism of the 'critic' has been proved to have been but the measure of his own ignorance, the want of evidence to have been merely his own ignorance of it. The spade of the excavator in Krete has effected more in three or four years than the labors and canons of the 'critic' in half a century. The whole fabric he had raised has gone down like a house of cards, and with it the theories of development of which he was so confident"[37].

Fritz Hommel, Professor of Semitic languages at the University, of Munich, is one of the ablest and most distinguished oriental scholars and Assyriologists of Germany. In his book *The Ancient Hebrew Tradition as Illustrated by the Monuments* (which was intended to be

[34] *Op. cit.* Preface, p. iv.
[35] *Op. cit.* pp. 17-18.
[36] *Op. cit.* p. 23.
[37] *Op. cit.* p. 121.

as the author himself tells us, "A Protest against the Modern School of Old Testament Criticism"), speaking of the English Assyriologist, A. H. Sayce, "who not long ago opened a bold and destructive fire from an archeological standpoint, upon the whole method of the so-called Higher Criticism of the Bible," he says:

> "It is unquestionable that the Higher Critics have gone virtually bankrupt in their attempt to unravel, not only chapter by chapter but verse by verse, and clause by clause, the web in which the different sources are entangled, arguing frequently from premises which are entirely false;"[38]

and again:

> "The Graf-Wellhausen theory is contradicted in various particulars by evidence of the most direct kind, which, to use Meyer's own expression 'defies contradiction.' This evidence does not rest on any latter forgery, but on documents whose authenticity is confirmed by contemporary inscriptions which are found in distant regions. The higher critics, therefore, here play the part of Balaam, however little they may have foreseen or desired the issue. Called in to curse, they have been restrained to bless the Israelites."[39]

II

Before discussing the Hommel-Sayce contention, viz: that the Higher Criticism of the Old Testament has been reduced to practical bankruptcy by the archeological discoveries of Western Asia, it is important, in order to define the limits of the controversy, to settle what is meant by Higher Criticism, the accepted results of which have been, it is claimed, so utterly demolished by Assyriology, Egyptology and the other branches of Oriental Archeology.

In the first place, smart writing on Higher Criticism is comparatively easy; but, if the conclusions of the same are to be effectually refuted, it must be done not by employing misrepresentation and ridicule, but by approaching the matter with a calm and unprejudiced mind and with at least the same diligence, patience and competency shown by its defenders. It is undeniable that the present condition of affairs in the controversies between our modern theologians and critics is the direct result of a misunderstanding; for it can never be too much emphasized that reverent, sober and cautious criticism has nothing to do with that irreverent, extravagant, hypercritical and ultra-radical school of criticism which has lately become a fashion in many German Universities. What a tremendous difference is there not to be noticed between the reverent and judicious criticism of scholars like Franz Delitzsch, Dillmann, König, Kautzsch,

[38] p. 18.
[39] *Op. cit.* p. 27.

Cornill, Driver, Davidson, Ryle, Briggs, Moore, G. A. Smith, Ramsay, etc., and that of critics like Kuenen, Wellhausen, Stade, Winckler, Vernes and Cheyne! Criticism, it should be remembered, does not stand for a school or for a definite set of results; it stands for a method, a method which patiently collects and impartially examines all the available facts and allows them to make their own impression upon the mind of the investigator. We are all well aware of the fact that there is very little Christianity in scholars like Wellhausen and Stade, and still less Judaism in scholars like Kuenen; but neither Wellhausen nor Stade nor Kuenen are the Higher Criticism. We freely admit that Higher Criticism, in the opinion of certain very distinguished scholars, has been extravagant and destructive in some of its conclusions, but these conclusions are far from being universally accepted. Extreme positions are seldom permanently tenable; as neither the ultra-conservative nor the ultra-radical critics are in the right track, but their defects place upon others a still greater responsibility of being searching yet cautious, critical yet sober, impartial yet charitable, exacting yet reverent in the interpretation of the Holy Scriptures. And, whatever the deficiency of the individual critics may be, Higher Criticism is certainly compatible with a reverent appreciation of the Bible as a revelation of God; and it is impossible to resist the impression that this reverent criticism is destined to be victorious.

In the second place, in order for Sayce and Hommel to make good their case against the Higher Criticism, they must show that Oriental Archeological discoveries have, at least in some case, contradicted the *accepted* results of the modern school of Biblical criticism. Prof. MacFadyen justly remarks that "Everyone who has tried carefully to concatenate the facts presented by the Old Testament is compelled to admit that there is a good deal about which it would not be safe to dogmatize; and many of the Higher Critics themselves have expressed themselves with the most becoming reserve, especially with regard to the more obscure and difficult details. No doubt many of the critics have been unduly dogmatic, just as many of their opponents have been; but it would be unfair to overlook the majority for the minority. There are some, if not many, on both sides of the controversy, who, under the constraint of facts, would be willing to admit that some of the main points at issue are of such a nature as not to admit, at least for the present time, any final settlement. To the scholars who have been over all the ground of Higher Criticism, nothing is so certain as that there is much that is uncertain. These very

divergences of opinion among the Critics enable them to act as a constant check upon each other. Every important book receives the most minute and searching attention and criticism, either in subsequent books or in the great scientific and theological magazines, especially in Germany. No critic has it all his own way. His interpretations are subjected to the severest tests, his errors and mistakes are publicly exposed and scientifically refuted, while his correct conclusions and discoveries are heartily welcomed and approved. No great movement is ever wholly in vain. As critic keeps watch on critic, it is reasonable to expect an ever nearer approximation to the truth. This expectation is all the more reasonable since we already notice signs of what we might call a conservative reaction, and the higher criticism of the near future is likely to be more conservative in its tendency than it has been, or at least to do fuller justice to the positive data than has been done.

"The errors and extravagances of criticism will be corrected in time by a criticism that is more alert and penetrating. Theories whose inadequacy can be proved will be modified or rejected, and the fittest ones only will survive, and theology will become far more international and interconfessional. Men will begin to compare notes the world over, and extravagances and aberrations will be struck off on this side or on that. Before this great tribunal of sound criticism, eccentricities cannot stand.

"But to suppose that the whole critical movement is invalidated because the results of its various supporters are not unanimous, is completely to mistake the comparative unanimity that prevails in many of the larger issues, and in attitude to the critical or historical methods as a whole. Two blacks do not make a white. It is still the fashion to-day, as it was twenty years ago, to deride the Higher Criticism as the mere product of individual caprice, or to exaggerate the discrepancies of its results, and to imagine that they can be got rid of like positive and negative quantities in an equation by setting one against the other. But it is a mistake to suppose that this process, however far it may be carried, necessarily helps the traditional view of things. Criticism is making its sure way from destruction to construction, from negative to positive results. There is much that is still uncertain; there is much that may never be certain; but there is a great deal more that is certain."[40]

[40] *Old Testament Criticism and the Christian Church*, New York, 1903, pp. 70-72.

It should be remembered that Pentateuchal criticism, in its essential points, is nowadays generally accepted by the critics of all schools. The composite character of the first five books of the Bible, the three different Pentateuchal legislations, the late date of Deuteronomy, the various progressive stages of revelation, the evolution and progress of the same, the religious and literary importance of the Babylonian Exile, the sharp contrast between prophet and priest, the very late date of the closing of the canon, and many other conclusions are scientifically demonstrated and unanimously accepted. The composite character and the double authorship of Isaiah, the non-Davidic authorship of the Psalms as a whole, the very late date of many of the historical glosses, interpolations, transpositions and additions; the influence of Babylonian religion, literature and culture on that of the Hebrews, the Babylonian origin and the legendary character of the early chapters of Genesis, etc., are also well established; and if we consider the scantiness of the available materials upon which the critics have to work, we shall be surprised to see the unanimity which prevails as to the main conclusions. As Dr. Steuernagel says, "In by far the largest number of cases the judgment of specialists in the main points is unanimous; and for this, one may rightly demand the same recognition from the non-expert as he would willingly accord to the judg- of the historians of art".[41] Hence, if Sayce and Hommel can show that Oriental Archeological discoveries have disproved any of these and other accepted results of the Higher Criticism, then, and then only, they can be said to have made their point.

III

Having premised the above considerations we can now proceed to the direct discussion of the controversy.

The fundamental error of the Sayce-Hommel school of biblico-archeological exegesis consists in their apparent inability to distinguish between *illustration* and *evidence*, between *facts* and mere *possibilities*, between *certainties* and mere *probabilities*; hence, any chance similarity between the Babylonian, Assyrian, Egyptian and other monuments, and the Hebrew records is at once seized upon as a piece of confirmatory evidence.

For clearness sake, we select eight instances, which are constantly brought up by members of this school. These we shall submit to the test of impartial criticism.

[41] "Allgemeine Einleitung" at the end of his Commentary on Deuteronomy and Joshua, p. 260, quoted by MacFadyen, *op. cit.* p. 71. Note 2.

Ur of the Chaldees, Abraham, and the Beginnings of the Hebrew Nation.

From the simple fact that Ur of the Chaldees (Ur-Kasdim), the supposed fatherland of Abraham, has been identified with the modern Muqayyar, in South Babylonia, Sayce argues that Abraham was after all a historical personage,and that the beginnings of Hebrew history, as portrayed in the Book of Genesis, have been historically confirmed by the Assyro-Babylonian monuments.[42]

"It is with Abram the Hebrew," he tells us, "that the history of Israel begins. Future ages looked upon him as the ancestor of the Hebrew race, the rock from whence it was hewn. He had come from the far East, from 'Ur of the Casdim,' or Babylonians. His younger brother Haran had died 'in the land of his nativity;' with his elder brother Nahor and himself, his father Terah had migrated westward, to Harran in Mesopotamia . .Upon these beginnings of Hebrew history *light has been thrown by the decipherment of the Cuneiform inscriptions.* The site of "Ur of the Chaldees" has been found, and geographers are no longer dependent on Arab legends or vague coincidences with classical names."[43]

How in the world the simple fact of the discovery and identification of Ur of the Chaldees with the present Muqayyar has thrown light on the beginnings of Hebrew history, we cannot see.[44] Furthermore, from the mere fact that such personal names as Ab-ramu, or Abi-ramu (Abraham), Ya'qub-ilu, (Jacob?), Yasup-ilu (Joseph?), and other Hebrew names like Abdiel, etc., have been found in some Babylonian contract-tablets of the Hammurabi period (cir. 2250 B. C.), Sayce concludes that

"There were, therefore, Hebrews, or at least a Hebrew speaking population, living in Babylonia at the period to which the Old Testament assigns the life-time of Abraham, that the names Hammurabi, Ammizaduga etc. are not south-Arabian only, they are Hebrew as well.....When

[42]See especially his work on the *Early History of the Hebrews.*

[43]*Op. cit.* pp. 8-10.

[44]The Ur-Kasdim of Genesis was formerly identified by Sir Henry Rawlinson with the present Warka; but in the light of later discoveries it is now generally believed to be identical with the modern Muqayyar, on the right bank of the Euphrates about 40 miles SE. from Warka, and about 135 miles SE. from Babylon. Kittel (*History of the Hebrews,* I, p. 118 f.) and Gunkel (*Commentary on Genesis,* 1901, p. 145), however do not accept this identification; they prefer to locate the *Ur* of Genesis in north Mesopotamia. Cheyne, of course (*Enclycopedia Biblica,* col. 5233), places Ur-Kasdim in the Negeb, in Arabia. The addition "Kasdim" (Chaldeans?) to Ur (i. e. Ur-Kasdim) must indicate that there was at least one other Ur which was not in land of the Chaldees. *Ur,* or *Uru,* means "the city" *par excellence,* and is found in other compound names, such as "Urushalim" (Jerusalem), which means the "city of safety," just as *Dar-ul-Salam,* in Arabic. The local god of Uru was Nannaru, or Sin, the Moon-god.

Abraham, therefore, was born in Ur of the Chaldees, a dynasty was ruling there which was not of Babylonian origin, but belonged to a race which was at once Hebrew and South Arabian. The contract-tablets prove that a population with similar characteristics was living under them in the country. Could there be a more *remarkable confirmation* of the statements which we find in the Xth chapter of Genesis? There we read that 'Unto Eber were born two sons: the name of the one was Paleg,' the ancestor of the Hebrews, while the name of the other was Joktan, the ancestor of the tribes of South Arabia. The parallelism, therefore, between the biblical account and the latest discovery of archeological science is thus *complete*, and makes it impossible to believe that the biblical narrative could have been compiled in Palestine at the late date to which our modern critics would assign."[45]

Amraphel, Hammurabi and the XIVth Chapter of Genesis.

Another instance in which, according to Sayce and Hommel, Oriental Archeology has disproved the conclusions of higher criticism is furnished by the XIVth chapter of Genesis. Here again from the philologically *possible* and historically only *probable* identity of Hammurabi with Amraphel, king of Shinar, of Arioch with Rim-sin or Eriaku, king of Ellasar, and of Chedorlaomer with Kudur-lagamar, king of Elam, they conclude that consequently the episode narrated in the XIVth chapter of Genesis, notwithstanding the many chronological difficulties and historical improbabilities, must needs be strictly historical, and probably copied by an Israelitish scribe from an original Babylonian or Canaanitish document preserved in some Canaanitish state-archive. "The historical character of Chedorlaomer's campaign has been *amply vindicated by the monuments*," Sayce concludes,[46]

[45] *Patriarchal Palestine*, pp. vii-viii; and his article on "The Limitations of Archeology as a Substitute for Old Testament History," in the *Homiletic Review*, vol. XXXIV, (1897) pp. 198-199. Sayce's argument is, of course, endorsed by Hommel: "Ancient Hebrew Tradition," etc., pp. 94-96. In the light of Babylonian monuments and inscriptions it cannot be shown that a distinct Hebrew race lived in Babylonia at the time of Hammurabi, or even several centuries later. Considering the limitations of our actual knowledge of early and primitive Semitic tongues and personal nomenclature, it is extremely hazardous to speak of the names *Abraham*, *Jacob*, *Joseph*, and others as being distinctly Hebrew. Names compounded with *El* (God) are frequent not only in the Pentateuch and in the early Arabian inscriptions, but occur also among the heathen nations bordering on Palestine long after the return of the Jews from Exile. If there is anything obscure in the entire domain of Hebrew history it is precisely the beginning of the Hebrew nation, and Assyro-Babylonian discoveries have complicated the problem rather than solved it.

[46] "Palestine in the Light of Archeology," in the *Homiletic Review*, 1897, p. 205. In his *Early History of the Hebrews*, p. xvi, the same author says: "The story of Chedorlaomer's campaign preserved in Genesis has found *complete verification*." See also his *Higher Criticism and the Verdict of the Monuments*, 1895, p. 171.

and, further, that its strictly historical character "has been *verified in a very complete manner*";[47] that the points in which the narrative in Genesis have been verified and illustrated by Assyriological research are "more than sufficient to *prove its historical character*, and to indicate that it has been derived from a Babylonian source";[48] that the fact in question "is an encouragement to those who believe in the historical credibility of the Pentateuch, and it is also one which those who belong to the school of skeptical criticism will find it impossible to explain away".[49] Prof. Hommel goes still further, so far indeed, as to tell us even of the original source from which Genesis XIV was derived, viz. a Cuneiform original written in Babylonian, rescued from the archives of the pre-Israelitish kings of Salem (i. e. Jerusalem), and preserved in the archives of the temple at Jerusalem.[50] Prof. Sayce, of course, indorses Hommel's statement in the matter, adding that the account "must have come, therefore, from the official chronicles of Babylonia from one of those historical works, in fact, which we know to have been current in Babylonia, which would have formed part of the literature studied in the schools and stored in the libraries of Canaan in the age of Babylonian supremacy and influence".[51]

After this one ceases to wonder that the Sayce-Hommel statements and inferences have been characterized by Dr. Bevan as a "fairy palace of conjecture, built upon the slenderest foundation".[52] It is evident that the simple occurrence of historical names in a narrative is no guarantee whatever of historical truth.[53] In reading Sayce's

[47] *Op. cit.* loc. cit.

[48] *Op. cit.*, loc. cit.

[49] *Palestine in the Light of Archeology, op. cit.*, p. 205.

[50] "The balance of probability inclines in favor of a Cuneiform original. An original, moreover, dating not from the post-exilic period but from Jerusalem, in or soon after the time of Abraham, a Hebrew translation of which must have been incorporated into the main stock of the Pentateuch at a very early date," (*Ancient Hebrew Tradition*, p. 191). And on pp. 151-2, he tells us that "For the rest, the very fact that the text (of Gen. xiv) has fallen into confusion from verse 17 onwards —taken in conjunction with the presence of so many obscure and archaic expressions, which it was necessary to explain to later generations by means of glosses—is the best possible proof of the very high antiquity of this whole chapter. Probably the original, which seems to have been written in Babylonian, was rescued from the archives of the pre-Israelitish kings of Salem (Jerusalem) and preserved in the archives of the temple at Jerusalem."

[51] *Monument Facts and Higher Critical Fancies*, p. 63.

[52] *Critical Review*, vol. VII (1897), pp. 410-411.

[53] *Op. cit.*, loc. cit.

and Hommel's statements, the non-expert reader will naturally imagine that there must have been discovered, somewhere in the ruins of Babylonia or Palestine, a Cuneiform text dated from about 2250 B. C. in which the narrative of Genesis XIV is found in its integrity with the mention of Abraham, Melchizedek, etc., and he will conclude that, therefore, the conclusions of the modern school of biblical criticism concerning the date and the historical improbabilities of many of the details of that narrative, have been entirely overthrown by the Assyro-Babylonian monuments. Such a reader will be surprised to find that the narrative in Genesis XIV has not been confirmed, or vindicated by the Babylonian monuments. No mention is found in any of the inscriptions, of the Mesopotamian raid in Canaan in the time of Hammurabi and Abraham; nor can any proof be adduced in favor of the theory of the Mosaic, or pre-Mosaic date of the original narrative of Genesis XIV. Prof. Driver justly remarks that "Monumental evidence that the narrative is historical is at present entirely lacking".[54] All that the Babylonian monuments have revealed to us can be reduced to the following facts: (1) That Amraphel, Arioch and Chedorlaomer of Genesis XIV, are *probably* identical with Hammurabi, Rim-Sin (Eri-aku), and Kudur-lagamar of the Babylonian inscriptions. (2). That the two first mentioned kings seem to have been contemporaries, and (3) that the political and literary influence of Babylonia was dominant in Canaan centuries before the age of Abraham. The monuments consequently have shown this, and only this, viz. that an invasion of Palestine and neighboring countries on the part of a Babylonian ruler was, in the abstract, within the military possibilities of the age.[55] "They have not shown more than this. They make no mention of the particular expedition into Canaan which forms the principal subject of Gen. XIV., and they name neither Abraham nor Melchizedek, nor any one of the five Canaanite kings against whom the expedition was directed. Obviously, the monu-

[54] *Commentary on Genesis*, 1904, pp. 172-173; also p. xlix ff., and the same author's *Introduction to the Literature of the Old Testament*, 9th ed., 1899, pp. xvii-xviii; as well as his valuable essay on "Hebrew Authority" in Dr. Hogarth's *Authority and Archeology, Sacred and Profane*, London, 1899, pp. 44-45. Cf. also G. A. Smith, *Modern Criticism and the Preaching of the Old Testament*, 1902, p. 56 ff; Bevan, A. A., in the *Critical Review*, 1897, pp. 406-415, also vol. IV (1894), pp. 123-127; Cheyne, *Bible Problems and the Material for Their Solution*, 1904, pp. 146-150; W. H. Bennett, "Archeology and Criticism," in the *Contemporary Review*, 1906, pp. 518-527; Peters, *The Old Testament and the New Scholarship*, 1902, Part IV, esp. pp. 248-249.

[55] G. A. Smith, *Modern Criticism and the Preaching of the Old Testament*, p. 100; and Driver, *Authority and Archeology*, p. 44.

ments cannot corroborate the account of the expedition which they do not mention, or even by implication presuppose."[56] The campaign described in Gen. XIV may in outline be historical but the evidence that it was so is for the present confined to that which is supplied by the Biblical narrative itself.[57]

The Art of Writing and the Mosaic Authorship of the Pentateuch.

Another instance in which, according to Sayce, Oriental archeology has scored another victory against the Higher Criticism is the fact nowadays universally admitted, although formerly controverted, that the art of writing was known and extensively used not only in Babylonia and Egypt but also in Palestine and Syria centuries before the age of Moses. From this fact Sayce argues that, therefore, the traditional theory concerning the antiquity and Mosaic authorship of the Pentateuch is substantially correct.

"The assumption, he tells us, upon which the method and results of the Higher Criticism rest has been disproved by archeological research. Moses not only could have written the Pentateuch, but it would have been little short of a miracle had he not been a scribe...Centuries before Abraham was born, Egypt and Babylonia were alike full of schools and libraries, of teachers and pupils, of poets and prose-writers, and of the literary works which they had composed."[58] "The huge edifice of modern Pentateuchal Criticism," he tells us in another work, "is based on a theory and an assumption. The theory is that of the literary analysis of the Hexateuch, the assumption that a knowledge of writing in Israel was of comcomparatively late date." Hence, he argues, the discovery of the fact that the art of writing was long known and practiced in Babylonia, Egypt, Canaan and all over Eastern Asia "has vindicated the antiquity and credibilty of the narratives of the Pentateuch; it has proved that the Mosaic age was a highly literary one, and that, consequently, the marvel would be, not that Moses should have written, but that he should not have done so; and it has *undermined the foundation on which the documentary hypothesis of the origin of the Pentateuch has been built*;" and so, "A single archeological discovery has *destroyed*

[56]Driver, *Commentary on Genesis*, p. 172-173.

[57]Driver, *op. cit.*, loc. cit. For a discussion of the xivth chapter of Genesis, see the writer's study "The XIVth Chapter of Genesis in the Light of Modern Biblical Criticism and Oriental Archeological Discoveries," in the *New York Review*, vol. II (1906), pp. 204-243. In the case of Hommel, it is hardly conceivable how he can insist on the identity of Amraphel and Hammurabi, since, according to his system of Biblico-Oriental chronology, Abraham, who is supposed to have been contemporary with Amraphel, is placed several centuries earlier than Hammurabi. This last remark has the force of an "argumentum ad hominem" only; for, according to other Assyriologists, the Hebrew patriarch and the Babylonian monarch were to all appearances contemporary.

[58]*Monument Facts and Higher Critical Fancies*, pp. 29 and 42.

the base of operations from which a one-sided criticism of Old Testament history had started.[59]

The statement that "the Mosaic age was a highly literary one" is very debatable, but it would be too long to discuss here. Suffice it to say that if modern criticism rejects the theory of the Mosaic authorship of the Pentateuch it is for other reasons than the absence of a contemporaneous literature, or the assumption that the art of writing was unknown or not by Moses and by the Hebrews of his age. The question whether the art of writing was known among the Hebrews at the Mosaic age is of secondary importanec, for even though decided in the affirmative, it does not settle the question of the Mosaic authorship of the Pentateuch. That Moses could have written memoirs and records is undeniable, but that he actually wrote the Pentateuch is quite another question; a question to be decided on other grounds than the one which Prof. Sayce has arbitrarily chosen.

The Code of Hammurabi and the Mosaic Legislation.

Another archeological discovery which, according to Sayce and his followers, has dealt a death blow to the modern school of Pentateuchal criticism is the discovery of the Code of Hammurabi, the oldest code of laws in the world, and at least ten centuries older than Moses. As is well known, the modern biblical school rejects the Mosaic authorship of the various legislations of the Pentateuch, with the exception of the Code of the Covenant.[60] Yet Prof. Sayce thinks that the compilation of a code of law similar to the Pentateuchal legislation, in Babylon, and at a much earlier date, is evidence of the Mosaic authorship of the Pentateuch.[61] As Dr. Bennett remarks, "Parallels between an organized, civilized empire (i. e. Babylonia) and a handful of nomad tribes are precarious."[62] "At any rate, all that the existence of the Code of Hammurabi could possibly show is that Moses *might* have given laws to Israel; but there is a far cry from this to the position that Moses gave to Israel *all* the laws found in the Pentateuch. Modern scholars recognize that Moses may have

[59] *The Higher Criticism and the Verdict of the Monuments*, pp. 1-60; and his article "Archeology versus Old Testament Literary Criticism," in the *Homiletic Review*, 1896, pp. 100-101. (Italics are ours).

[60] See the writer's article "The Four Hebrew Legislations of the Pentateuch," in the *New York Review*, vol. I (1905-6) pp. 616-639, and the authorities quoted there.

[61] *Monument Facts and Higher Critical Fancies*, and the *Contemporary Review*, 1906, p. 519.

[62] "Archeology and Criticism," in the *Contemporary Review*, (1906) p. 519.

given laws to Israel, and that some of these may still be found in the Pentateuch. The similarities between the Code of Hammurabi and the Pentateuchal legislation support rather the modern view, because the portions of the Pentateuch in which they occur are those which criticism recognizes as the oldest. At the same time it must be remembered that the Code of Hammurabi seems to have been well known in Babylon and Assyria from the time of its compilation till after the Exile, so that Israelite legislators of any period might well have been influenced by it."[63]

Hebrew Proper Names and the Antiquity of the Pentateuch.

Another archeological discovery which, according to the Sayce-Hommel school, has vindicated the theory of the antiquity and, possibly, of the Mosaic authorship of the Pentateuch is the fact that certain forms of proper names which occur in the Pentateuch are found to have been used in Babylonia and South Arabia at a very early period. Hence, they conclude, this fact sufficiently proves the antiquity of the Pentateuch, as against the modern critical theory which holds to its late origin.

This is substantially the thesis maintained by Hommel in his *Ancient Hebrew Tradition.*

"For years past," he tells us, "I have been convinced that the question of the authenticity of the Ancient Hebrew Tradition could not be finally decided, until the Hebrew personal names found in the Old Testament had first been exhaustively compared with other contemporary names of similar formation and carefully checked by them." "One of the main objects, therefore, which I have kept before me in writing the present book, has been to adduce external evidence (i. e. from contemporary inscriptions) to show that even from the time of Abraham onwards personal names of the characteristically Mosaic type were in use among a section of the Semites of Western Asia, and that it is consequently useless to talk any longer of a later post-exilic invention."[64]

But even so, what is the consequence? From the fact that the Book of Isaiah or of Jeremiah contains many Hebrew proper names

[63] *Op. cit.*, loc. cit. On the relation between the Mosaic legislation and the Code of Hammurabi, see the exhaustive bibliography at the end of the writer's article "The Code of Hammurabi," in the *New York Review*, vol. I (1905-1906), pp. 194-197. The reason why the Higher Critics reject the Mosaic authorship of the Law of Holiness, the Priestly and the Deuteronomic legislations of the Pentateuch is not because Moses could not have promulgated Codes of law and legislation, but for the reason that the legislation attributed to him reflects and bears the impress of much later times and conditions, times and conditions which do not in any way correspond to the Mosaic age.

[64] *Ancient Hebrew Tradition*, p. vi.

of the same form and type as those found in the Mosaic age, does it follow that those books have been or could have been written by a writer of the Mosaic age? Hommel cites a number of proper names as proofs of the extreme antiquity of the Pentateuch, but he overlooks the fact that names of the same, or of a similar type, are common in inscriptions admitted on all hands to be quite late. As Dr. Bevan remarks, out of the vast number of proper names cited by Professor Hommel, there are very few of which both the form and the date can be considered certain. But, setting this difficulty aside, and assuming that the forms and the dates are all correctly stated, what can we consider as established? Merely this, that certain forms of proper names which occur in the Pentateuch were used in Babylonia and Arabia at a very early period. But this does not even raise a presumption in favor of the antiquity of the Pentateuch, unless it can also be proved that the forms in question were no longer used in later times.[65] But as a matter of fact, this point is one which neither Prof. Hommel nor any body else has as yet proved, for the facts are against it. It is true that all through his book Prof. Hommel displays an immense amount of ingenuity and an extensive erudition, but the arbitrariness of his methods and conclusions destroys in large part the value of his labors.[66]

Abdi-Taba (Abdi-Kheba) and Melchizedek.

In some of the famous Tell-el-Amarna tablets, discovered in Egypt in 1887, and which date from the XVth and XVIth centuries B. C., i. e. about three centuries before Moses, we find certain letters addressed to Amenophis IV, King of Egypt, from a king of Jerusalem, Abdi-Taba (or Abdi-Kheba) by name (cir. 1430 B. C.). In one of these letters, among other things, Abdi-Taba says that "not from my father or my mother am I king, but from the arm of the mighty king," i. e. the Egyptian Pharaoh. When this letter was first published and deciphered Prof. Sayce immediately announced to the world that a wonderful confirmation of the story of Melchizedek, who is mentioned in the Epistle to the Hebrews (VII. 1) as being "without father or mother, without genealogy or beginning of days, nor end of life," was at last discovered.

"Two or three years ago," wrote Sayce, "it would have seemed a dream of the wildest enthusiasm to suggest that light would be thrown

[65] *Critical Review*, vol. VII (1897), p. 413.

[66] See the various discussions of Prof. Hommel's theory in the *Expository Times*, 1897, pp. 433 ff; 499 ff; 1898, pp. 54 ff; 96 ff; 221 ff; 273 ff; 362 ff, etc.

by modern discovery on the history of Melchizedek...and yet among the surprises which the tablets of Tell-el-Amarna had in store for us was the discovery that after all Melchizedek might well have been an historical personage...The *vindication of the historical character* of Melchizedek has important bearings on the value we must assign to those narratives of Genesis, the local colouring of which is Canaanite. The way, moreover, in which his historical character has been vindicated is equally important for Biblical criticism...Does it not follow that the history of Melchizedek and his reception of Abraham the Hebrew may have been derived from a cuneiform record of the age to which it refers, and does not its accordance with what we now know to be historical fact make it probable that such was the case? At all events criticism has no longer any serious argument to bring against the supposition; on the contrary the arguments are all upon the opposite side. It is much more probable that the story of Melchizedek was derived from the old clay records of Jerusalem than that it made its way into the pages of Genesis through the distorting medium of tradition. It is on the one hand too accurate in details, and on the other hand too unlike the picture a writer of the Jewish period would have imagined, to have had its source in popular tradition."[67] "The monuments, consequently, have shown that it is the critics and not the biblical writer who have been in error."[68]

It is impossible to see how the Tell-el-Amarna tablet in question has vindicated the historical character of Melchizedek, or to have demonstrated the antiquity and accuracy of the Abraham-Melchizedek narrative, as Hommel, Sayce and others claim. No mention of Melchizedek has as yet been found in the inscriptions. Some of the expressions Abdi-Taba uses have no similarity whatever with those of the Hebrew narrative, and consequently do not illustrate the position assigned to Melchizedek as King and priest or as a man with no genealogy; for the expression "the arm of the mighty king" (or, as Winckler, Ball, Jastrow and Pinches read, "the mighty arm of the king") does not refer to God (El-Elyon) but to the Pharaoh who had appointed Abdi-Taba king over Salem.[69] The date of the tablet is at

[67] *Higher Criticism and the Verdict of the Monuments*, pp. 173-178. (Italics ours).

[68] *Patriarchal Palestine*, p. 71. The same statements are repeated by Hommel: *Ancient Hebrew Tradition*, chap. v.

[69] Comp. the interesting controversy which arose, concerning this subject, between Prof. Sayce and Canon Driver in the columns of the *Expository Times*, vol. VII, (1896-7) pp. 340 ff; 478 ff; 565 ff; and vol. VIII pp. 43; 94; 142; 435; 464. This is Sayce's translation of Abdi-Taba's letter "Behold neither my father nor my mother has exalted me in this place; the *Prophecy* of the *Mighty King* has caused me to enter the house of my father. Why should I have committed a sin against the king my lord?" and in Tablet 103, lines 25 to 28, Abdi-Taba says again: "Behold: this country of the city of Jerusalem neither my father nor my mother has given it me; it (was) an *Oracle* [of the mighty king] that gave (it) to me;" From this erroneous translation Sayce argues that the expression "the oracle of the mighty king" refers to God, and in this expression he finds a parallelism

least 700 years later than the time of Melchizedek (if Amraphel be Hammurabi). All that Abdi-Taba's letters show is that already towards 1400 B. C., Jerusalem was a stronghold and an important place in Canaan; but they contain nothing which has any bearing on Melchizedek; and everything which Prof. Sayce has inferred from them on the subject will be found, if examined, to be destitute of all foundation.[70]

The Babylonian Account of the Deluge and the Composite Character of the Biblical Flood Narrative.

One of the strongest arguments Prof. Sayce adduces to show that Oriental Archeological discoveries have completely demolished the fabric of the Higher Criticism is derived from the Babylonian account of the Deluge, which bears such striking similarity with the corresponding biblical account found in Genesis VI-VIII.[71] In the Babylonian account we find in a single and apparently non-composite narrative many passages which have been regarded by the Higher Critics as composite in the parallel Hebrew narrative. Hence Sayce argues that the theory of the existence of two distinct and forcibly harmonized documents in the Biblical narrative of the Deluge is a fabrication of the Higher Critics.

"There is yet," he writes, "another test to which we can subject the results of the 'critical' school. There are cases in which recent archeological discovery has enabled us to put them to the proof. The most striking of these is the account of the Deluge contained in the Book of Genesis. Here, if anywhere, we should seem to be justified in inferring

and an explanation of the language used by Melchizedek. But as Halévy, Zimmern, Jastrow and other Assyriologists have pointed out, in the above letter there is no mention of an *oracle*, for the word translated by Sayce as *oracle* is to be translated *arm*; and the *mighty king* refers not to God, but to Pharaoh, to whom the letter was addressed. Thus the correct meaning of Abdi-Taba's letter is that he (Abdi-Taba) had become King over Jerusalem not by reason of the royal blood of his father or mother, but simply through the favor and the power of the mighty Pharaoh who had appointed him.

[70]See Canon Driver's article in the *Guardian*, April 8, 1896, and the same author's *Commentary on Genesis*, p. 164-167. See also Ball, *Light From the East*, London, 1899, p. 89; and Pinches, *The Old Testament in the Light of the Historical Records of Assyria and Babylonia*, pp. 233-36, and 239 f.

[71]The Babylonian account of the Deluge was first discovered in 1872 by George Smith while arranging the various Assyrian tablets of the British Museum for publication. See the interesting account of this discovery in Prof. Roger's *History of Assyria and Babylonia* (in 2 vols. New York, 1901), vol. I, pp. 229 ff; and Hilprecht's *Explorations in Bible Lands During the Nineteenth Century*, Philadelphia, 1903, pp. 191 ff.

the existence of a composite narrative, in which at least two stories of the Flood have been mixed or combined together. But it so happens that a Babylonian story of the Flood, which goes back in its present form to the age of Abraham, has been preserved in the Chaldean epic of Gilgames. When we compare this story with the account in Genesis, we find that it agrees not only with the so-called Elohistic version, but with the so-called Yahvistic version as well. It thus presupposes an account of the Deluge in which the Elohistic and Yahvistic elements were already combined together. And since it was written some centuries before the birth of Moses, there are only two ways of accounting for the fact, if the narrative in Genesis is really a composite one. Either the Babylonian poet had before him the present text of Genesis, or else the Elohist and Yahvist must have copied the Babylonian story on the mutual understanding that the one should insert what the other omitted. There is no third alternative. It follows from all this that the critical method is scientifically unsound, and its results accordingly will not stand the application of a scientific test."[72] "The Babylonian account of the Deluge, then, presupposes the biblical account in its full integrity. What becomes, therefore, of that 'literary analysis' of the latter which the 'Higher Criticism claims to have made?...The account of the Deluge is a critical test of the soundness of that purely philological criticism which has decomposed the text of Scripture into a literary mosaic, has assigned its component elements to comparatively late date, and on the strength of this has denied the historical trustworthiness of the narrative and the Mosaic origin of the Law. Like the Ptolemaic theory of the universe, the so-called 'critical' theory of the character of the Pentateuch is consistent and imposing enough when helped out by a constantly increasing number of assumptions and fresh hypotheses, but, like the Ptolemaic theory when compared with the Copernican, the 'critical' theory breaks down so soon as it can be compared with the facts of archeological discovery."[73]

Does Prof. Sayce mean to say that because a certain narrative is not composite in one literature it must be necessarily also non-composite in others? And, even supposing that the Babylonian narrative, in part or in whole, is not composite in character (which many Assyriologists deny) must it necessarily follow that the Hebrew one is also of non-composite character? In Tatian's *Diatesseron* we have the various Gospel narratives in one single harmonious account; must we conclude, then, that the four Gospels were actually written by the same author? The Synoptic Gospels furnish us with the best refutation of Prof. Sayce's conclusions. Prof. Bennett, in an interesting article in the *Contemporary Review*, has mathematically shown how starting from a supposition mutually agreed upon by both schools, it is perfectly possible that the Biblical account of the Deluge may be composite, and yet its parallel Babylonian narrative be not—composite.

[72] *Monument Facts and Higher Critical Fancies*, pp. 20-21.

[73] "Archeology versus Old Testament Literary Criticism," in the *Homiletic Review*. 1896, p. 103.

"Let us suppose," he tells us, "that the Babylonian story fairly represents the original Semitic tradition, and let us represent this tradition by a formula *A plus b plus c plus d*. The narrative *P* (Priestly) and *J* (Yahwistic) obtained by analysis are separate and partly independent developments of this tradition. Both to a certain extent take the same portions of the tradition, say *A;* and also omit the same portions, say *b; P* takes a portion *c* which *J* omits; and *J* takes a portion *d* which *P* omits; each adds features peculiar to itself, *f* and *g* respectively. This is the natural process. The results are:

P equals *A plus c plus f*
J equals A plus d plus g

and the composite narrative *P plus J equals A plus c plus d plus f plus g*. So that the portions *c* and *d*, once combined in the original tradition, and then existing separately in *P* and *J*, are again combined, when *P* and *J* are combined. Nothing is simpler."[74] We can hardly believe in Prof. Sayce's sincerity when he says that the Babylonian account of the Flood has shaken to its very foundations the critical theory of the composite character of the Biblical Flood-narrative. The modern critics base their conclusions in the matter on philological and literary arguments which no student, no matter how much of an archeologist he is, can possibly doubt or deny; and there is not, in fact, a single critic even of the most conservative tendencies, who does not nowadays admit the composite character of the Biblical narrative in question, notwithstanding Prof. Sayce's startling discoveries and denunciations.

Babylonian Mythological Literature and the Early Chapters of Genesis.

Another impression which has gained wide currency is that the first ten chapters of Genesis, in which an account is given of the creation of the world and of the first man, of the garden of Eden, the tree of life and the tree of the knowledge of good and evil, the ten ante-diluvian patriarchs, the Deluge, the Tower of Babel and the confusion of tongues, etc., have received confirmation from the Assyro-Babylonian monuments and inscriptions. This much is true, that we have discovered in the literature of the ancient Babylonians certain accounts concerning the creation of the world and of mankind, of the Garden of Delights, of the Tree of Life, of the existence of ten ante-diluvian kings, or patriarchs, and of the Deluge, etc. which bear striking resemblances

[74] "Archeology and Criticism," in the *Contemporary Review*, 1906 (April), p. 526.

to the parallel accounts in Genesis. But it would be most unwise for apologists to conclude too hastily that this fact proves that the Genesiac narratives are necessarily historical, or that the traditions incorporated in these Hebrew and Babylonian accounts represent primitive *historical* traditions? On the contrary, the solution very generally accepted among scholars is that both accounts represent only poetical, legendary, and philosophico-theological speculations and traditions; the Hebrew narrative being based on the old Babylonian sources which in their literary form go back as far as the fourth millennium B. C., or two thousand years before Abraham and three thousand years before Moses. These Assyro-Babylonian legends and traditions are held to be of importance only in so far as they give us valuable data for the comparative study of Babylonian, Hebrew and, ingeneral, Semitic legends and mythology.[75] It is necessary for the apologist to realise this situation and to decide on his attitude with regard to it. Until he has done so, he has not touched the question at issue.[76]

IV

The foregoing discussion, covering eight of the principal instances generally urged as demonstrating the failure of the Higher Criticism of the Old Testament from an archeological standpoint, is sufficient, we trust, to mitigate the really dangerous over-confidence which many good people seem to put in the sweeping assertions of the Sayce-Hommel school. Of course, by calling *confirmation* that which is purely *illustration*, *certain* that which is only *probable*, *demonstrated* that which is *possible* or *plausible*, *fact* that which is only a *theory*, and *proved* that which is *to be proved*, rapid progress may apparently

[75]See Dr. Gunkel's valuable introduction to his *Commentary on Genesis* (1902), published also separately in English under the title *The Legends of Genesis*, Chicago, 1904; and Abbé Loisy, *Les Mythes Babyloniens et les premiers chapitres de la Genèse*, Paris, 1896.

[76]It is evident that, in the same way as in the parables of the Gospels the theological and ethico-religious value inculcated by the same does not depend on the historical character of the narrative itself, so also the ethico-philosophical teaching of the book of Job, Jonas and others does not depend on the historical character of the narratives themselves; for we know that those books represent philosophico-religious parables and allegories. So also is the case of the early chapters of Genesis, the aim of which is not to give a strict history of the origin of the world and of primitive mankind, but simply to give a philosophico-ethical exposition of the various problems connected with the idea of creation, of the absolute supremacy and power of the divine Being, of the origin and propagation of mankind, of the origin of evil, of the development of primitive civilization and art, etc. Hence their value is primarily theological and ethical.

be accomplished, and the most startling discoveries may be confidently announced, but it is pure illusion.[77]

It should not, however, be imagined for a moment that we are seeking to mimimize the exceptional value of Oriental Archeology for the critical study and the apologetical defence of the Old Testament. Oriental archeology has rendered, indeed, many valuable services for the correct understanding of the Old Testament in its triple aspects of history, religion and literature. Our purpose is to show that the contention of a certain school that Oriental archeological discoveries have been "distinctly unfavorable" to the Higher Criticism, or that they have contradicted its main results and conclusions, is a delusion, more dangerous to those who maintain it than it is to their opponents.

The true relation between Oriental archeology and the light which it has thrown on the Old Testament has been stated in a masterly way by two eminent Old Testament scholars: Dr. George Adam Smith, of Glasgow, and Prof. Driver, of Oxford. The former, speaking of the light Oriental Archeology has thrown on some of the narratives of Genesis, remarks: "Nor can archeology furnish us with contemporary evidence of the Patriarchs and their careers. Archeology has indeed restored much of the life to which they belong. It has shown us that in the time of Abraham, whom the documents assert to have come out of Mesopotamia in Palestine, there was constant traffic between these countries. The city to which the early home of his family is assigned, has been identified and explored. Ur of the Chaldees lies on the borders of Arabia and Babylonia.

"The settlement there of a nomadic Arabian tribe, such as the earliest records of Israel prove them to have been in genius and temperament; their contact for a time with civilization; their half-weaning from the desert and subsequent migration northwards along the Euphrates to Haran and then South into Canaan, are all illustrated not only by archeology but by the drift of Arabian tribes upon Mesopotamia and Syria within historical times. These last also make possible the wanderings of such a half-settled family as Abraham's upon the desert borders of Southern Palestine and Egypt. The four Mesopotamian kings, of whose invasion of Canaan and pursuit by Abraham we are told in Genesis XIV, were really contemporaries; and at least three of them ruled over the countries of which they are said in Genesis XIV to have ruled; and their invasion of Palestine

[77]Cf. Bevan, *op. cit.*, loc. cit.

was in the abstract, within the military possibilities of the age. The existence of the names Jacob and Joseph has been discovered in Palestine at an earlier age than the Exodus; the name 'Israel,' as a people, in touch with Egypt, has been deciphered upon a stele of the Pharaoh under whom the Exodus probably took place. And not only does the story of Joseph reflect the social customs, the economic processes, and the official etiquette of the kingdom of the Pharaohs; but the settlement of a semi-nomad tribe in Goshen, at first in favor with the court of Egypt, and then, on the succession of another dynasty, oppressed and enslaved, has also been proved to be perfectly possible in the history of Egypt between the eighteenth and fourteenth centuries.

"But, just as we have seen that in all this archeological evidence there is nothing to prove the early date of the documents which contain the stories of the Patriarchs, but on the contrary, even a little which strengthens the critical theory of their late date, so now we must admit that while archeology has richly illustrated the possibility of the main outlines of the Book of Genesis from Abraham to Joseph, it has not one whit of proof to offer for the personal existence or characters of the Patriarchs themselves. Where formerly the figure of the 'Father of the Faithful' and his caravans moved solemnly in high outline through an almost empty world, we see, (by the aid of the monuments) embassies, armies, and long lines of traders crossing, by paths still used, the narrow bridge which Palestine forms between the two great centres of early civilization; the constant drift of desert tribes upon the fertile land, and within the latter the frequent villages in their busy fields, the mountain-keeps with the Egyptian garrisons, and the cities on their mound walled life we peer in vain for any trace of the fathers of the Hebrews; we listen in vain for any mention of their names. This is the whole change archeology has wrought; it has given us a background and an atmosphere for the stories of Genesis; it is unable to recall or to certify their heroes."[78]

Dr. Driver holds that "The attempt to refute the conclusions of criticism by means of archeology has signally failed."[79] "The archeological discoveries of recent years have indeed been of singular interest and value; they have thrown a flood of light, sometimes as surprising as it was unexpected, upon a previously dark and unknown region of

[78] *Modern Criticism and the Preaching of the Old Testament*, London-New York, 1902, pp. 99-102.

[79] *Introduction to the Literature of the Old Testament*, 9th ed., p. xviii.

antiquity. But, in spite of the ingenious hypotheses which have been framed to prove the contrary, they have revealed nothing which is in conflict with the generally accepted conclusions of critics. I readily allow that there are some critics who combine with their literary criticism of the Old Testament an historical criticism which appears to me to be unreasonable and extreme, and I am not prepared to say that isolated instances do not exist, in which opinions expressed by one or another of these critics may have to be reconsidered in the light of recent discoveries; but the idea that the monuments furnish a refutation of the general critical position is a pure illusion."[80]

Indeed, Oriental Archeology is so far from being in antagonism with the main results of Biblical criticism that Professor Sayce himself does not hesitate to confess that "It must not be supposed that Oriental Archeology and Higher Criticism are irreconcilable foes. On the contrary we shall see that in many respects the learning and acumen of the long line of critics who have labored and fought over the words of the Scripture have not been altogether in vain. Much has been established by them, which the progress of Oriental research tends more and more to confirm. There are narratives and statements in the Old Testament as to which the scepticism of the critic has been shown to be justified. The judgment he has passed on the so-called historical chapters of the Book of Daniel has been abundantly verified by the recent discoveries of Assyriology. The same evidence and the same arguments which have demonstrated that the scepticism of the Higher Criticism was hasty and unfounded in certain instances have equally demonstrated that it was well founded in others."[81]

V

Another fundamental error of the Sayce-School regarding the value of Oriental Archeology in its bearings upon the critical study of the Old Testament is that, while they unduly exaggerate the importance of archeology, they belittle the value of literary and historical criticism.

"It is clear," Sayce tells us, "that there is only one test of the truthfulness of history which is scientifically acceptable. The test is contemporaneous evidence. The evidence may be of various kinds, the facts, of which it consists may be literary and epigraphical, or of a more or less material nature. The more material they are, indeed, the more certain are the conclusions to be derived from them. Literary evidence may be

[80] *Op. cit.*, loc. cit.

[81] *The Higher Criticism and the Verdict of the Monuments*, pp. 27-28.

explained away or misinterpreted, inscriptions may be broken and imperfect, but the evidence of potsherds and forms of art is evidence which, once acquired, is acquired for ever, and constitutes a solid foundation of fact upon which to build. In other words, the more archeological and the less philological our evidence is, the greater will be its claim to scientific authority...It is archeology and not philology that has to do with history. The study of language and the study of the past history of mankind belong to different departments of thought. We cannot exact history out of grammars and dictionaries, and the attempt to do so has always ended in failure. For the purpose of history philology can be only accidentally of service, only in so far as it throws light on the meaning of a literary record or assists in the decipherment of an ancient inscription...In the eyes, therefore, of inductive science there is only one admissible test of the authenticity and trustworthiness of an ancient record, and that is an archeological test. So far as the historical side of the question is concerned the philologist pure and simple is ruled out of court. It is the archeological evidence of Egyptology and Assyriology, and not the philological evidence, which can alone be applied to the settlement of historical disputes."[82]

It is not difficult to show that Prof. Sayce and his followers greatly underrate the value of comparative Semitic philology and of historical and literary criticism when these are applied in a scientific way. Indeed these sciences cover a wide range of facts and are more fruitful in historical results than pure Archeology. The history and the development of a language, or of a class of languages, is the history of the development of the thought of the people who spoke them; and as these languages have been the transmitting vehicle, so they now constitute the record of their religious and social evolution. Consequently, the comparative and scientific study of Hebrew and the other Semitic languages must necessarily guide us in those deep literary and historical investigations of remote ages where Archeology utterly fails to give us any clue, or evidence, or illustration. In the second place, Sayce and his followers underrate the real value of historical criticism which has given us such excellent and unexpected

[82] *Monument Facts and Higher Critical Fancies*, pp. 11-13. Prof. Sayce's deficiency and lack of knowledge of the most recent investigations and results in the domain of Old Testament literary and historical criticism is apparent to any one who peruses his works even in the most superficial way. He shows not the slightest acquaintance with modern exegetical and critical works, and his conception of modern Old Testament criticism is based on his former knowledge of twenty-five years ago, which is quite antiquated, indeed. In this respect, his distinguished friend and admirer, Prof. Hommel of Munich, occupies in the biblical-scientific world an altogether different standing, for, with a rare acquaintance with Oriental history, literature and archeology, the distinguished German Assyriologist combines a very extensive and accurate knowledge of the leading problems of Old Testament exegesis and criticism.

results. The books of the Old Testament, it must be remembered, unlike those of the Egyptians, Assyrians, Babylonians and other peoples of the ancient East, are mainly composite in character, and in many instances written centuries after the happening of the events which they relate. Moreover, they are distinctly anonymous. There is no literature in which so many anonymous and pseudonymous writings are to be found as in that of the ancient Hebrews,—which is one of the proofs of their composite character. The origin, date, and historical value of the Old Testament writings should be, consequently, investigated from the only possible scientific standpoint, viz.: that of literary and historical criticism; for it is preposterous to expect from Oriental Archeology any evidence for the settlement of problems eminently literary and critical. Since tradition fails to supply us with tenable historical data concerning the origin and authorship of the books of the Old Testament, we must perforce apply to them the rules and canons of internal analysis and of literary and historical criticism which are not so badly needed in the case of ancient contemporary monuments and inscriptions.

Prof. Sayce finds further grounds for disparaging the efficacy of internal criticism in the facts that the Old Testament, being an Oriental production, is not in accordance with our modern Occidental ideals and standards; and that it is written in a language which is not only dead but also imperfectly known. Accordingly, he concludes that we must never rely on philological and literary methods of investigation and criticism.

"Still less," he tells us, "can we look for help to what has been called 'literary tact.' Literary tact is but another name for a purely subjective impression, and the subjective impressions of a modern European in regard to ancient Oriental history are not likely to be of value. It is quite certain that an ancient Oriental author would not have written as we should write, or as we should have expected him to write; and consequently the very fact that an ancient Oriental document does not conform to our modern canons of criticism is an argument in favor of its genuineness. A document written in accordance with the critical requirements of a German professor can never have come to us from the ancient East."[83] "How then," he goes on, "is it possible for the European scholar of to-day to analyse an Old Hebrew Book into its component parts, to lay down with mathematical accuracy what section of the same verse belongs to one writer, what to a second, and what to a third, and even to fix the relative dates of these hypothetical authors? Hebrew is a language that is very imperfectly known; it has long ceased to be spoken; only a fragment of its literature has come down to us, and that often in a corrupt state; and

[83] *Monument Facts, etc.*, p. 13.

the meaning of many of the words which have survived, and even of the grammatical forms, is uncertain and disputed. In fact, it is just this fragmentary and imperfect knowledge of the language which has made the work and results of the Higher Criticism possible. The 'critical' analysis of the Pentateuch is but a measure of our ignorance and the limitations of our knowledge. What is impossible in the case of modern English or French novels must be still less possible in the case of the Old Testament Scriptures. With fuller knowledge would come a recognition of the futility of the task."[84]

One is tempted to reply that with "fuller knowledge" of the facts and of Old Testament Criticism, Prof. Sayce would soon have to recognize the futility of his task in attacking the modern school of Old Testament Criticism. Of course, the Hebrew language is a dead language, and, consequently, the knowledge of it is not as perfect and complete as in the case of our modern languages. But that our actual knowledge of Hebrew is so imperfect as to make it impossible for us even to distinguish differences of style and diction, or to note the differences between the Hebrew of the Mosaic and that of the exilic and post-exilic ages, is an assetiron to which Prof. Sayce himself would hardly be tempted to subscribe. The Hebrew language is undoubtedly better known than any other ancient Semitic or Aryan language; and if Prof. Sayce had only examined the contents of the last edition of Gesenius-Kautzsch Hebrew Grammar, or the English translation of the 26th edition of it, by the Rev. G. W. Collins and A. E. Cowley (Oxford 1898) in 600 pages octavo; or Dr. E. König's masterly work *Historisch-Kritisches Lehrgebaude der Hebraischen Sprache* in three large volumes (Leipzig 1881-1897); or the same author's *Stilistik, Rhetorik, Poetik, in Bezug auf die biblische Literature Komparativisch dargestelt* (Liepzig 1900); or the Oxford Hebrew-English Lexicon (now completed) by Brown, Driver, and Briggs, of about 1200 closely compressed pages in quarto,he would hardly have committed himself to such a statement. Our knowledge of Hebrew, thanks to the progress of Assyrian, South Arabian, Syriac, Ethiopic and Aramaic philology and especially the comparative grammar and lexicography of these Semitic languages, has advanced in the last twenty-five years to such a degree as to leave little to be desired. Of course particular points will always remain obscure, but these few instances are of

[84] *Op. cit.*, loc. cit., pp. 19-20. Sayce's utterances and remarks concerning our imperfect knowledge of Hebrew find wonderful confirmation in his own case. This otherwise distinguished Oxford Assyriologist has repeatedly made a pitiful show of his knowledge of Hebrew. See Dr. A. A. Bevan in the *Critical Review*, vol. IV (1894), pp. 125 ff.

secondary importance when compared with what is definitely established.

As for Prof. Sayce's remark concerning the character of Oriental writings, let me say that we Orientals are not aware that lack of logic, of consistency, of harmony and of common sense are the characteristic features of the literary productions of the East. We readily admit that the ideals and standards of Oriental writers are in many cases quite different from those of the Occidentals; but we do not therefore feel bound to relinquish our claims to the possession of the common prerogatives of rational beings. Logical connection of ideas, distinction between facts and fiction, co-ordination of cause and effect are certainly familiar to the Orientals, although not in the same degree and perfection as, to use Sayce's expression, in the case of a "German professor," and modern historians and critics. But no man has the right to assume that a biblical narrative, from the mere fact of its being Oriental, is necessarily illogical, inconsistent, and out of accordance with the ordinary requirements of literary taste and of common sense. We are far from denying or minimizing the great contrast which exists between the Oriental and the Occidental way of thinking and writing, but we do most firmly believe that Oriental and especially Biblical writings, in their original shape, were far more logical, connected, self-consistent and intelligible than Prof. Sayce imagines. Consequently our modern critics are fully justified in applying the approved methods of literary and historical criticism to the Old Testament writings. And if in some cases the method has been pushed too far, the responsibility for this rests not on the method itself, but on the excessive and too subjective attitude of some of the critics.

GABRIEL OUSSANI.

STUDIES

DIVORCE IN THE NEW TESTAMENT

AN EXEGETICAL STUDY. (III)

Francis E. Gigot, D. D.

The impartial study of Christ's words concerning divorce as recorded in our earliest Gospel clearly shows that in public (Mk. x, 2-9), Jesus set Himself up against the lawfulness of divorce, and that in private (Mk. x, 10-12), He expressly taught His disciples to look upon remarriage after divorce as entailing the guilt of adultery. The same unbiassed examination of the single verse in our third Gospel (Lk. xvi, 18), which refers to divorce, proves no less conclusively that St. Luke bears witness to the same teaching of Christ concerning divorce as is set forth in Mk. x, 2-12. This is the plain meaning of Lk. xvi, 18, and the closer its wording is studied in the light of its context and of its origin, the clearer it appears that, according to our third, as according to our second, Evangelist, Jesus condemned every remarriage after divorce as an adultery. In fact, the concordant testimony of these two Synoptic Gospels is so distinct that the Catholic apologist hardly feels the need of appealing to any other text of the Apostolic Age to confirm it and to substantiate his position that in forbidding remarriage after divorce the Church of God simply enforces Christ's injunction to that effect. In a matter of this importance, however, it manifestly behooves him to bring forth every available evidence in favor of his contention; and there is no doubt that in I Cor. vii, 10, 11, he is supplied with one of the greatest value. The right of this Epistle to be considered as the genuine work of St. Paul, the friend and master of "Luke, the beloved physician" (Col. iv, 14), is practically undisputed in the present day. The early date,—between 53 and 56 A. D.,—to which it is commonly ascribed, makes its composition anterior to that of our earliest evangelical narrative, the Gospel of St. Mark. When therefore in I Cor. vii. 10, 11, St. Paul answering the inquiry of an early Christian community[1] which he

[1]One of the objects of our First Epistle to the Corinthians was to answer the questions which the faithful of Corinth had asked of St. Paul in a letter of theirs which is no longer extant. (Cf. I Cor. vii, 1; viii, 1; xii, 1; xvi, 1, 12).

had founded rehearses the Lord's absolute command against divorce, his words are readily seen to contain a strong confirmation of the actual meaning of both Lk. xvi, 18, and Mk. x, 2-12. And it is the purpose of the present paper to set forth the exact meaning of this important passage of the First Epistle to the Corinthians.

The following parallel columns present side by side the original Greek of I Cor. vii, 10, 11, and its literal English rendering:

10.	Τοῖς δὲ γεγαμηκόσιν παραγγέλλω,	10. But to the married I command,
	οὐκ ἐγὼ, ἀλλὰ ὁ Κύριος,	not I, but the Lord,
	γυναῖκα ἀπὸ ἀνδρὸς μὴ χωρισθῆναι,	that a wife depart not from a husband,
11.	ἐὰν δὲ καὶ χωρισθῇ,	11 --but and if she depart,
	μενέτω ἄγαμος	let her remain unmarried
	ἢ τῷ ἀνδρὶ καταλλαγήτω,	or let her be reconciled to the husband.—
	καὶ ἄνδρα γυναῖκα μὴ ἀφιέναι.	and that a husband dismiss not a wife,

Whoever reads attentively this short passage will easily notice that it is made up of three several elements which all demand a careful examination from the unbiassed interpreter. The first is a brief introduction consisting of the two opening lines:

I Cor. vii, 10ab.
But to the married I command,
not I, but the Lord,

wherein we are told of St. Paul's intention in quoting the Lord's command. The second is made up of two lines also, viz.: the last line of the first verse, and the last one of the second verse, in the passage:

I Cor. vii.
10c that a wife depart not from a husband,
11d and that a husband dismiss not a wife.

It gives the command of Christ concerning divorce. The third is a parenthesis inserted between the two lines which set forth the Lord's command:

I Cor. vii, 11.
—but and if she depart,
let her remain unmarried
or let her be reconciled to the husband.—

In it the Apostle declares the duty of a woman who has separated herself from her husband.

The two lines wherewith St. Paul prefaces the Lord's command, claim first our attention. They refer to a well-defined class of members in the Corinthian community τοῖς δὲ γεγαμηκόσιν "but to the married," to a group perfectly distinct from those spoken of in the immediately preceding verses (verses 8, 9), where there is question

of those actually free from the marriage bond: "the unmarried and the widows." The persons spoken of here as "married," have been living in the married state, as shown by the use of the Greek perfect γεγαμηκόσιν and are both, the husband and the wife, Christians, since St. Paul considers them as subjected to his authority παραγγελλω "I command," and since he intends to treat of mixed marriages, that is, of marriages wherein either the husband or the wife is alone a Christian, only in the following section (verses 12-16). As Christian partners, "the married" are bound by a law which the Apostle thinks his duty to proclaim, but of which he expressly says he is not the author: "But to the married I command, not I, but the Lord." The law which binds them together in holy matrimony he distinctly traces back to Christ and represents as in full vigor for those who recognize Him as "the Lord." As well said by a leading Protestant commentator: "Paul knew from the living voice of tradition what commands Christ had given concerning divorce . . . ; [and] the authority of Christ lives on in His command."[2] From these opening lines then, St. Paul's frame of mind in writing I Cor. vii, 10, 11, can readily be seen: he wishes to enforce upon the married Christians of Corinth the peculiar command of Christ which referred to their state in life, and the tenor of which he knew through tradition.

After this introduction, the Apostle proceeds to quote the Lord's command. He sets it forth by means of two lines the first of which regards the wife, and the second concerns the husband:

I Cor. vii.

10c that a wife depart not from a husband,
11d and that a husband dismiss not a wife.

These two lines are indeed separated from each other by a parenthetical remark of St. Paul as stated above; yet, they actually belong together. They are the two clauses (note the conjunction καὶ "and" which unites them) of the one sentence which states the Lord's doctrine regarding the matter in hand, and on that account, they should be interpreted in immediate connection with each other. Again, especially in the original Greek, they run so closely parallel in construction:

I Cor. vii.

γυναῖκα ἀπὸ ἀνδρὸς μὴ χωρισθῆναι
καὶ ἄνδρα γυναῖκα μὴ ἀφιέναι

[2] H. A. W. Meyer, *Critical and Exegetical Handbook to the Epistles to the Corinthians*, Eng. Transl., p. 156. Funk and Wagnalls, New York, 1884.

that their parallelism was manifestly intended by St. Paul, and should therefore be made use of by the modern exegete to determine their precise meaning. And there is no doubt that whoever studies them impartially together and in the light of each other, is led to admit that, taken in their obvious sense, they ascribe to Christ an absolute rejection of divorce. They both evidently refer to the bond which unites a man and a woman in the married state, since they speak of "a husband" and "a wife." They both contemplate the possibility of an actual separation of the parties concerned that would go against that sacred bond. As regards the exact nature of that separation, they both describe it in words which "are taken from the [New Testament] phraseology of divorce,"[3] so that the natural meaning of the terms expressing it cannot be doubted for a moment. One of these terms,—the one applied here to a wife's separation from her husband, is χωρίζειν the precise verb used by Our Lord in Mk. x, 9, and Mt. xix, 6, to forbid the breaking of the marriage tie: "what therefore God has joined together, let not man put asunder" (μὴ χωρίζειν). The second term,—the one applied here to a husband's separation from his wife,— is ἀφιέναι which even in classical Greek means in such connection: "to put away, divorce" one's wife.[4] Whence it clearly appears that the actual separation spoken of in I Cor. vii, 10c, 11d, is one that would be considered by either husband or wife as terminating a marriage union, in other words as a divorce.[5] Lastly, it can be easily realized that this prohibition of divorce ascribed by St. Paul to "the Lord" is set forth in both lines in an absolute manner. In form, both lines are just as unconditional as Christ's statement in Mk. x, 9, and Mt. xix, 6: "what God has joined together, let not man put asunder"; so that whoever interprets them without dogmatic preoccupation will naturally take them to mean that Our Lord forbids the divorce of the parties concerned simply because of the tie of matrimany which binds them as "husband" and "wife": as they are living in the married state it is unlawful for them to sever the marriage tie.

Such is the straightforward interpretation of the two lines in which St. Paul rehearses Christ's command concerning "the married."

[3] A. P. Stanley, *the Epistles of St. Paul to the Corinthians*, p. 103 (5th edit., London. 1882). See also article *Marriage*, in Hastings' *Dictionary of the Bible*, vol. iii, p. 274.

[4] Cf. Herodotus, *History*, Book V, chap. 39.

[5] Meyer, *loc. cit.*, p. 157, and Protestant scholars generally, rightly take μὴ χωρισθῆναι as a middle aorist meaning "let not her [the wife] separate herself." This meaning is required by the Parallelism of that expression with μὴ ἀφιέναι which plainly denotes in I Cor. vii, 11d, the husband's personal action in promoting divorce.

According to the Apostle, "the Lord" strictly enjoins that the marriage bond existing between "a husband" and "a wife" be considered by them as indissoluble. That this is his real view of the matter is further forced on us by an unbiassed examination of the parenthetical remark which he has inserted between the two lines setting forth Our Lord's command, and which forms the third and last element of the passage under consideration. The following is a literal English rendering of this parenthetical remark:

I Cor. vii.
but and if she depart,
let her remain unmarried
or let her be reconciled to the husband.

The first of these lines states clearly the case contemplated by St. Paul. As he has just given Christ's command concerning a woman who was bound by the marriage tie and who had not yet separated herself from her husband: "that a wife depart not from a husband" (verse 10c), he now supposes (ἐὰν "if") that she has gone so far (καὶ "and," "even") as to contravene (δὲ "but") that command by separating herself from her husband (the same Greek verb χωρίζειν and in the same middle aorist form, is used here as in verse 10c). He has plainly in mind a wife's separation forbidden by "the Lord," that is, one which, from the use of the verb χωρίζειν would, as we have seen, break the marriage tie if this tie could be broken. Having thus given the exact state of the case, the Apostle sets forth in the next two lines the precise relation in which a wife thus separated must consider herself with regard to the bond of matrimony. He authoritatively declares that the wife's practical resolve of terminating her union with her husband does not give her any right to marry another man: "let her remain unmarried." And the reason for which all remarriage is forbidden her is not left to our surmising. St. Paul gives us distinctly to understand in the last line of his parenthesis. In saying: "or let her be reconciled to the husband," the Apostle shows clearly that according to him, a wife, thus separated from her husband, is still bound to him by the marriage tie; he is still "the husband," the only one with whom she may, after having made up with him, lead a married life. It is divorce then that in this parenthesis St. Paul supposes a wife to have intended in separating from her husband, and that he considers as a contravention of the Lord's command concerning "the married." It is this divorce which he treats as leaving intact the binding force of the marriage tie. After,

as before, it, the divorced wife must not marry another man. After, as before, it, she is the husband's wife. Clearly, according to St. Paul's mind, Christ has proclaimed the marriage bond indissoluble.

As can be readily noticed, the foregoing interpretation of the three component elements of I Cor. vii, 10, 11, is thoroughly objective. It takes the words of St. Paul in their natural sense, and reads nothing else into them. It supplies a meaning perfectly intelligible to the faithful of Corinth, who, as well as their great Apostle, must have already known of Christ's absolute rejection of divorce, through "the living voice of tradition."[6] It should therefore lead every unbiassed mind to admit that in this Pauline Epistle, in this very early document of Christianity, there is ascribed to "the Lord" a doctrine which unconditionally forbids divorce on the part of either of two Christians who have lived together in the married state. In point of fact, very recent Protestant scholars, who have impartially examined this passage, have felt the force of its meaning, and distinctly acknowledged it. Thus Dr. Willibald Beyschlag, of Halle, writes:[7] "The Apostle opposes the desire of divorce, which existed in the Corinthian Church... with the Lord's unqualified prohibition of divorce, granting, indeed, the possibility of a separation, but without freedom to marry again (I Cor. vii, 10, 11)." In a like strain, Prof. George T. Purves says:[8] "It is most important to note that he (St. Paul) forbids, on the ground of Christ's command, any seeking after divorce." The late Prof. George B. Stevens, of Yale, remarks:[9] "Paul knows that Jesus discountenanced divorce (I Cor. vii, 10, 11). He repeats the same principle, and adds the inference that if separation does, nevertheless, take place, remarriage is not thereby permitted." Dr. Von Soden, of Berlin, informs us[10] of "Paul's decided rejection of every idea of divorce," and Otto Pfleiderer, of the same German university, states:[11] "Divorce was, according to the teaching of Jesus, not

[6]As well said by a learned Protestant commentator, Principal Thomas C. Edwards (*A Commentary on the First Epistle to the Corinthians*, 2nd edit., p. 169, New York. 1886): "Indeed Our Lord's doctrine on the subject [of divorce] was in that age singular, and cannot fail to have been known among Christians throughout the world."

[7]*New Testament Theology*, vol. ii, p. 220. Eng. Transl., Edinburgh. 1899. (2d Engl. edit.).

[8]*Christianity in the Apostolic Age*, p. 217, New York, Chas. Scribner's Sons. 1902.

[9]*The Theology of the New Testament*, p. 449, New York, Scribner's. 1902.

[10]*The History of Early Christian Literature*, p. 42. Engl. Transl., N. Y., Putnam. 1906.

[11]*Primitive Christianity*, vol. i, p. 162. Engl. Transl., N. Y., Putnam. 1906.

permissible." Lastly, and most distinctly, Prof. Shailer Matthews, of the Chicago University, writes:[12] "Brought face to face with an actual separation of husband and wife, Paul speaks in the name of Jesus: 'the wife shall not depart from her husband, but and if she depart, let her remain unmarried or else be reconciled to her husband; and let the husband leave not his wife,' (I Cor. vii, 10, 11). Here is the one clear instance in which the apostles quote Jesus as an authority in ethical matters, and it is worth attention that it is at the one point at which the social content of Christianity cannot change except for the worse. If there is anything in all the specific social teaching of St. Paul that may be said to have transcended the historical situation in which it was uttered, it was this concerning the family: the union of a man and woman in marriage is a primal fact of humanity; it is not a matter of contract, it is an actual status. Separation may be permitted, but not remarriage to other persons. Divorce is neither instituted nor permitted by New Testament ethics."

A strong confirmation of the sense yielded by the direct study of I Cor. vii, 10, 11, is found in the contrast which exists between that passage and the immediately preceding lines:

I Cor. vii.

8. But I say to the unmarried and the widows:
   It is good if they remain as even I.
9. But if they do not contain themselves, let them marry,
   for it is better to marry than to be burnt.

In these two verses, as in those which we have thus far examined, St. Paul has indeed in view Christians to whom he proceeds to give ethical directions. But he speaks only of Christians actually free from the bond of marriage: "the unmarried and the widows," intending to treat afterwards (in verses 10, 11) of "the married" or Christians already living in the married state. According to him ("I say"), those who are thus free from the marriage tie do well to remain unmarried as he is himself: "It is good if they remain as even I." Realizing, however, that this rule of conduct may not be appropriate to all those whom he has in view, he adds at once that such a course is right only in so far as their present state does not betray them into incontinency, for if it does, it is incumbent on them to contract marriage and thereby put an end to what is for them a source of sins of the flesh:

I Cor. vii, 9.

But if they do not contain themselves, let them marry,
for it is better to marry than to be burnt.

[12] *The Messianic Hope in the New Testament*, Chicago, the University Press, 1905.

In striking contrast with these decisions of St. Paul concerning "the unmarried and the widows" in verses 8, 9, stand those which he gives in regard to "the married," in the next verses 10, 11. Differently from the former, these Christians are living in the married state, and fall on that account under Christ's own command against divorce:

I Cor. vii.

10. But to the married I command,
not I, but the Lord,
that a wife depart not from a husband,
11d and that a husband dismiss not a wife.

Thus, whereas those truly free from the marriage tie are allowed to remain unmarried, those actually bound by that tie, the husband and the wife equally, are forbidden to dissolve their matrimonial union. And whereas "the unmarried and the widows" should on account of sins against their present state alter it and contract marriage, St. Paul admits nothing of the kind with regard to "the married." There occurs indeed to his mind the case of "a wife" severing, as far as in her lies, the bond which unites her to a husband. But he does not think for a moment of placing her, in her actual separation, among "the unmarried and the widows." While they *may* remain unmarried, she *must* remain so. While he obliges them to enter the married state should their single condition betray them into incontinency, he has no such thing to tell the separated wife: the only alternative he gives her is to go back to the one with whom she is still married:

I Cor. vii, 11.

but and if she depart,
let her remain unmarried,
or let her be reconciled to the husband.

Whoever then interprets I Cor. vii, 10, 11 in the light of ts contrast with the immediately preceding verses (8, 9), must admit that in quoting the Lord's command regarding "the married" Christians and in applying it to the particular case of a wife's separation from a husband, St. Paul considers the bond of matrimony as indissoluble because Christ has willed and still wills it so.

That such is the Apostle's actual frame of mind is powerfully confirmed by a brief comparison of I Cor. vii, 10, 11, with the immediately following verses. In Cor. vii, 12-16 he treats of persons who are indeed living in the married state, but of whom he expressly says that the Lord's command regarding "the married" which he has

enforced in I Cor. vii, 10, 11, does not apply, because one of the parties in the union is not a Christian:

I Cor. vii.

12. But to the rest say I, not the Lord:
If any brother has a wife who does not believe
and she consents to dwell with him,
let him not dismiss her.
13. And if any wife has a husband who does not believe
and he consents to dwell with her,
let her not dismiss the husband....
15. But if the one who does not believe departs,
let him depart.
The brother or the sister is not enslaved in such [cases],
but God has called us in peace.
16. For how knowest thou, O wife,
whether thou shalt save the husband?
or how knowest thou, O husband,
whether thou shalt save the wife?

It is clear that in these verses we are far from the strict rules given in I Cor. vii, 10, 11, that is, in verses where St. Paul quotes and applies the command of "the Lord" against divorce. Here, differently from I Cor. vii, 10, 11, the injunction to the effect that a husband and a wife must not sever the marriage tie is made subordinate to the willingness of one of them,—the non-Christian,—to dwell with the other:

I Cor. vii.

12. *If* any brother has a wife who does not believe
and she *consents* to dwell with him,
let him not dismiss her.
13. And *if* any wife has a husband who does not believe,
and he *consents* to dwell with her,
let her not dismiss the husband.

Here, also differently from I. Cor vii, 10, 11, the actual separation (designated by the verb χωρίζειν in verse 15 exactly as in verse 10) is certainly represented as setting free the deserted partner:[13]

I Cor. vii, 15.

But if the one who does not believe departs,
let him depart;
The brother or the sister is not enslaved in such [cases.]

The reason of these differences between the marriage of a Christian with a Christian in I Cor. vii, 10, 11, and that of a Christian with a non-Christian in I Cor. vii, 12-16, is given by St. Paul himself. The former union is subjected to the command of the Lord: "But to the married,

[13]The exact import of I Cor. vii, 12-16, will be discussed fully in our forthcoming paper on the "Pauline Privilege."

I command, not I, but the Lord"; the latter is not: "But to the rest say I, not the Lord." Because of the presence of the Lord's command, the former union is indissoluble; because of its absence, the latter is dissoluble.

The foregoing interpretation of the words of I Cor. vii, 10, 11, taken in themselves and in the light of their immediately preceding and following context may also be confirmed by means of other passages which disclose the Apostle's mind concerning Christian marriage. One of these is found in verse 39 of this very chapter vii of the First Epistle to the Corinthians:

I Cor. vii, 39.

A wife is bound for so long a time as a husband lives;
but if her husband dies (literally: falls asleep),
she is free to be married to whom she wills:—only in the Lord.

A passage more explicit still is supplied by the Epistle to the Romans, that is, by one of the letters of St. Paul which goes back to the same date as the First Epistle to the Corinthians. In Rom. vii, 2, 3, we read:

2. A married woman is bound by law to the living husband;
but if the husband dies she is released from the law of the husband.
3. So then, while the husband is living, she shall be called an adulteress
if she belongs to another man.
But if the husband dies she is free from law
so as not to be an adulteress
when she belongs to another man.

The bearing of these passages on the question of divorce is obvious. In both these texts, as in I Cor. vii, 10, 11, St. Paul considers the tie of Christian marriage which binds a wife to her husband as absolutely indissoluble: she is bound by it as long as the husband lives, and she is free from it, so as to be allowed to remarry, only in the event of the husband's death. According to Rom. vii, 3, in particular, her remarriage before the husband's death makes her guilty of adultery, whereas after the husband's death her remarriage is in no way tainted with that sin. The Apostle's mind is therefore clear: Christian marriage is indissoluble, and the wife's remarriage during the lifetime of her husband is an adultery. This is, as we have shown in our foregoing papers, the exact meaning of Mk. x, 2-12, and Lk. xvi, 18, and in the light of it, our interpretation of I Cor. vii, 10, 11, is manifestly correct.

The third and last passage to be quoted in this connection is found in an Epistle, the genuineness of which, though sharply ques-

tioned, is not disproved, to wit, the Epistle to the Ephesians, composed about 60 A. D. In Eph. v, 22-33, St. Paul writes as follows:

22. [Let] the wives [be subject] to their own husbands, as to the Lord;
23. for the husband is the head of the wife, as Christ also is the head of the Church, [being] Himself the savior of the body.
24. But just as the Church is subject to Christ, so also should the wives [be] to their husbands in everything.
25. Husbands, love your wives just as Christ loved the Church and delivered Himself up for it.
26. that He might sanctify it, after cleansing it by the laver of water with [the] word,
27. that He might present to Himself the Church, glorious, not having spot or wrinkle or any such thing; but that it should be holy and without blemish.
28. Thus also ought husbands to love their own wives as their own bodies. He who loves his own wife, loves himself;
29. for no one ever hated his own flesh, but feeds and cherishes it, just as Christ [does] the Church,
30. because we are members of His body.
31. On account of this a man shall leave father and mother, and shall cleave to his wife; and the two shall become one flesh.
32. This mystery is great, but I speak in reference to Christ and to the Church.
33. Nevertheless let every one of you love his own wife even as himself, and let the wife fear her husband.

Whoever reads attentively this passage will easily see that in it the Apostle considers as indissoluble the union which Christian marriage establishes between husband and wife. According to him, man and woman become through marriage "one flesh," that is, one principle of natural life. They are a unit of which the husband is the head, and the wife the body. As the wife plays the part of the body she must of course be subject to the husband (the head) "in everything." Again, as the husband plays the part of the head, he is naturally bound to a perfect love, to a love which excludes every hatred that might lead to a repudiation, towards his body [the wife]. In this way, the union between husband and wife which is of its very nature indissoluble, since it is that of a head with its body, is sure to be preserved by the absolute obedience of the wife [the body] on the one hand, and by the perfect love of the husband [the head] on the other. It thus appears that in Eph. v, 22-33, St. Paul sets forth as the mutual duties of husband and wife precisely those which he sees to flow directly from the indissoluble union established between them by the marriage tie, and the fulfilment of which he distinctly realizes to be necessary for its actual preservation. Hence it cannot reasonably be doubted that in this passage the Apostle considers as indissoluble the union which exists between Christians living in the

married state. If, however, a further proof of this position was required, it could be easily found in the fact that Eph. v, 22-33 places marriage in the most exalted light by representing it as a copy of the relation of Christ to His Church. As well said by an eminent Protestant writer:[14] "In this analogy is implied the indissoluble nature of the marriage bond; for the union between Christ and His bride, the Church, can never be broken. The husband and the wife are one flesh; and what God has joined together, man must not put asunder (comp. Mt. xix, 3-9; I Cor. vii, 10)."

The foregoing pages show that only one conclusion is possible with regard to the doctrine which St. Paul ascribes to Christ in I Cor. vii, 10, 11. The exegete who examines the very words of this passage without dogmatic bias, and takes them in their obvious and full sense, is naturally led to admit that the Lord's command as given by the Apostle to "the married" Christians rules out every divorce, and that its application to the case of a Christian wife permanently separated from a Christian husband treats the marriage bond as indissoluble. This same meaning of I Cor. vii, 10, 11, is forced upon him when he compares its contents with those of the immediately preceding and following context, as also with those of other Pauline passages bearing on the nature of the marriage between Christian partners. It is therefore plain that the teaching of Christ against divorce as transmitted to St. Paul by "the living voice of tradition," and as recorded by him in one of the earliest documents of Christianity, is the very same as the one proclaimed by the Roman Catholic Church. Nay more, it is plain that that Church in absolutely forbidding divorce not simply in virtue of her own authority but also in virtue of Christ's injunction to that effect, is acting in precisely the same manner as did the great Apostle of the Gentiles when he wrote nineteen hundred years ago:

I Cor. vii, 10, 11.

But to the married I command,
not I, but the Lord,
that a wife depart not from a husband,...
and that a husband dismiss not a wife.

FRANCIS E. GIGOT.

[14]Philip Schaff, *History of the Apostolic Church*, p. 444. New York, Charles Scribner. 1859.

CLEMENT OF ALEXANDRIA[1] (II.)

Joseph Turmel.

The Works of Unbelievers.—If faith is necessary to salvation, it follows necessarily that those who have not faith are unable to gain heaven. Thus we read in the first book of the *Stromata*: "It will avail them nothing at the end of their lives that they have done good, if they have not the faith." Note that this text grants to unbelievers the power of doing good, though this good is not meritorious of heaven. We should, therefore, be cautious about pressing too far certain formulas in which Clement says that "the action of every heathen is sinful;"[2] or that "all the action of a man possessed of knowledge is right (useful) action; and that done by a man not possessed of knowledge is wrong action."[3] These expressions merely signify that the actions of unbelievers even when they are intrinsically good, do not satisfy all the conditions demanded to lead the doer of them to salvation. What they lack in the eyes of Clement is purity of intention, as is shown by the passage of the *Quis Dives*:[4] "It is not a new thing to renounce riches to devote oneself to the poor. Many did that before the coming of the Savior; some to give themselves leisure for the study of letters and vain wisdom, others for empty fame and vain glory...It is not the outward act which the Son of God demands but something else indicated by it, greater, more godlike, more perfect, the stripping off of the passions from the soul itself. This is the lesson peculiar to the believer, and the instruction worthy of the Savior. For those who formerly despised external things, relinquished and squandered their property, but the passions of the soul, I believe, they intensified. For they indulged in arrogance and vain-glory, and in contempt for the rest of mankind, as if they had done something superhuman."

Necessity of Works for Salvation.—In order to be saved one must have the faith. But faith is not sufficient unless it be accompanied by works. This we learn from the following texts:[5] "They are

[1] *Str.* I, 7, p. 733. For guidance in verifying citations see first section of this article, NEW YORK REVIEW, vol. II, No. 5, p. 629 note 14.

[2] *Str.* VI. 14, p. 336.

[3] *Str.* VII, 10, p. 484.

[4] *Quis dives* 11, 12.

[5] *Str.* VI, 14, p. 329; V 3 p. 333; IV 26; VII 3 p. 425.

become like unto God by the practice of good works.... (The Lord says) 'my sheep hear my voice'—that is, they understand my commandments...When we read 'thy faith hath saved thee' we do not conclude that a man is saved because he believes, if the works do not follow." "The 'violent storm heaven,' not by disputatious demands but by continuance in a right life and unceasing prayer." "We ought to have works that cry aloud...For the Gnostic must, as far as possible, imitate God." "We have received existence in order to observe freely the precepts if we wish to be saved....The duty of man then is to obey God who has declared salvation through the commandments."

The Image and Likeness of God.—At times Clement seems to confound the ideas of the image and the likeness of God.[6] This is because he does not always take pains to be precise in his thought. When he is more exact, he distinguishes these two prerogatives. He says, "The Christian alone is rich...in him alone the image of God has become His likeness. For Christ has made him righteous, holy, prudent, consequently like unto God." "The soul of a righteous man is in a pre-eminent way a divine image resembling God." "That man is in the likeness of God who has been adopted as His son and numbered amongst His friends."[7] In such terms does he speak of the divine likeness, which, as is evident, he considers as a privilege of the Christian. As for the image of God, he finds it in all men, since it consists, according to his view, in the faculty of reason. "Man is the image of the Logos," he says, "because man possesses thought."[8] And if it be asked what it is in the Christian that transforms the divine image into a likeness, his answer is that this result is due to the virtues which adorn the soul of the disciple of Jesus. Such at least is the impression left by the passages just read. He conceives therefore this likeness as something in the psychological order. But is it only by his virtues that a Christian differs from a pagan? By no means. We read in the *Stromata*; "You have been sanctified in the name of the Lord; you have been justified, and made, so to speak, as righteous as He is; and you are blended, as far as possible, with the Holy Spirit."[9] This union with the Holy Spirit is no doubt the source of the virtues of the Christian, the cause of his likeness to God; and this is a reality

[6] *Exh.* 10, p. 71 26; *Str.* II 19 p. 1040.

Exh. 12, p. 86 15; *Str.* VII 3 p. 421; VI 14 p. 337; *Pæd.* I 12 p. 148 25 (other men are only in the image of God; the Christian is in His likeness); *Str.* II 22.

[8] *Exh.* 10, p. 71, 26.

[9] *Str.* VII, 14, p. 521. Cf. *Pæd.* I, 6, p. 106, 22.

which belongs to the ontological order. Here we have in germ the doctrine of habitual grace.

Baptism.—"It ought to be known that those who fall into sin after Baptism (λουτρόν) are subject to punishment; the deeds done before baptism are remitted." "God wishes that we should be such as He has begotten us in the bosom of the water." "God formed man out of the earth; He has regenerated him by water; He has made him to grow by the Spirit." "We who are baptized, having wiped off the sins which obscure the life of the divine Spirit, have the eye of the Spirit free, unimpeded, and full of light by which alone we contemplate the divine, the Holy Spirit flowing down to us from above." "Being baptized, we are illuminated; illuminated, we become sons; being made sons, we are made perfect; being made perfect, we are made immortal....This work is variously called grace, and illumination, and perfection, and washing: washing, by which we cleanse away our sins; grace, by which the penalties accruing to transgressions are remitted; and illumination, by which that holy light of salvation is beheld, that is, by which we see God clearly."[10] These texts distinctly ascribe to baptism the remission of sins and of the punishment due to sin. Do they also ascribe to it the infusion of the Holy Ghost? This seems to be indicated by the light which comes to the soul of the baptized Christian, "the Holy Spirit flowing down to it from above," and by which he can contemplate the divine. But on this point Clement's thoughts are somewhat obscure. On another point however it is more clear. The author of the *Stromata*, commenting on a text of Proverbs (ix, 17) in which there is question of "aqua aliena," sees in it a proof that God "reckons heretical baptism not proper and true water."[11] "He is manifestly the precursor of Tertullian and St. Cyprian. It is also worthy of note that in the *Quis Dives* he speaks of baptism under the name of σφραγίς.[12]

The Eucharist.—Clement knows of Christian communities which celebrate the Eucharist with bread and water; but he views this

[10]*Str.* IV, 24, p. 1364; IV, 25, p. 1369; *Paed.* I, 12, p. 148, 19; I, 6, p. 106, 22; I, 6, p. 105, 20.

[11]*Str.* I, 19, p. 813. He says in the preceding lines that the heretic has abandoned God, and dwells in a desolate land where all is barren. Le Nourry (*Dissert.* II, 9, 1. *P. L.* IX, 1160) tries unsuccessfully to make Clement say that the baptism of heretics is only illicit.

[12]*Quis dives*, 39, 42, p. 29, 3 and 33, 1. M. de la Barre (*Dict. de theol. cath.* III, 184) believes that Clement here refers to Confirmation. But the "seal" is Baptism, inasmuch as it implies the taking possession of the soul by the Lord.

practice as a heresy. He lets it be clearly understood that this sacrament should be celebrated with wine. Moreover he establishes against the Encratites that Christ at the Last Supper used wine; and he avers that Melchisedech "offered bread and wine, furnishing consecrated food for a type of the Eucharist."[13]

But what does he consider the sacrament of the altar to be? The text just quoted is not decisive on this point. It indicates that the Eucharist is something more than the sanctified bread and wine which prefigured it, since the thing prefigured is always superior to the type. But in what this superiority definitely consists the text does not tell us. So, too, no enlightenment can be obtained from the passage of the *Stromata* which says, "the Saviour, having taken bread gave thanks and broke it and offered it to be eaten according to reason;" nor in this other where we are told that "some after having partaken of the Eucharist allow the faithful to receive a part."[14] However, the following passage of the *Pædagogus* deserves special attention, "the mixture of the water and the Logos is called Eucharist, i.e.: marvellous grace; and they who partake of it with faith are sanctified both in body and soul."[15] Here the Eucharist is viewed as a drink sanctified by the presence of the Logos: the doctrine of impanation. These texts are also found in the same place: "The blood of the Lord is twofold. For there is the blood of His flesh by which we are redeemed from corruption, and the spiritual, that by which we are anointed. And to drink the blood of Jesus is to become a partaker of the Lord's immortality, the Spirit being the energizing principle of the Word, as blood is of the flesh. . . . The divine will mystically compounds man with the Spirit and the Word. The Spirit is joined to the soul, which is inspired by it; and the flesh, by reason of which the Word was made flesh, to the Word." The ideas which can be drawn from these obscure phrases may be formulated as follows: (a) the Spirit is the power, the energizing or constituent principle, so to speak, of the Logos. Since the Logos dwells in the Eucharist, the Spirit also is there, and whosoever receives the Eucharist is united to the Spirit as well as to the Logos; (b) the eucharistic drink, containing the Spirit as well as the Logos, is the spiritual (pneumatic) blood of the Saviour, which should not be confounded with the corporeal blood which redeemed us.

[13] *Str.* I, 19, p. 813; *Pæd.* II, 2, p. 176, 13; *Str.* IV, 25.
[14] *Str.* I, 10, p. 744; I, 1, p. 692.
[15] *Pæd.* II, 2, p. 168, 5.

In the foregoing extract the Eucharist is presented as bread and wine in which the Logos (accompanied by the Spirit) dwells, and which, thanks to this presence, are spiritual. But why are the terms "flesh" and "blood" applied to the bread and wine which are thus sanctified? In a fragmentary sort of way, Clement solves this problem as follows. He remarks that "the wine is called blood allegorically," and that it is "the blood of the vine."[15] Besides, why should not the Logos designate as His blood the wine in which He dwells? Clement sees no obstacle to this. Hence the passage: "Christ blessed the wine when he said: take and drink, this is my blood, *the blood of the vine.* He designates the wine allegorically as (the blood) of the Logos which was shed for the remission of the sins of many."[17] Clement would no doubt have justified by like considerations—though as a matter of fact he does not do so—the formula "this is my body."

However, the wavering mind of the great catechist of Alexandria, here as elsewhere, has taken different points of view. We read in the *Pædagogus*:[18] "the different metaphors of meat, flesh, bread, blood, milk serve to designate the Logos." In the *Stromata*[19] we are also told that "contemplation is a food," and that "the understanding

[16] *Pæd.* I, 6, p. 118, 5; *ibid.* II, 2, p. 176, 2.

[17] *Pæd.* II, 2, p. 176, 1. Note *Pæd.* II, 2, p. 174, 5, where the wine is called "the mystical symbol of the sacred blood."

[18] *Pæd.* I, 6, p. 118, 10. This passage comes at the end of a long and labored dissertation, the literal sense of which is often difficult to make out, though the general meaning is clear. It starts with the text of St. Paul (I Cor. iii, 2): "I fed you with milk, not with meat." The Gnostics made use of this text to belittle the faith of simple Christians. Clement answers that the act of taking drink is the symbol of a perfect participation, and he justifies his view by the words of the Savior: "My blood is drink." He concludes that milk indicates the preaching, and meat means faith. He then explains that the Savior expressed the same truth by "the symbols" of flesh and blood, when He gave command to eat His flesh and drink His blood; since "the faith and the promise are distinctly described by the metaphors of the food and drink." Finally he allows that another interpretation may be given, viz.: that the flesh represents the Holy Spirit, and the blood the Logos. Clement entangles himself in the strange speculations in which he indulges concerning the milk and the blood, but it is at least evident that his sole intention is to show that Christ nourishes us by the preaching of Christian truth and by faith. Struckmann (*Die Gegenwart Christi in der hl. Eucharistie nach dem schriftlichen Quellen der vornizanischen Zeit*, p. 118), and de la Barre (*Dict. de theol. cath.* III, 195) attempt without success to apply these texts to the Eucharist.

Neither should we apply to the Eucharist the text of the *Quis dives*, 23 (p. 18, 21): "I am He who feeds thee, giving myself as bread, of which he who has tasted experiences death no more, and supplying day by day the drink of immortality." Here once more there is question of the food which faith supplies. The same holds good for *Quis dives*, 29 and *Pæd.* I, 5, p. 104, 1.

[19] *Str.* V, 10, p. 101.

of the divine essence and power constitutes the flesh and blood of the Logos...for the food and drink of the divine Logos is the knowledge of the divine nature." Here the allegory goes one step further and the expressions "flesh and blood" are completely detached from the Eucharist.

The Agape.—Speaking of the Carpocratians, Clement writes in the *Stromata*:[20] "It is said that when they meet for their banquets (for this feast should not receive the name of *agape*) they stimulate their lust with exciting viands, and then putting out the lights, indulge in promiscuous fornication...and that in order to effect this sort of *agape* they sometimes make women promise obedience to the laws of Carpocrates." In the *Pedagogus*[21] the *agape* comes up in connection with sobriety at meals, and is made the subject of the following remarks: "By a scandalous abuse of speech some dare to apply the name *agape* to pitiful suppers, dishonoring the good and saving work of the Logos, the consecrated *agape*, with pots and pouring of sauces....Gatherings for the sake of mirth we call rightly suppers, dinners, banquets. But such entertainments the Lord has not called *agape*....The *agape* is in truth celestial food, a spiritual banquet. 'It beareth all things, endureth all things, hopeth all things. It never falleth away.'...And this *agape* which never falleth away, is cast from heaven above into the midst of sauces! And do you think I shall apply to a perishable meal the name of this *agape* of which it is said: 'If I bestow all my goods and have not *agape*, I am nothing'? On this *agape* alone depend the law and the Logos; and 'if thou shalt love the Lord thy God and thy neighbor,' this is the celestial festival in the heavens. But the earthly festival is called a supper. The supper can be made for the purpose of the *agape*, but the supper is not the *agape*, only an expression of generosity which gives of its goods without stinginess....The *agape* in relation to the community is as a good nurse....But for those that are absorbed in pots...the Holy Spirit denounces them by Isaias, depriving them tacitly of the name of *agape*." Of the two passages just quoted, the first one from the *Stromata* is brief, and if taken by itself, might lend itself to different interpretations. The second, on the other hand, is as clear as anything can be. It shows that at the close of the second century the custom had been introduced at Alexandria of furnishing charitable repasts (to the poor, evidently), which repasts were called *agapæ*, on

[20] *Str.* III, 2, p. 1112.

[21] *Pæd.* II, 1, p. 156, 12. Cf. also *Str.* VII, 7.

account of the motive which inspired them. Clement enters a strong protest, not against these dinners, but against the name given to them. *Agape*, according to him, could indeed give repasts, but the word is too sacred to be applied to them. And it is quite evident that he wishes to reserve the word to indicate charity or love.

The Catholics were not the only ones to give such repasts under the name of *agapæ*. Some of the Gnostics had also their *agapæ*, but with them they were only a cover for debauchery. The Carpocratian *agapæ*, defiled as they were with infamous practices, had nothing but the name in common with the charity-dinners of the Catholics. Clement protests against the misuse of a sacred term to designate these latter repasts, but at least they were carried on in conformity with the strictest attention to the laws of propriety. In the passage of the *Stromata* it is Clement's purpose simply to mark the abyss which separates these two kinds of *agapæ*. So he strongly declares that the banquets of the Gnostics are only caricatures of the meals which the Catholics called *agapæ*, and had no manner of right to the name. If he were to open his whole mind, he might have added that the Catholic *agape* was itself ill-named. But he was writing against the heretics, so he saves his reprimand to the Catholics for another occasion.

To resume: at the close of the second century the *agape* was practised at Alexandria, both by Catholics and Gnostics; and what was called by this name was a repast, a repast inspired by charity among the Catholics, a repast defiled by lust among the Gnostics. Clement upbraids the Catholics for giving to these repasts a name which belongs only to charity; he denounces the Gnostics for giving to their immoral reunions a name which Catholics apply to charitable repasts. To these points substantially his teachings on the *agape* can be reduced. But it may be asked whether these meals among the faithful had not a liturgical character. The answer to this question seems clear. Clement never gives us to understand that they are of a liturgical character; on the contrary, he presents them as "the expression of a generosity which gives its goods without stinginess," that is, as being of a philanthropic or charitable nature. The *agape* is, then, according to the author of the *Stromata*, a meal which is unconnected with the Eucharist, or with any form of public worship.

Sacrifice. Clement rejects the pagan sacrifices with scorn. He says, however, that Christians must offer to God a sacrifice, for which the

following texts[22] will give his idea: "Mildness and kindness and piety, I think, are the rules by which the gnostic should direct his life to grow like God. These virtues are 'a sacrifice acceptable in the sight of God.'...We do not sacrifice to God, since He has need of nothing, and supplies all men with all things; but we glorify Him, who gave Himself in sacrifice for us, we also sacrificing ourselves. . . We do not, therefore, and with reason, offer sacrifice to Him; God is not honored with sacrifices or gifts." "We honor God by prayers; this is the very good and holy sacrifice which we offer....We ought to offer to God sacrifices not costly, but such as He loves. And that compounded incense which is mentioned in the Law is that which consists of many tongues and voices in prayer." "The whole life of the gnostic is a festival. His sacrifices are prayers and praises and readings in the Scriptures before meals, and psalms and hymns during meals and before bed, and prayers also during the night....He knows also the other kind of sacrifice, which consists in the giving forth of doctrines and of money to those who need."

JOSEPH TURMEL.

[22] *Str* VII, 3 p. 417; VII, 6, pp. 444, 449; VII, 7, p 569

NOTES.

In our last issue we presented a symposium of the views of different Protestant writers on present conditions and tendencies in the Catholic Church. "To see oorsel's as ithers see us" is generally a profitable if not always a pleasant experience. But, after all, the best way of getting an idea of what Catholicity stands for to-day is to study the attitude of our own leaders, especially of the members of the hierarchy, who are the divinely appointed guides of the faithful. With this object in view we here present a record of recent actions and utterances of Catholic prelates bearing on matters of present-day importance—social, ethical, religious, and educational. Of necessity, such a report will be far from exhaustive; but we feel that any reader must be impressed with the many-sided activity of the Catholic hierarchy when he reflects that so many movements are represented in a mere chronicle of current events.

To begin with the event that occurred nearest home: there is the well-balanced utterance of Archbishop Farley at the Peace Conference held in New York in April. As a Christian and a lover of mankind, he would wish to see war cease utterly from the earth; but as a representative of the wisdom of the old Church which has dealt with humanity for two milleniums of strife, he indulges in no vain hopes that the millenium of peace will suddenly dawn upon the world. Make the best of to-day and prepare for a better to-morrow, is his advice. And that better to-morrow, in his opinion, must come through "the influence of two great moral forces, Education and Religion." He has no confidence that the end will be attained by appeals to the feelings of the crowd or to national self-interest—these are factors which can easily be made to work the other way. His plan goes to the root of the matter: "If in all the nations that make up modern Christendom the youthful generations were taught in all earnestness the law of Christian holiness and rectitude of life, and made to know the divine Exemplar of that life, we should have begun the formation of a Christian Public Opinion that would in time discredit many of the motives and occasions from which wars have in the past originated."

Proceeding to a more immediately practical suggestion, he goes on to say: "I shall not, therefore, surprise anyone if in connection with the profound influence of religion in all that tends to create and preserve a state of peace I call attention to the continuous existence of a famous tribunal of peace—the Holy See at Rome. Its services in the past are so well-known that all impartial historians, even such as do not recognize its spiritual authority, agree that for centuries it was a successful court of final resort for countless conflicts. The only practical international law for centuries was the Gospel of Christ as it was preached by its legates to Emperors and Kings....The Holy See is still the working head of the great Catholic body, over 250,000,000 of souls, and its moral authority was never greater. All these countless millions would surely welcome the recognition of the Holy See as a factor in International Arbitration. It stands forth

universally venerated as a divine representative committed to the work and the interests of peace by the nature and history of its office, at the head of a great working system of international religious administration which permits it to reach rapidly and efficiently the minds and the hearts of whole peoples and races."

Another American prelate whose views on great ethical questions have always been gladly received by the American public as being dictated by deep religion and sound sense, is Cardinal Gibbons. As with other great men who have kept abreast of their times, the advance of years does not diminish his interest in movements and events which are of importance to the Church and to humanity. Recently he has written two noteworthy articles, one reasserting strongly the Catholic position on the sin of self-destruction; and the other treating the causes of corporate covetousness, and suggesting as remedies the strengthening of the sense of personal responsibility and the realization of the higher ends of life.

Dr. Brigg's article on the Papacy, in the *North American Review*, to which we referred in our last issue, has been answered by Archbishop Ireland in the same periodical. He pays a tribute to Dr. Briggs' argument in support of the divine institution of the Papacy, than which "no truer and more convincing presentation, from Scripture and early Christian history, could be wished for." But the proofs, both from Scripture and history, he contends, lead to the conclusion that the Vicar of Christ possesses not only primacy, but supremacy, in the Church. Accordingly, his powers cannot be restricted to the executive functions or be limited by a constitution. Nor does the Archbishop share in the Professor's opinion that the Papacy is responsible for the great separations in the Christian body. Coming to Dr. Briggs' practical suggestions, Mgr. Ireland admits freely that on many points, such as the nationality of the Pope and his residence in Rome, the matter, in theory at least, is open to discussion. His answers are those which any Catholic theologian would give, but they will prove a source of enlightenment to many non-Catholic readers who do not distinguish between the accidentals and the essentials of our religion. On certain of these questions it will be well to cite Archbishop Ireland's own words.

"If purely civil matters are in issue, the Pope has no right whatsoever to give directions to Catholics. Catholics would resent directions of this kind. I think, however, that the Professor will admit that the question changes when issues under consideration are such as to appeal to the religious conscience and to demand solution in the light of religious principles. The issue then would appertain to the spiritual order. Who should refuse to the Chieftain of the Church the right to define what such principles mean, and how they are to be applied? The question under discussion in the great battle days of the 'Centrum' in Germany was the inherent right of the Church to the appointment, according to its own rules and requirements, of its bishops and priests: was not this strictly a matter of religion? In France, the controversy turns on the question whether Church property shall be held under control of the hierarchy or under that of bodies independent of that control. Is not this, again, a religious question?

" 'The claim of the Papacy to determine questions of science and philosophy, of sociology and economics' are, in the Professor's mind, serious obstacles to his journeying towards home. But the Papacy claims no right, possesses no right, to determine questions of science and philosophy, of sociology and economics. The realm of the Papacy is faith and morals—that much, and nothing more. The situation changes, of course, when speculation, clothed in the garb of science or philosophy, of sociology or economics, soars into the domain of faith and morals, and challenges the Church within its own sphere. Must not the Church be on guard at its frontiers, lest, under the flag of truth, error be seeking passage? Parleying, at least, there must be. The Church calls for time to consider whether faith and morals are really, and not apparently only, put in jeopardy; and it allows to speculation time to re-examine its groundwork and discover whether it is the proven voice of science and philosophy, of sociology or economics, or merely, as the case often is, a phantasm of the imagination. But, it might here be urged, the Church is at times too meticulous, too exacting, and, occasionally, goes too far in its demands and its prohibitions. Be it so; the treasures in the keeping of the Church are so precious that extreme vigilance must be the rule. Better, by far, now and then, an excess of vigilance than, now and then, a lack of prudent care and forethought.

"The Œcumenical Councils should be more frequent—it is possible. Good comes from such gatherings, where bishops from every clime under the sun raise their voice to offer suggestion and counsel. However, in practice, it is not so easy a task as Professor Briggs may imagine to bring from their homes, every three or five years, a thousand bishops, so many of them removed from Rome by wide expanse of continent and of ocean, and hold them together in one place, be it the largest of cities, during the weeks and months needed for mutual deliberation. Nor are Œcumenical Councils so necessary that the Pontiff be informed of the needs of religion the world over. Provincial councils, episcopal visitations *ad limina*, modern facilities of correspondence, accomplish much in this regard. Moreover, we must keep in mind the organization of the Church. The Papacy is not the dreadful centralization that it is sometimes reported to be. There are the Dioceses and the Provinces, where greatest latitude is given to local action, as local interest may require. The organization of the Catholic Church is much as that of the American Republic, with its national and its state governments. However, an occasional Œcumenical Council is profitable; and perhaps the Professor may see one during his lifetime."

Passing now to consider the collective wisdom of the American hierarchy, we hail with delight the encouraging report of the meeting of the Trustees of the Catholic University at Washington. There is much in the report to be glad for; the steady improvement in the financial position; the foundation of the scholarships in Gaelic; the donations towards the Chair of Teutonics; the proposed affiliation of colleges and seminaries to the University; the hope expressed by many that at some future date the great Sulpician seminary now in Baltimore may become the undergraduate theological school of the university. Amid these varied items one point

asserts itself; that all classes of Catholics, bishops, religious, laity, men of different interests and occupations, are beginning to recognize that the national Catholic University is and must always be the centre in which the forces of Catholic thought shall meet, and from which they shall radiate.

The action of the representatives of the Catholic colleges is of special importance. It comes in response to a suggestion made by Archbishop Farley in an address to the members of the Catholic Educational Conference held in New York two years ago. In that address he drew attention to the fact that the Catholic primary schools now enjoy the confidence and support of the people, while the colleges are still fighting an uphill fight. The success of the parochial schools he ascribed, and rightly so, to episcopal interest and supervision. Now the colleges through their representatives request that the hierarchy take a more direct and active part in ensuring the efficiency and success of the institutions devoted to higher education. That the situation demands united action is evident to everybody, as thousands of Catholic young men are in attendance at non-Catholic institutions. To meet the religious needs of these students Archbishop Messmer has found it necessary to establish a Catholic center at the University of Wisconsin, and Bishop McQuaid purposes doing the same at Cornell. It is reported that this plan for safeguarding the faith of Catholic students at sectarian colleges was brought to the attention of the Archbishops, but that they refrained from pronouncing on the matter.

The English hierarchy will probably have a similar matter submitted to their judgment in the near future, but they have a fund of experience to help them in their decision,—experience, by all accounts, of a re-assuring kind. Everybody knows the history of the discussion, in which Newman and Manning took opposite sides, about the foundation of Catholic Halls at Oxford and Cambridge. After many years, Newman's view has prevailed, but there is still a prohibition against the establishment at these Universities of colleges for Catholic women. It was to obtain this extension of the law that Miss Warner, M. D., recently obtained an audience with the Holy Father. There are now many Catholic women in attendance at Oxford and Cambridge, and it is urged that the interests of the faith demand that they be grouped in a college of their own.

The Irish Church, as all the world knows, has also its University problem, although there are increasing signs that it will soon cease to be a problem. If a settlement cannot be reached, the fault will certainly not lie with the Irish bishops, who have displayed an admirable spirit of fairness and consideration in urging the just claims of Irish Catholics on the Government. Their latest utterance is a straightforward declaration that they are willing to accept as final "an adequate and worthy scheme on any one of the three plans which we put before the recent Royal Commission;" that they recognize the difficulties of the Government in dealing with a question like this; and that "the directness and frankness of the Government deserve to be met by us, and by the people of Ireland, in the friendliest and most sympathetic spirit, and with the amplest allowance for the difficulties that have to be overcome." There is a very instructive

article, written in similar spirit, by the Bishop of Limerick in the April *Dublin*.

It would be impossible to give here anything like an adequate account of the work of the Continental hierarchy. But there is one utterance which ought to find a place in this Review, even if other matter have to be crowded out. It is the sermon of Archbishop Mignot at the Month's Mind of Bishop Le Camus (published in the *Revue du Clergé Français*, Feb. 15, 1907). It is in every way such an admirable production—so timely, so broad, so Catholic, so serene—that it is deserving of the widest possible currency among thinking Catholics. It is moreover, such a well knit piece of work that one cannot do justice to it by a summary or by brief extracts. Accordingly we present the greater dart of it *in extenso*.

...Bishop Le Camus was consecrated in 1901 at the age of 62. His elevation to this dignity had the effect of enlarging the sphere of his activity but the spirit animating his work and the end in view remained the same. If the promotion was received with satisfaction, it was not because of the honor and distinction which it conferred, but rather because it afforded an opportunity to continue more efficiently and with fuller authority his valuable services to the cause of sacred science. "I have no desire to be bishop," he once said to an intimate friend, "but I would like to be able to do something for the reform and advancement of ecclesiastical studies."

You are fully aware, Reverend Fathers,—and the teachings of our lamented prelate have made it clearer to your minds—that the Church though immovable in her faith is not so with regard to her theological teaching. And this for a two-fold reason. On the one hand it is a logical necessity for the human mind to reflect upon the original data of divine revelation in an effort to better understand it. On the other, the domain of our natural knowledge is ever broadening, ever including new fields of investigation, and thus the essential unity of our mind and its processes necessitates a continual correlation of natural with revealed truth—a continual adjustment of one to the other.

Only a little reflection is needed in order to perceive a priori the necessity of a doctrinal development in the Church on the lines laid down in the *Commonitorium* of Vincent of Lerins, and afterwards so ably traced by the illustrious Cardinal Newman. Being given the nature of the human mind and the conditions of divine revelation, it could not be otherwise. This natural and inevitable trend of Christian thought is nourished and stimulated by the ideas and experiences which each generation adds to the general fund of human knowledge. These go to form the mentality of each successive epoch, and so far as the element of truth which they contain is concerned, they have to be confronted with the formulated expression of religious belief and be combined with it in a practical synthesis of Christian life.

Thus the grain of mustard seed sown by the Master grows by virtue of its own inherent vital principle, attracting to itself and assimilating the treasures of earth and atmosphere which each successive season brings. The teachings of the Gospel and of the first disciples expanded under the action of the Holy Spirit promised by the Saviour. Little by little they were methodically arranged and co-ordinated with the existing data of human knowledge by a process which resulted in the great theological development of the ages of faith.

Under the interior action of the Holy Ghost and the vigilant guidance of the infallible teaching Church this development ever remains true to the faith once delivered to the saints. Throughout this long process of growth the essential elements of the original revealed deposit stand forth like great landmarks in the definitions of the Church.

But no thinking mind can fail to see that in the great storehouse of ecclesiastical and theological tradition, by reason of its very abundance, everything can not be of equal value. Even certain doctrinal definitions have been framed in terms which now need to be explained, for words themselves have a history and their meaning is subject to change. Thus it is well known, for instance, that the term "consubstantial" adopted by the Council of Nicæa, had been rejected by the Council of Antioch on account of the sense attached to it by Paul of Samosata. The gigantic work of the schoolmen is a vast fabric woven by human hands and it is necessarily marred by the imperfections inherent in every human achievement. To these imperfections and limitations divers causes have contributed, such as the inadequacy and relativity of human language; the party spirit which is more bent on securing the triumph of a system than on finding out the truth; ignorance and error in the domain of science; absence of the critical spirit and method in historical and scientific research, etc. Yet, notwithstanding these grave drawbacks—many of which were inevitable in the circumstances—the activity displayed by the constructors of the Medieval theology was productive of good, and it had the effect of showing, among other useful lessons, that the Christian revelation is not to be confined within the narrow limits of a rigid formalism, and that without losing its identity or continuity it is capable of being adapted to the varied exigencies of the successive phases of civilization and philosophic thought.

Bishop Le Camus, who was in the fullest and best sense a man of tradition, since he consecrated his whole life to the study of Christian tradition in its purest and most authentic sources, could never endorse that easy, cut and dry notion of the Christian religion according to which the present generation would be dispensed from all study and research in matters pertaining to revelation under the pretext that all this intellectual work has been accomplished once for all by the great theologians of past centuries. He learned from his study of tradition that no matter how indisputably certain religious doctrines may be, no soul desiring to live by and assimilate them can afford to look upon them with a lazy mental indifference. The study of tradition taught him that outside of a comparatively small oasis of truths which are incontrovertible, there extends a vast region filled with religious problems which God has left for us to work out for ourselves with the help of his revelation. It taught him likewise that though the Church has been made the depositary and guardian of the supernatural truths necessary to salvation, the same is not true of the scientific truths of the natural order. With regard to these she simply shares in the intellectual life of mankind at large—like everyone else she has to learn and wait. There is no Catholic geometry or astronomy, no Catholic physics or geology. These and other sciences develop according to their own methods; they are in themselves neither Christian nor anti-Christian, but their ascertained conclusions are always capable of being harmonized with the real dogmas of our faith.

The Church, daughter of heaven, has for her end the salvation of souls, and to be understood by them, she has to enter into our needs and preoccupations, she must speak the language of all, rich and poor, ignorant and learned. As St. Paul says of himself, she is a debtor to the unwise as well as to the wise.

Bishop Le Camus well knew, having found it inscribed on every page of ecclesiastical literature, that this constant adaption of the Gospel message to the various intellectual milieux—adaption which is so well exemplified in the writings and discourses of St. Paul—is possible only by making use of the ideas, of the elements of knowledge which the preacher or writer adroitly borrows from the mentality of those whom he wishes to impress with his doctrine, and it is by means of these elements familiar to his hearers that he throws new light upon the exposition

of the Christian mysteries. He whose life was passed, so to say, in the company of the early Fathers, of the Doctors and the Theologians; he who was so familiar with their writings and consequently knew so well the many variations and vicissitudes through which theological thought has passsed in the course of centuries; he who had this great perspective so clearly before his mind did not entertain with regard to the so-called intellectual novelties of our own age that mistrust and alarm with which they are considered in some Catholic circles. He realized that without movement there is no life, and that it is in great part to the happy initiative of original thinkers not always appreciated by their own contemporaries, that the Church owes the richness of her great traditional literature.

Many indeed are the doctrines now settled and venerable that were branded as novel when first propounded. They provoked surprise and suspicion, but after having been opposed and criticised, they finally prevailed and were recognized as embodying a more accurate expression of the Church's thought, or rather they were found to embody a less inadequate approximation to the inexpressible eternal truth. Thus the Pauline theology which shed such a sudden and brilliant light upon the beginnings of Christianity, was, at least in form and to some extent in its content, a novelty unwelcome to many. The Fourth Gospel which at the end of the first century added to the other evangelical accounts the supreme testimony of the Beloved Disciple set forth in language such as no one had used before, must likewise have appeared strikingly novel. Novelties too were the energetic precisions of Athanasius in his effort to dissipate the equivocations lurking in the mind and langague of Arius. Novel indeed were the bold speculations of Augustine on the Trinity and on grace; also the *Cur Deus Homo* of St. Anselm who therein introduces into the theory of the Redemption the judicial notion of vicarious satisfaction. A novelty—and one too that was for a long time opposed and more than once condemned—was the philosophy of Aristotle, broached by the early schoolmen but which finally triumphed when presented by the genius of St. Thomas Aquinas. Novelties in later times were the *Pensées* o Pascal and his famous treatise against Pyrrhonism; so too Chateaubriand's Genius of Christianity and the bold apologetics of Lacordaire. Novelties were the masterly works of Tillemont and Mabillon in the eighteenth century and those of Duchesne in the nineteenth, and even the prudent exegesis of men like Le Hir and Vigouroux now so orthodox was, not so very long ago, opposed on account of its novelty. But, let it be well borne in mind, that which characterized all these novelties so rich in happy consequences, was not principally the fact that they ran counter to received ideas and disturbed the quiet of certain persons constitutionally impatient of all change even for the better; it is rather that being inspired by a docile faith and by a great love for truth they were consequently found to be in harmony with Catholic doctrine rightly understood, and they served to illustrate its adequateness to meet all the exigencies of human progress.

On the other hand there are not a few theories and systems which though they once enjoyed an undisputed sway in the schools are at present universally abandoned. For instance, no serious exegete now accepts the chronological scheme of Bossuet, and very few there are who still hold to the ingenious and elaborate concordistic system according to which the six days of creation are understood to mean so many indefinite periods of time. All therefore is not equally valuable in the theological development of each succeeding epoch. It would be no less unreasonable to maintain as settled and definitive all of its past positions, than to accept beforehand and without control all the modifications it may assume in the future. What is needed is a careful discriminating appreciation of the accumulated treasures of past tradition as well as of the theological speculations of the present; in fact, the maintenance of this sane balance of judgment in the world of Christian thought has always been a matter of solicitude with the great doctors of the Church.

It is plain that those processes that have constituted the life of the Church during twenty centuries of her existence must be still going on in our own time. Bishop Le Camus was fully conscious of the intellectual crisis through which we are now passing. He realized how deep is the stirring of Catholic thought in its effort to grasp and properly adjust the many new factors that at present claim consideration in the discussion of the religious problem, and the movement is one that he was far from disapproving. In every epoch religious science—I do not say religion—has undergone inevitable changes according as the intellectual horizon of mankind has become more extended, and surely never was such adjustment more needed than at the present time. It is not that the ground principles of revelation have become less certain, but never before, excepting perhaps the period of the Renaissance, has there been so great an addition of new elements to the sum of human knowledge as has resulted from the scientific researches of the last century

When we consider the lack of trustworthy information both with regard to the knowledge of the material universe and of the history of mankind which prevailed during the constructive period of the theological synthesis which has come down to us, we should not be surprised to find that the adaptation of the system to the needs of modern thought necessitates a certain number of modifications. The faith of our lamented prelate was too strong and enlightened to be alarmed in presence of this necessity. He knew that it is no part of God's plan to lead us by ways of subterfuge and deceit, and he feared nothing more than the accusation of insincerity so often made against the Church in connection with the apologetical methods of her defenders. Far from looking on the progress of science with distrust he considered it rather as a secondary revelation. His view was that the natural manifestations of the Creator through human reason should serve to enlighten us in our theological researches and become, as it were, a sort of commentary helping to elucidate the data of supernatural revelation. Such a commentary based on facts would be more valuable than one composed of the reflections of men always prone to identify their own thoughts with those of God.

He could not tolerate, and even regarded as impossible, the notion that science can be really made a weapon against our faith. When convinced by the logic of facts, he gave up without much concern the scholastic ideas which had been in vogue down to his own time, but what he sacrificed was not any part of revealed truth, but something in the domain of man-made theories. He accorded full recognition to the role of modern criticism and respectfully accepted its results, but he did not forget that any science which does not finally contribute to greater love of God is vain. He admired the fertile genius and the painstaking toil of rationalistic scholars, but was saddened and painfully surprised to find God absent from their work.

I would compare such critics to those tourists who visit our great cathedrals but who are strangers to our faith. They enter the edifice and admire its majestic beauty; with keen artistic acumen they analyze the elements that go to make up the graceful harmony of the structure; they examine in detail the windows, the arches, the columns and the capitals, and often set forth the results of their observations in interesting volumes. Nay, it is not infrequently through such works that we ourselves have learned to appreciate more intelligently and to admire those marvels of art the beauty of which we scarcely suspected. But these distinguished art critics who have such a keen appreciation of our architectural masterpieces, and who have made such detailed inventories of the beautiful things they contain, have failed to notice the little lamp burning dimly in the recess of a silent chapel. They did not know or would not believe that the Master Himself was there waiting for them, that on account of His presence alone the Cathedral was planned, built and embellished. While they

admire the grace of the arches, the coloring of the windows and the harmony of the various parts; while they scrutinize the bedimmed walls where each of many centuries has left its trace, in order that they may read there a lesson in history, they forget that He is the centre and the soul and the life of it all. He alone makes intelligible the work of the past as He alone merits the homage of the present. The true inner sense and signification of the great edifice is far less understood by these cultured critics than by the poor humble woman who kneels in silent prayer before the alta where she recognizes the presence of the hidden Saviour. . . . Analogous is the position of certain rationalistic scholars with regard to modern religious problems, but no such errors or misconceptions could disturb the faith of Bishop Le Camus or cause him to abandon his purpose. They rather served to establish more firmly in his mind the conviction that an extensive reconstruction in the domain of the sacred sciences was necessary. His attitude in presence of the various problems was that of a believer in firm possession of all fundamental truths and who knows that he need have no fear with regard to them. He entered therefore boldly and without misgiving into the field of science. He endeavored to utilize in the interests of religious truth the many scientific discoveries that had so often been used against it.

During the course of the nineteenth century not only were wonderful discoveries made in the domain of physical sciences; not only did geology wrest from the earth many of her important secrets, but moreover, the remote depths of human history have been explored as never before. The veil which for so many ages hung over the mummified monarchs of the Egyptian dynasties has been raised. The long forgotten past of Assyria and Babylonia has again been brought to light with its language and civilization of four milleniums B. C. appearing as perfect as in the days of Assurbanipal. Could all these astounding discoveries be lightly passed over when unbelievers pretended to find therein the denial of all Scriptural authority? What was needed on the part of apologists was to master the field by patient conscientious study and make the answer to the objections just as scientific as the objections themselves.

This sentiment and this conviction explain the attitude of mind which Bishop Le Camus always maintained with regard to science, and also certain acts of his episcopal administration. He loved study first of all on account of its utility in the good cause, but also on account of its very difficulties and consequent merit. Never in oral pronoucement or in his writings did he express a propos of the movement of modern thought any of those vague censures, of those scornful imputations of unspecified error, of those covert accusations concerning "suspicious novelties" etc. He uttered no sweeping assertions as to the bankruptcy of science or other like expressions so often met with in our modern clerical apologetics. Such charges indeed are so vague and ill defined that they serve no other purpose than to reveal the incompentency of those who formulate them, and perhaps to acquire for their authors by an easy process a reputation of rigid orthodoxy. These were not his apologetical tactics. When he took issue with a false doctrine—and he never hesitated to do so when he considered the faith to be in danger—it was with a strong open frankness; he specified clearly the point in question, and he was careful to distinguish the elements of truth from the erroneous and the uncertain in complex disputed problems. He accorded full value to the arguments of his opponents; he did not minimize objections or resort to special pleading, and never did he say aught that could be interpreted as a disapproval of science or a depreciation of mental activity. He would have deemed it a crime to discourage the efforts of a man of study. Even when he felt obliged to deny or dispute a theory he always showed respect for the scholar by whom it was advanced, for he was well aware that often much sincerity, disinterestedness and love of truth is found coupled with erroneous views. He knew that in the course of church

history certain errors had proved fruitful inasmuch as they served to throw the opposite truths into bolder relief, and he used to contrast favorably the patient labor of the true scholar with the cheap flippancy of those who without taking the trouble to investigate, discredit his researches and seek only to pick flaws in the results achieved.

Not only did Bishop Le Camus respect the person of the savant, but he revered also science and intellectual work for their own intrinsic excellence. He was well acquainted with the problems and the causes of the present intellectual crisis. Not a few timid persons are alarmed at the number and far reaching consequences of the questions involved. They do not perceive that for us believers the movement exhibits many symptoms that are encouraging for the future of our religion. Far from complaining we should rejoice to see such a vivid interest manifested in connection with the religious problems of the day. For a century and a half minds had been estranged from the Church through the bitter sarcasm of Voltaire. Chateaubriand and Lacordaire with the charm of their style and the force of their eloquence were able only to draw attention, as it were, to the facade of the temple and to the beauty of its outline. Positivism supervened and occupied mens' minds with the stupendous development of the physical sciences, and one might be tempted to conclude that the age of theology was past, when behold at the end of the nineteenth century after the scandal caused by Renan's *Vie de Jésus*, and in the wake of the bold negations of rationalism, a reaction sets in. Human conscience distressed, as it were, by the void that had been produced in it, now seeks a change. The much vaunted science no longer suffices for its needs and aspirations, and the religious problem returns again claiming the attention of the most eminent thinkers of the age. This revival of religious interest coincided with the impulse ever more and more vigorous given to historical research which has reclaimed from beneath the dust of ages the memory of the religious beginnings of mankind. And let it be noted moreover that the theatre of this religious and intellectual movement is not our theological seminaries or even our universities which remain strictly faithful to their time honored programs; the movement was not inaugurated by a curious or restless clergy. No, it originated in the outside world, in the conscience of laymen, often unbelievers. It is among the masters of secular knowledge, among the students of history, literature and science that the movement began and assumed a definite form. . . . And now Christian people turn towards us who are their masters and fathers in the faith, asking that we explain and justify our religion and its doctrines. The language of this expectant people is that of its own generation, that of the world in which it lives, of the science which it has learned. They beseech us to speak to them in their own tongue, and can we bear the responsibility of remaining deaf to their appeal? Should we not endeavor to come into intellectual contact with them, to follow with interest their researches and take due account of their discoveries? Is it not incumbent on us to christianize their ideas and infuse into their active palpitating lives the divine life principle of the Savior? Can we refuse to these famished souls the bread for which they are crying; can we leave in the dark those who are honestly seeking the light?

Such indeed was not the attitude of the great intellectual worker whose memory we honor to-day. He sought in all sincerity to give a straightforward answer to the various questions that are forced upon our consideration through the progress of modern science. He was far from favoring the ostrich-like tactic of shutting his eyes in the face of facts and denying the existence of an intellectual crisis. He knew that the progress of human thought can not be thus stopped. Intellectual movements may be guided or corrected, even thwarted to some extent, but they cannot be definitely suppressed. Instead of being alarmed at the exigencies of the modern scientific

spirit and the religious preoccupations of present day thought, we should rather rejoice. Do not these symptoms afford a probable indication that we are on the threshold of another theological century? Like its predecessors the fourth, the thirteenth and the seventeenth, it comes in the wake of great political, economic and social upheavals, as well as of a great and rapid progress in scientific matters; all of which by modifying the conditions of civilization have had a great effect on human thought. After an age of induction and analysis comes an age of synthesis. The great problems of to-morrow will be in the domain of theology, and it should be an occasion not of fear but of gratitude and hope that such questions are being brought forward and that they arouse such a vivid passionate interest. It is the undying leaven of the Gospel which is working in the mass of mankind.

Bishop Le Camus knew all this. All his activity as a private individual and a scholar was directed toward the furtherance of the great cause of religious science. As a bishop his constant effort was to encourage the younger clergy in the pursuit of all studies having a bearing on this field of knowledge and to provide opportunities for them in their line of work.

No sooner had he entered upon his episcopal administration than he began his work of reform, and his first care was the equipment and direction of his theological seminary. To this end he began by securing a staff of professors young, active and intelligent, all having obtained their academic degrees and having been trained according to the methods which he desired to introduce. His plans were ably seconded and it was not without good reason that the following year, when his ideas were already in a fair way towards realization, that he deplored the untimely loss of the Lazarist Fathers who had been so efficient in helping him to carry them out. Besides fortifying the personnel of the seminary, he turned his attention to the programs of study and the methods. His letter on the reorganization of the course of studies is one of the most original and interesting that has ever appeared on the subject though the matter has occupied the attention of the French hierarchy during the last few years.

In a few substantial pages he traces a complete program of seminary instruction. It is judicious and wisely progressive, departing not a little from the rigid lines laid down in the current theological text-books. Topics of less interest and utility are omitted, as also the long discussions bearing on systems and controversies that have long since been laid at rest. The old synthetic, deductive method is replaced in many instances by that of historical exposition, and a severe criticism is recommended in the choice and appreciation of proofs as well as in the interrpretation of texts. Alongside the great essential branches of sacred learning are introduced courses of scientific apologetics; of ancient and modern languages; of patrology and sacred archeology. But the study of Scripture is the one on which the principal stress is laid. This study, which was formerly considered, practically at least, as one of secondary importance in the seminary curriculum, is here made the axis of the entire course, and that not only because Holy Writ was considered by the Bishop as the most direct communication of the divine mind and the most authentic source of piety and interior life, but also because he felt that it is only through deep and extensive study of the Scriptures that one can develop a truly theological mind. He felt moreover that historical research and Higher Criticism were destined to have a great influence in shaping the future of theology.

Being endowed with an eminently practical mind, he was not content with tracing the outlines of the curriculum, and so he enters into various details with reference to the distribution of available time, the daily program of classes, etc. Instead of the cumbersome and barbarous Latin of which the least considerable

drawback was to substitute pretentious formulas and empty words for ideas on the part of the students, not to say even of the professors themselves, he substituted in all branches the use of the vernacular which besides being more clear and flexible, had the further advantage of presenting to the students the elements of sacred science in the same idiom in which they in their turn would be obliged to impart it to others. In place of the cut-and-dry memory method of the ordinary text-book he substituted the living oral teaching, and the class manual was relegated to its proper subsidiary place as an instrument of research, an aid to the memory, a guide or source of information. Thus the mind and judgment were to be formed without attaching undue importance to what proves often to be but a parrot memory; the mind should actively assimilate the ideas and not receive them in a merely passive manner.

Bishop Le Camus attached great importance to the application of the historical method to the study of all religious problems, and thus he endeavored to give to the seminary courses a broad positive basis of facts, viewing tradition comprehensively and in its ensemble. If one, for instance, accepts as the final and supreme exponent of Catholic dogma a theologian say of the time of Billuart or of Perrone, it is probable that he will find himself in presence of a magnificent synthesis well put together and of incontestable authority. However, it is but the artificial synthesis of one epoch, of one school, perchance even of a single mind. The traditional elements are interwoven in a masterly manner, if you will, but they appear only in the perspective of a particular school or of a particular theological genius. Such a view cannot be sufficiently comprehensive to adequately represent the great current of Christian tradition. In positive theology on the other hand, with its application of the historic method, Christian thought in its growth and living activity is kept constantly before the mind, and one follows the vicissitudes of theology in its progressive evolution. Familiarity with this method causes us to take a dynamic view of religious truth, looking upon it not as crystallized in immobility, but rather as ever unfolding itself in new developments. This onward movement, not indeed of religion but of the science of religion or theology, is a pledge of security for the future. Happen what may, we can always repeat with assurance *non praevalebunt*. The theological history of the past points a lesson for the time to come. The great current of living Christian tradition is a mighty river which may well bear us on its bosom towards other shores yet unknown....

At a Consistory held on April 15th, the Holy Father elevated seven prelates to the dignity of the Cardinalate. Of the new Cardinals, five are Italians, one Belgian, and one Spaniard. The latter, Mgr. Aguirre y Garcia, Bishop of Burgos, has come strongly to the fore as a leader in the threatened difficulties of the Church in Spain. Of the Italians, Cardinals Lorenzelli and Rinaldini are of the diplomatic corps of the Church. The former (a philosopher of some repute in his day), was the last Papal Nuncio at Paris; the latter now occupies the same post at Madrid. Cardinal Cavallari is Patriarch of Venice and a man after the stamp of the present Pontiff, who preceded him in that See. The three remaining Cardinals deserve more than a passing mention in a Review devoted to ecclesiastical science.

Of these the one who is probably best known to the learned world is Mgr. Désiré Mercier, Archbishop of Mechlin, formerly director of the School of St. Thomas Aquinas at the Catholic University of Louvain. It is in the main due to his labors that the neo-Thomistic movement

achieved such magnificentresults in the Belgian center of learning—results which on the philosophical side exceed those obtained in Rome itself. Better than any of the other leaders of the movement, he caught the spirit of Leo XIII's advice "Vetera novis augere et perficere." He was not content with merely interpreting the *Summa* from the point-of-view of Cajetan or any other ancient commentator. He strove to take the scholastic philosophy out of its medieval setting and made it modern. He accepted the main principles of the great schoolmen, but for him St. Thomas was more than a book—he was a master. He did not shirk the task of inaugurating the "diligens ac subtilis inquisitio" of which Aquinas saw the necessity in matters of psychology; and Louvain had a fine laboratory for the study of psycho-physics at a time when few Universities outside of Germany had begun to take up such work. The results of his labors stand not only in his published books: *Cour de philosophie, Origines de la psychologie contemporaine,* etc., but in the *Revue néo-scholastique,* and in the works of his pupils and collaborators, who have partaken of his energy and his spirit. Although he has devoted the best years of his life to the advancement of a definite movement of thought, his mind has not been narrowed to a groove. He is alive to every movement for the betterment of his country and of the Church, and views with a broad and generous spirit the labors of all who are striving for truth and right.

The name of Cardinal Maffi, Archbishop of Pisa, is not so widely known as that of Cardinal Mercier; but that it ought to be, and will be, is evident from the account of his learned labors which we borrow from the Roman correspondence of the *Freeman's Journal* of New York. "He was born at Carteolona, in the diocese of Pavia, on October 12, 1858. He was professor of physics and natural sciences at the seminary of Pavia, where he also established an observatory and at the same time started and assumed the management of a very able newspaper named *Il Ticino.* Mgr. Maffi deserves great credit for the part he has taken in encouraging the scientific movement amongst the Catholics of Italy. It is only necessary to mention the Congress of Como, held on the occasion of the Centenary of Alexander Volta, over which he presided. At that Congress it was decided to form the Scientific Society of Italian Catholics. To him also is due the founding of the Review of Physical and Mathematical Science, the only publication of its kind in Italy. He also reorganized the Vatican Observatory which of itself would be sufficient to earn for him the gratitude of all those who appreciate the importance of an harmonious accord between science and faith. Mgr. Maffi presided over the Marial International Congress held in Rome in December, 1904, on the occasion of the jubilee of the Immaculate Conception. Cardinal Maffi is not only a theologian, a physicist and a journalist, but likewise the author of several novels dealing with social questions. The best known of his novels is entitled: *"The Village Hawks."* The place which the new Cardinal holds in the hearts of his present flock may be judged from the fact that a strong delegation of Pisans headed by that fine representative of the Italian Catholic laity, Professor Toniolo, besought the Holy Father to allow their Archbishop to continue with them. His services are needed, however, for the larger concerns of the Universal Church.

When after the death of Cardinal Celesia of Palermo, Pius X was looking about for a man capable of handling the exceedingly thorny problem of religious decadence in Sicily, his choice fell on Mgr. Lualdi, then rector of the Lombard College in Rome. To those who did not know the man, the appointment seemed far from wise, mainly from the fact that he hails from Milan, in the extreme north of Italy, and therefore, presumably, would be from the first *persona non grata* to the Sicilians. Scarcely two years have passed, and the Piedmontese stranger has won his way among his Southern people. He has still many troubles to contend with, but the greater part of his clergy and the mass of public opinion are with him in his reforms, which affect not only his own diocese, but the whole island. His wise grasp of the situation is evident from the fact that his dearest object is to improve the conditions of seminary training so as to form a body of priests who shall be prepared mentally and morally so as to be efficient guides of the people. He took a leading part in the council of Sicilian prelates which determined on the suppression of many of the smaller seminaries and the strengthening of the larger ones. If a man of his stamp had been appointed to Sicily a half-century ago, the Church in America would probably have one problem the less to contend with.

That the Holy Father is persistent in his attempt to extend the same reforms to other parts of Italy is evident from the following report of the *Tablet* correspondent: "The education of the clergy has become one of the grave problems of the Pontificate of Pius X. In his first Encyclical his Holiness dwelt with special emphasis on the care bishops in general should have of their seminaries. Just a year ago the Pope addressed an encyclical letter to all the bishops of the Catholic world, recommending them to devote special attention to the study of the Scripture in their seminaries and laying down a series of rules for this study; and four months later he addressed a letter to the Italian bishops, which regarded closely the education of the young clergy. But before these two latter documents his Holiness had appointed a Pontifical Commission for the reorganization of the Seminaries in Italy. He has now appointed nine Apostolic Delegates, to each of whom is assigned a special district in central or southern Italy, the seminaries of which he is to visit and report upon. After the visitation the bishops of each of these districts will meet together, with the Apostolic Delegate, to devise means for improving the education of the clerics under their charge. Your correspondent has reason to believe that as a result of meetings and the visitation, many small anemic seminaries will be entirely suppressed and that in some cases at least a central seminary for a whole district will take the place of groups of diocesan seminaries."

For information concerning the progress of two undertakings which are of general interest to Catholic scholars we are indebted to *Rome*, the new English weekly published in the Holy City. His Holiness granted the honor of a private audience to Father Cormier, Master General of the Dominicans, who presented to him Father James Lyttleton, O. P., Father Peter Paul Mackey, O. P., Father Gabriel Horn, Editors of the monumental edition of the works of St. Thomas Aquinas, and with them the Chevalier

Gatti, Director of the Propaganda Printing Press. The Editors offered the Holy Father a beautifully bound copy of the ninth volume of the Summa, which contains the Third Part of the Summa Theologica, from Quaestio LX beginning the treatise *De Sacramentis*, to Quaestio XC which is the last written by the Angelic Doctor. The volume also contains the Quaestiones *De Sacramentis* written by Cardinal Cajetan, to complete his commentaries on the Third Part of the Summa, and finally the supplement to the Third Part. The Holy Father greatly praised the Editors for their zeal and was glad to learn that they will soon be able to publish five Indices, viz: i) Index quæstionum et articulorum; ii) Catalogus alphabeticus sive concordantia Articulorum; iii) Index analyticus materiarum; iv) Index citationonum auctorum, and v) Index citationum Sacræ Scripturæ.

The Pontifical Commission for the Codification of Canon Law has now been in existence three years, having been constituted on the Feast of St. Joseph 1904, and yet it is still a long way from the end of its labors. Probably four years more will be required to finish the colossal task. The Holy Father was at first desirous that the Consultors should finish entirely the important part of canonical legislation relating to the sacraments, and to have this part of the new code promulgated at once. Grave difficulties, however, were found in the way, and it is now likely that the entire Code of Pius X will be promulgated in one act. But it is very probable, if not quite certain, that within the present year a very important, not to say radical, change will be made in the law regarding the celebration of the sacrament of matrimony. At present the most numerous and difficult cases that come before the Congregation of the Council are those regarding marriage, and not a few of them arise from the different legislation existing in countries were the decree *Tametsi* of the Council of Trent is in force and those where it is not. The forthcoming act of legislation will in all probability tend to unify the conditions requisite for the valid marriage of Christians. It will at the same time greatly simplify the work of the Congregation of the Council.

In still another field of work—that of Christian Archeology—our Roman scholars have been making considerable progress. Professor Marucchi advances the opinion that the death of St. Peter took place on or near the Vatican, and not on the Janiculum, where the church of San Pietro in Montorio stands. He points out that the present Basilica of St. Peter stands on the very spot where once stood the great villa of Nero. He thinks it extremely probable that the Apostle was martyred there and interred in the tomb of one of Cæsar's servants, since the Epistle to the Philippians proves that Christians were to be found in the household of the Emperor. This view would confirm the tradition extending back to the second century that the body of St. Peter was buried on this spot. Father Grisar, S. J., has given his approval to another conclusion of Prof. Marucchi, that the Ostrian Cemetery was located in the Via Salaria, though he says that the tradition that St. Peter used to baptize on that site cannot be affirmed with certainty. We are glad to announce that the Italian government has at last recognized the value of the work that is being done in this field, and has established in the University of Rome a chair of Christian Archeology, which has been assigned to Professor Marucchi.

We cite the most important passages of a very noteworthy utterance of the Holy Father in his reply to the address of Cardinal Cavallari. The greatest trial of the Church, he says, is not in the difficulties in France. It "is that which springs from the aberration which falsifies her teachings and raises again throughout the world the cry of revolt for which the rebels were driven from heaven. Rebels indeed are they who profess and propagate under deceitful forms monstrous errors on the evolution of dogma, on a return to what they call the pure Gospel, stripped of the explanations of theology, of the definitions of the Councils, of the maxims of ascetics; or emancipation from the Church, but, after a new fashion, in such a way as not to be cut off on account of open rebellion, and yet not to give up their convictions through submission; and, finally, on the duty of falling in with the times in speaking, in writing, in preaching a charity without faith and full of tenderness towards unbelievers, but which, alas, opens to all the road to eternal ruin.

"You see, then, Venerable Brethren, whether We, with the duty of preserving with all our strength the deposit entrusted to us, have not reason to be afflicted by this attack, which is not one heresy, but the essence and the poison of all heresies, and which is of a nature to undermine the foundations of the faith and to annihilate Christianity. Yes, to annihilate Christianity. For the Sacred Scripture, in the eyes of these modern heretics, has ceased to be the sure fount of all the truths of faith, and is no more than a common book; for them inspiration is limited to dogmatic teachings, and these understood in a sense of their own, and it differs but little from the poetical inspiration of Aeschylus or Homer. The Church is the lawful interpreter of the Bible—but the Church in subjection to the rules of the so-called critical science which dominates theology and enslaves it. Lastly, in addition, everything is relative and changeable, and thus the authority of the Fathers is whittled away to nothing. And all these and a thousand other errors are propagated in pamphlets, reviews, ascetical works, and even in novels, clothed in ambiguous terms and cloudy formulas in such a way as always to leave an escape from certain condemnation, and yet serve to take the unwary in their snares."

We find in a daily newspaper the following statement concerning the new Italian review, *Il Rinnovamento*, the first number of which was noticed in our last issue: Cardinal Steinhuber, prefect of the Congregation of the Index, has written a letter to Cardinal Ferrari, Archbishop of Milan, asking him to put a stop to the publication of *Rinnovamento*, a Catholic review. Among the contributors to this magazine are Antonio Fogazzaro, author of *Il Santo;* Father Romolo Murri, leader of the Catholic democrats, who was recently suspended *a divinis* by the Pope for criticism of the action of the Church in Italy, and other authors of radical tendencies. Cardinal Steinhuber says the "infamous work of these men is unworthy of true Catholics and that its object is the cultivation of a dangerous spirit of independence of the Church and the formation of an anti-Catholic school." If this order is not obeyed *Rinnovamento* will be placed upon the Index.

Father Salvatore Minocchi, the scholarly editor of *Studi Religiosi*, is having troubles of his own,—not, however, with the authorities of the Church. He is simply in the not unusual position of a man who tries to pursue an even way between extremes and finds himself under fire from both sides. An Italian review has been pitching into him for having been severe in his criticism of Father Billot and Schiffini, and for having defended Father Tyrrell after his expulsion from the Society. As for Father Schiffini, it would be hard for any critic to be as severe with him as he, without any such justification, was in his language concerning Father Lagrange. And as for Father Tyrrell—well, the Church has not declared him *vitandus*. Are all who might act as counsel for him to be disbarred before his trial? The Holy Catholic and Roman Church—whether considered as the body of the faithful or as the governing authority—would never consent to such measures as that. The Catholic Church is made up of men who, whatever their individual backslidings, are devoted to justice; it is ruled by men whose concern it is to advance the kingdom of justice, and who are guided in their decisions by a system of open and impartial judicial procedure. In this case as in all others justice will be done by the Church of Christ in accordance with the due forms of its law—to doubt it would be insulting; to attempt to prevent it, disloyal.

Now for the other extreme. Father Minocchi made an analysis of Father Tyrrell's "Much Abused Letter," and ended by declaring his frank conviction that certain principles which he considered could be found in it are untenable. He has been beseiged with letters from correspondents who blame him for what they call his disloyalty to Father Tyrrell. But what do these people want? As originally written—to help certain worried souls to tide over a period of intellectual trial—Father Tyrrell's letter presents one aspect. But now that circumstances have forced him to give it to the world, it takes on a new phase. It becomes a fair question for the theologian to discuss whether positions tentatively advanced in that letter can be permanently held. At a time when so many good souls are puzzled and led astray, and when every active-minded and earnest priest is looking about for some means of reconciling the mind of the age with the ancient faith, such an inquiry is most natural and proper. And if an honest inquirer comes to the conclusion that he cannot accept the solution, because it seems out of harmony with the faith or the facts—well, it is exactly through the clash of opinion such as this that truth ultimately comes into her own. There are mighty theological problems to be settled by this generation or the next, and no one man is going to settle them. Father Tyrrell's Italian friends are on the wrong track. We believe that Father Tyrrell himself would be in favor of a full and fair free discussion of the whole matter on all its sides.

But here is a matter of another complexion. Father Tyrrell has found it necessary to write to a Catholic paper in London to refute a miserable fabrication which has been given wide currency: "Sir,—Your Roman Correspondent writes: 'I learned some time ago that the Rev. George Tyrrell had communicated with Rome on the subject of dogmatic teaching. Now I hear that his missive was a letter to the Pope, and that it was of such a nature as to sever the brilliant writer from the Catholic

communion.' Is it not monstrous that neither you nor your correspondent took the trouble to verify a statement so easily verifiable if true; but which, not being true, constitutes a gross slander? If I ask no apology from you it is because I should set no value on it whatever.—Your obedient servant, George Tyrrell. PS.—I should perhaps make it clear that not only is the principal allegation of your correspondent false, but also the subsidiary statements about my controversy with Rome, which are inventions pure and simple."

Now what are we to think, or rather, what are we to say about methods such as this? Let us be charitable as far as we may, and admit that the publisher was guilty only of negligence and the correspondent of credulity. The fact remains that somebody gave deliberate utterance to that lie, presumably with the desire to advance the interests of One who Himself was made to suffer through lying witness. Here we have no question of theological schools. Even the personal wrong of the man accused must take a second place in view of the larger interests involved. It is a question of the ethical standards of religion, of the principles of Christianity, of truth, justice, fair play. And amid the shame and indignation we feel that anyone of our faith should stoop to such foulness, it is a source of gratification to feel that it is truer of Catholics than of any other body of men that no matter what differences of opinion may exist among them, they will join in reprobating any man who thinks to fight the battles of Christ with the weapons of Satan—"not (as we are slandered and as some affirm that we do say) let us do evil that good may come: whose damnation is just."

An *obiter dictum* of a writer on the "New Theology" in the *Tablet* has brought forth two very interesting letters on the theory of development. The first is from the widely known Catholic theologian, Rev. T. B. Scannell: "In your excellent summary of the case against the so-called 'New Theology' you say: 'The Catholic principle of Development of Doctrine is an intellectual unfolding of conclusions from premises.' Surely it is something more. Can we not admit an *organic* Development? In the case of logical development (which would seem to be your view), all the deductions are actually contained in the premises, and are merely drawn out of them as occasion requires; whereas in organic development the results are only potentially contained in the germs from which they spring. In a logical process nothing is taken in from without: in an organic process there must be absorption of external elements. The grain of mustard seed sown by our Lord has grown up and become a tree by taking in and assimilating materials from the soil and the atmosphere in which it was planted. Jewish, Greek, and Roman elements have in turn been absorbed; and in later ages, Keltic and Teutonic influences have also contributed their share. For example, Scripture teaches plainly that there is only one God, and yet it speaks of Father, Son, and Holy Ghost; it speaks, too, of Jesus Christ in such a way that He must be both God and man. Set these truths down in an environment of Greek thought, and what will happen? They will be worked out on the lines of Greek metaphysics; the primitive teaching will absorb into itself the appropriate Greek elements by a process analogous to the growth of an organism. There is no accretion,

transformation, corruption, but absorption, assimilation, growth. Take, again, the doctrine of Original Sin and Redemption. The Apostle speaks of the sin committed by Adam, transmitted to his posterity, and atoned for by Jesus Christ. The Western Fathers, accustomed to Roman Law, worked out this doctrine on the lines of the Roman theory of obligations arising out of contract and delict, the Roman view of debts, and the mode of incurring, extinguishing, and transmitting them, and the Roman notion of the continuance of individual existence by universal succession. This view of the organic Development of the Church's teaching is a conclusive answer to those who ask us to produce from ancient authorities the exact counterpart of doctrines now held. They might just as well look for the trunk and the leaves of the oak-tree in the acorn from which these sprang.

The second letter is from Father Tyrrell. He rejects the development theory, and also takes occasion to repudiate certain other theological views: "The writer has seized the point at issue more clearly than most, and the clearness with which he has stated the 'intellectualist' position is to me simply invaluable. Clear men are the *enfants terribles* of every cause. It is, then, no travesty of his school to describe its conception of Doctrinal Development as purely dialectical—'an intellectual unfolding of conclusions from premises.' For this, and many similar admissions, I bless the writer's clearness. All we need, then, is the *Depositum Fidei* and *Barbara, Celarent*, etc. It is hard to see where the Holy Spirit comes in, or how dogmas so mechanically deduced are not 'man-made' rather than 'God-made.' I would undertake to produce twenty in a day, all systematically unassailable....As for M. Le Roy, he writes as a philosopher and a 'pragmatist.' If 'pragmatism' is right, the concept of dogma *must* be affected, he cannot have a Catholic epistemology any more than a Catholic arithmetic. To reply that our epistemology must be regulated by our notion of dogma is to tumble into the heresy of traditionalism. M. Le Roy should be met on the general question of 'pragmatism' or left alone. For myself, I seem to belong to a much older school than the writer. For while If admit development in theology as in any other science, I take my stand with the Fathers against any sort of development of Revelation or Dogma. If the writer understood his own system, which he does not, he would see that such a term and conception has no place in it. By syllogising, dogmas breed and multiply; they do not develop. I hold that they do neither, and that a new dogma is even a greater heresy than a changed dogma. As for the 'ten points,' I cannot recognize myself in any of them. I do not believe that there is 'an essential unity between God and Man,' or that Revelation is not external, nor dogmatic, nor final; nor that it is merely ethical; nor that 'dogmas are man-made, and not God-made,' nor that their value is merely pragmatical. And when the writer persistently uses the phrase 'prophetic or ethical' as though they were in any sense synonymous, it almost looks as if he were determined to make me say what he knows I have not said. Were the prophetic visions of Ezekiel or the Apocalypse, were the Messianic prophecies merely 'ethical'?"

In the April *Dublin* there is an interesting article "For Truth or for Life" in favor of a policy of moderation in the urging of new and startling

positions. In his conclusion the writer says: "Cardinal Newman, after his eloquent defence of the principle of economy in his introduction to the *Via Media*, urges strongly that the present time is one in which it is necessary to speak frankly and fully on these subjects—when the principle of economy should be reduced to a minimum. One of the last communications which the present writer received from the Cardinal was a memorandum in MS. written apropos to an article by the late Dr. Mivart, to the tone of which he greatly objected, urging the very policy we have just indicated. The Cardinal suggested that a fair statement, in which many hands should concur to prevent the intrusion of exaggeration or of personal bias, should be drawn up embodying the more important lines of thought in which widely current theological opinions were at variance with the trend of the positive sciences, and that such a statement should be submitted backed by the most influential episcopal sanction, to the Roman authorities for their consideration."

We are glad to give wider currency to the following wise and timely remarks of Professor Felix Adler of the Ethical Culture Society. They are quoted from his article on "The Argument for Uniform Divorce Laws" in the *Woman's Home Companion* for March: "The attempt to amend the laws on the subject of divorce is helpful, inasmuch as it leads all those who are engaged in this enterprise to realize the ultimate inadequateness of any laws, however stringent, however wise, and to search for a deeper remedy than any which legislation can supply. The conscience of the people must be awakened; and the best law will prove mere dead-letter unless this can be accomplished. The mutinous individualism of our age must be overcome, the springs of duty must be touched, the fundamental value of the family as the cornerstone of all our social institutions must be brought home. Moral teaching, moral enlightenment, moral appeals, must re-enforce the law and engender among the people a spirit favorable to the execution of it. Above all, in the face of many heretical opinions that are now spreading in the community with respect to marriage, the reasons must be made plain why the permanence of this relation is so essential to individual and public welfare. There is a disposition at the present time, due largely to the ever-increasing influence of science, to rebel against mere authority in every sphere, in the sphere of conduct as well as of thought. The most ancient traditions, the most sacred institutions, are summoned before the bar of reason to give an account of themselves and to justify their claims. Of this tendency among civilized nations we must take note, and the reasons must be adduced for the permanency of the marriage relation...It will not do merely to invoke immemorial custom or sanctified authority...The two main reasons may be succinctly stated as follows: For the partners themselves of the marriage contract, the expectation of permanency in the relation is indispensable, because it is the permanency alone that makes the relation pure, noble and human, and distinguishes it from the sexual commerce of the lower animals. For the child that springs from the conjugal relation, the permanency of marriage is indispensable, because the permanent home is necessary to insure its best development, because the child needs both parents in order that it may grow in the best possible manner, physically, mentally and morally."

The necrology list for the past half-year is a long one. It includes the names of Monsignor O'Reilly, the venerable American writer; Sir William Hingston, an eminent Catholic physician of Montreal; Very Rev. Canon Northcote, author of works on the Catacombs, and formerly president of Oscott; Father Nilles, S. J., professor of Canon Law at the University of Innsbruck; the French preacher Père Monsabré, O. P.; Pobiedonostseff, the Procurator General of the Holy Synod; Carducci, the Italian poet; Berthelot, the eminent French physicist who exercised such an influence over Ernest Renan; Mendelaieff, the Russian physicist; B. Stade, Old Testament critic and editor of the *Zeitschrift für die alttestamentliche Wissenschaft*; Mgr. Ceriani, director of the Ambrosian Library of Milan, a palaeographer to whose erudition and activity the world of learning is deeply in debt; Paul Vetter, professor of Exegesis, and F. X. Funk, professor of Church History and Patrology, in the faculty of Catholic theology at Tübingen. The loss of the two latter savants, following so close after the deaths of Schanz, Schell, and Bickell, makes a lamentable breach in the ranks of German Catholic scholars.

BOOK REVIEWS.

The Catholic Encyclopedia. An international work of reference on the constitution, doctrine, discipline and history of the Catholic Church. Vol. I Aachen—Assize. 826 pages. Robert Appleton Company, New York.

The general inadequacy of our English literature with regard to information pertaining to the Catholic Church is a well known fact. Moreover, the meagre information contained in the ordinary sources is often untrustworthy, either from religious bias, or more often perhaps, through simple lack of knowledge on the part of the writers. This inadequacy has of late come to be recognized by the editors and publishers of various encyclopedias and books of reference, and they have accordingly caused these works to be revised and supplemented by Catholic scholars. In this is manifested a laudable intention to be fair, and so far as it goes the idea is to be commended. But such revision and supplementing of works of which the general spirit is often far from being Catholic, can never be fully saitfsactory. At best it is only a makeshift, and in many instances the most that can be done is to remove or tone down the more objectionable features in articles which in reality ought to be re-written from another point of view. It has often therefore been a matter of legitimate wonder and regret that English speaking Catholics should be without a convenient and reliable work of reference on subjects pertaining to their religion, its doctrines and its practices, and this need has been felt more and more during the last few decades as a consequence of the rapid and extensive development of the Church among English speaking peoples. Both Catholics and non-Catholics must be interested to know the truth concerning an institution which has played so great a part in the world's history, and whose influence ever remains such a potent factor in the progress of civilization.

It was to meet this growing need that the great enterprise of which the present volume is the first fruits, was organized a little over a year ago. It is not unlikely that the successful publication of the Jewish Encyclopedia had proved an object lesson which served to stimulate and encourage the promoters of the project which otherwise might have been still longer delayed. It is a pleasure to note that

foremost among the promoters of the enterprise was His Grace the Archbishop of New York, and it has been largely through his encouragement and active support that the organization and prosecution of the scheme has been so successful.

The purpose of the work is broad and comprehensive and can be best set forth in the opening words of the preface. "The Catholic Encyclopedia, as its name implies, proposes to give its readers full and authoritative information on the entire cycle of Catholic interests, action and doctrine. What the Church teaches and has taught; what she has done and is still doing for the highest welfare of mankind; her methods, past and present; her struggles, her triumphs, and the achievements of her members, not only for her own immediate benefit, but for the broadening and deepening of all true science, literature and art—all come within the scope of the Catholic Encyclopedia. It differs from the general encyclopedia in omitting facts and information which have no relation to the Church. On the other hand, it is not exclusively a church encyclopedia, nor is it limited to the ecclesiastical sciences and the doings of churchmen. It records all that Catholics have done, not only in behalf of charity and morals, but also for the intellectual and artistic development of mankind. It chronicles what Catholic artists, educators, poets, scientists and men of action have achieved in their several provinces." The editors are of course aware that there is no "specifically Catholic science," but in view of the oft repeated assertion "that Catholic principles are an obstacle to scientific research, it seems not only proper but needful to register what and how much Catholics have contributed to every department of knowledge."

All well informed persons are aware that on this last, as well as on other scores, there is need of much rectification of judgment in the mind of the English speaking public at large, and they will also doubtless agree that the best means of accomplishing the desired end is not by emphasizing the apologetic—much less the polemic—note, but by a sober and accurate statement of facts. Not unfrequently in the past Catholic apologetic writers, though animated with the best intentions, have failed to convince even the open-minded because their work was over done—the attitude assumed being rather that of a lawyer making a skilful plea for a deserving client than of an inquirer seeking to get at the simple truth. A cursory examination of the Encyclopedia shows that in the main this defect resulting from excessive zeal has been avoided, a noteworthy instance being the article

on Alexander VI. Other articles v. g. the one on Arnauld can hardly be considered as conspicuous in point of fairness, but of course there is room in such matters for divergence of appreciation, and such instances go to show that the editors have wisely left to each contributor a goodly amount of freedom in the treatment of his subject.

The management is to be congratulated on having secured the collaboration of so many eminent Catholic scholars whereby the work is made truly international in character. In the department of Scripture and kindred topics, though the articles are not all of equal scientific value, it is gratifying to note that several of them at least give evidence of a thorough acquaintance with modern criticism together with a proper discriminating appreciation of its methods and results. In glancing over the list of contributors to this branch one cannot help regretting the absence of certain names such as Lagrange, von Hummelauer, Vincent, Condamin and Van Hoonacker, but this is only the first volume, and it is to be hoped that their collaboration may be secured later on. In the mean time the presence of the names of such writers as Maas, Gigot, Howlett, Van den Biesen and Oussani is proof that in the treatment of Biblical and Oriental subjects the importance of sound modern scholarship has not been overlooked. Typical of this scholary mode of treatment is the article Abraham by Canon Howlett. In connection with the Scripture articles it is to be regretted that through mistakes on the part of the printer and oversight on the part of the proof-reader, a great number of the Hebrew words have been mis-spelled, some of them being quite unrecognizable. Doubtless these errors will be corrected before the printing of the second edition.

Among the theological contributions the masterly article on Agnosticism by Dr. Shanahan and the important article by Dr. Hanna on Absolution deserve special mention. The latter study is mainly historical and is suggestive as showing some of the vicissitudes traceable in the development of the doctrine and practice connected with the sacrament of penance.

It would be beyond the scope of the present notice to attempt a detailed analysis and appreciation of the many scholarly articles on various topics throughout the volume. Suffice it to say that in the domain of philosophy there are contributions from such able writers as Dr. Pace, Dr. Turner and Francis P. Duffy; on historical subjects there are articles by Abbot Gasquet, Herbert Thurston, Dr. Shahan, Mgr. Loughlin, Dr. Healy, Dr. Hassett, etc., together with many biographical sketches by Father Campbell. Noteworthy among these

contributions is an important article on America by Ad. Bandelier of the American Hispanic Society. Canon law is represented by such standard authorities as Mgr. Burtsell, Dr. Creagh and Dr. Papi. In a word, we find that the responsibility for most of the principal articles rests with many of the leading Catholic scholars of Europe and America.

It was to be expected that the Catholic University would be well represented on the editorial board, and it is gratifying to note that the same institution together with the group of colleges that have grown up around it, has furnished so many able contributions in the various branches of ecclesiastical science. So important is this publication that it is only proper that it should be closely connected with the great centre of higher Catholic education in America.

Some readers may find that for a general encyclopedia too much space has been devoted to topics which would belong more properly to special works. Thus perhaps an undue importance is given to Old Testament subjects of slight interest except to the scholar who will naturally seek his information in the works of specialists. A similar remark might likewise apply to such articles as "Altar," the longest in the volume. The treatment is scholarly and exhaustive, but so long a discussion would seem more appropriate in a dictionary of Christian archeology than in an encyclopedia for the people. The expansion given to such topics is doubltess due to the laudable intention not to confine within too narrow limits the subjects that one might reasonably expect to find treated in a Catholic encyclopedia. However, a long article on Alabama seems to be somewhat outside the scope of the work, as also such articles as "Alcoholism" and "Adulteration of Food."

Another disederatum is noticeable in connection with some of the bibliographies appended to the articles. In many instances they would be more convenient for reference if they were more precise and specific, indicating not only the work but also the volume and the chapter or page.

But these are at the most but slight defects, and on the whole, the work is a very creditable production, both as regards the contents and the material make up of the volume. It contains a vast amount of information on Catholic subjects never before brought together in an English dress; it contains specimens of the best scholarship, and if in the succeeding volumes the same standard is maintained, the Catholic Encyclopedia will rank among the very important publications

of the twentieth century—a work extremely useful to Catholics and non-Catholics alike.

JAMES F. DRISCOLL.

Saint Thomas Aquinas: Pars Prima—from the Latin of B. BONJOANNES. Benziger, New York. Baker, London, 1906.

The Knowledge of God in its Relation to the Theory of Knowledge of St. Thomas—by MATTHEW SCHUMACHER, C. S. C., Ph. D. University Press, Notre Dame, Ind., 1905.

The God of Philosophy—by REV. FRANCIS AVELING, D. D. Herder. St. Louis. Sands & Co, London, 1906.

The impetus given to the study of the philosophy of St. Thomas by Leo XIII has not ceased with the life of that illustrious Pontiff. In the department of NOTES of the present issue of this Review will be found an account of the progress of the new edition of his works which is being carried out by his brethren in religion. Moreover, text-books (most of which add little to the subject), magazine articles, and special studies are being produced in large numbers. As an aid to the wider spread of the movement a writer whose name is modestly withheld has translated into English a compendium of Part I of the *Summa* which was made by Berardus Bonjoannes in the sixteenth century. An introduction, and also a short appendix explaining some of the more difficult scholastic terms, are added by Dr. Falcini, of Fiesole, Italy. The compendium possesses very real merit. The task of abbreviating St. Thomas' terse presentation of his thought was certainly a difficult one. The author has accomplished this task mainly by dropping the objections with which each article begins. The substance of the article is then stated, usually with comparatively little condensation. The translation (revised by Wilfrid Lescher, O. P.), has been as well done as the difficulties of the task allow.

2. Dr. Schumacher has hit upon the right method of advancing the Thomistic movement. Text-books, commentaries, and compendiums are of advantage in a class-room; but experience shows that there are two principal means of propagating the views of an ancient author—prepare a good critical text of his works, and provide a series of monographs on his main positions treated from modern points of view. Even from the title of his book one can infer that Dr. Schumacher first determined to set forth the teachings of St. Thomas on a question on which a modern English philosopher has

affected the views of many; then, seeing that the Angelic Doctor's way of handling this matter depends closely on his views of the validity of the thought-process, the author wisely determined to devote a large portion of his book to the epistemology of St. Thomas. The result of his labors is that we receive an admirable sketch of Thomistic epistemology and theodicy, which, apart from one's argreement or disagreement with the conclusions, is welcome as a contribution to the history of philosophy. The presentation of St. Thomas' views on both these subjects is ample and clear, as becomes a disciple of the schoolmen. Moreover, numerous citations throughout the work, as well as the excellent bibliography at the end, manifest his familiarity with the work of more modern authors and their positions. In accordance with the demands of his subject, he pays special attention to the difficulties from Agnosticism, Anthropomorphism, and, to some extent, Ontologism. His attitude toward the views of Aquinas throughout the work seems to be that of a satisfied disciple. At least he offers no criticism of points in his theory of knowledge which, in the view of the present writer, must be modified in the direction of concessions to a theory of relativity, e. g., sense-knowledge.

3. The work on *The God of Philosophy* is one of a series entitled "Expository Essays in Christian Philosophy," and is written by the energetic young editor of the series, Dr. Francis Aveling. He states his purpose in the opening lines of his Preface: "In the following pages I have attempted no more than to restate in simple language and upon the old philosophical basis, the natural proofs by which the existence of God is demonstrated." The lines of argument are Thomistic, *a posteriori* in their point of departure, metaphysical in their ultimate development. And the writer has the mental qualities of a good scholastic, definiteness of view, accuracy of distinction, clearness of presentation; and if he does not always attain to the simplicity of expression that he aimed at, he at least does the best he can with a terminology that will always sound stiff and foreign to unaccustomed ears.

His treatment of the subject, moreover, is not merely an exposition of scholastic teaching, although therein consists its chief value. The arguments that were evolved by the medieval thinkers are throbbing with actuality for this twentieth century scholastic, and his presentation of them is personal.

On the side of metaphysics the work is excellent. We must note as a drawback, however, that as an essay in apologetics, the

work is defective in a realm of thought in which the modern mind seems most to dwell and from which most of the present-day difficulties come—natural science. This could be justified if the author's scope were merely to give an exposition of the views of ancient philosophers, but he intends his book to be a contribution to the theistic problem as it exists to-day. True, in chapter xii he offers three lines of argument from the sciences: that of Stewart and Tait in *The Unseen Universe*, one from tidal action, and one from the failure to prove spontaneous generation. But he accepts, practically without consideration of objections, the validity of sense perception, the supposed fact of substantial change, the theory of matter and form, the archaic distinction of different kinds of motion; and his treatment of the question of evolution is unfortunately inadequate.

Dr. Aveling has done such excellent service through the Westminster Lectures in turning the minds of English Catholics in the direction of modern questions that we can feel certain that these deficiencies arise solely from a misapprehension on his part as to the constituency to which his book would make appeal. He may be assured that readers who can follow the philosophical arguments so ably presented by him will also be able to profit by a thorough discussion of the modifications suggested from the modern scientific point of view.

FRANCIS P. DUFFY.

Jesus Christ and the Social Question.—FRANCIS GREENWOOD PEABODY, Harvard University. (374 pages). The Macmillan Company.

It has recently been said that the Church which has nothing to say anent the social problems of the time forfeits to a great extent its claim to existence, for the Gospel of to-day is a Gospel of social service.

Mr. Peabody's book tries to point out Christ's attitude to social questions, and shows very convincingly that the Christianity of the Gospels can deal with present day difficulties. The book is a painstaking study and the answer is hopeful in the extreme.

In the first chapter especially there is a very clear statement of the questions asked by socialists with reference to religion. Religion has been so long in the field, what has it done for the working man? The answer as sought in the churches has not always been satisfying to the inquirers. The poor and the working classes are not looking for charity. They are reading and thinking and asking questions, and

when men begin to do that, it is well to be ready with more than a scholastic answer. Why is philanthropy or pity necessary? What men want is justice and work.

The attitude of socialists toward religion is well known. They brand Christianity as "The religion of private property and of the respectable classes." More and more the masses are looking askance at organized religion. So far, at least, the church has combatted socialism and forced its leaders to look upon her as their most bitter enemy. And yet these leaders are sincere enough in their efforts to find a way for the betterment of the social conditions of the masses. The "other-worldiness" of Christianity and the laying all the stress upon happiness in the life to come finds scant acceptance when suffering people begin to realize through hearing and reading that this life also is part of the universal scheme.

It is evident from the pretty general consensus of opinion among writers on the social question that there is "a gulf of alienation and misinterpretation lying between the social movement and the Christian religion," and the author intends to show from the Gospels, i. e., from the earliest written accounts of what the people thought of the economy of Jesus, that there is, or should be, no such gulf. He points out that the Gospel of Jesus was interpreted as a "Gospel for the poor, the blind, the prisoners, and the broken-hearted.' The modern world is going to test the Christian religion by its ability to solve the social question. Therefore, "either socialize Christianity, or Christianize socialism."

In the ministry of Jesus, social principles are, so to speak, a mere by-product. He unfolded no system He dealt with individual cases as they occurred. But he entrusted his hope for the world to the individual. When the spirit of God gets into every human life, the kingdom of God will have come; and the kingdom is to come "not by outward force or social organization, or apocalyptic dreams, but by the progressive sanctification of individual human souls."

The attitude of Jesus toward the social and industrial world is stated substantially as follows: He looked at the world's affairs and at human conditions *from above*, i. e., he took an ideal view of life; he looked at them *from within* the individual's heart, i. e. he pointed to character-building; and he measured and judged of everything with reference to *the kingdom*, or the ideal condition when all shall be brothers. With this ideal outlook upon life, and with this development of individual character, every man will consider and respect his fellow-man, and

look upon himself as merely the administrator for the general good of the goods and talents he may have control over. Certainly, if worked out from these points of view, the social questions of the hour could be solved with satisfaction to all.

In so many chapters the author then discusses the teaching of Jesus concerning the family, the rich, the care of the poor, and the industrial order, with a final correlation of the social questions." The treatment is fresh and vigorous indicating a thorough mastery and assimilation of the subject, and in several instances, particularly with reference to the stability of the family, the writer's interpretation of the Master's teaching is in strict harmony with the teaching and discipline of the Catholic Church. The number of references given in the footnotes on nearly every page, of itself makes the work valuable. Anyone who is dealing with the people and trying to uplift and direct them will find this book eminently suggestive and useful. It is a work that commends itself to all clergymen and to all who in one way or another are interested in philanthropic or charitable work.

THOMAS J. MULVEY.

Lo Gnosticismo: Storia di Antiche Lotte Religiose—By E. BUONAIUTI. Rome, Libreria Editrice Francesco Ferrari, 1907.

This recent contribution to the study of Christian Origins deals with the system which threatened, and to some extent rivaled the spread and influence of Christianity from the first to the third centuries. As Dr. Buonaiuti defines his subject, Gnosticism was a system which took its stand on the power of human reason and endeavored to solve the great riddles of life without extraneous assistance. It was therefore an exaggerated rationalism. For the student of to-day, the gnosis becomes a reality only when it deals directly with Christianity, either in its antagonism to Christ and His work, or in its insidious efforts to mould and guide Christian thought and practice. Under this aspect, Gnosticism was, as our author well calls it, "a bizarre compound of mysticism and rationalism" directed againt the deposit of faith. Fundamentally, the *gnosis* was exercised over the questions which have agitated human thought from the beginning—the existence of evil and the mystery of pain. The simple, straightforward Gospel explanation did not saitsfy the subtle oriental mind. In its stead were proposed a crude dualism which appealed to the ordinary man, and a set of esoteric traditions to captivate more refined intellects.

Apart from its essential defects, we may certainly agree with Buonaiuti that Gnosticism possessed many high, noble and even spiritual sentiments. Nor again shall we be inclined to class all the sectaries as frauds and imposters. Concerning the early stages of its development, at least, we need not be more severe than was Tertullian. We may safely admit that if in later times the *gnosis* led to horrid excesses, there were among the leaders men of great intelligence as well as of conspicuous virtue.

In his development Buonauiti follows the broad historic lines. He points out the signs and traces the increase of the errors from the New Testament days, through its golden age as he terms it, when it came to flower in the Alexandrian schools, to its final decadence. Every phase of this section is worked out from documentary evidence so far as our meagre sources will allow it. Another valuable feature of the book is a sketch of the character and doctrines of the Gnostic leaders from Simon Magus to Marcion. The best part of the book, to our way of thinking, is found in Chapter VIII—"The Reaction of the *Gnosis* upon the Church and upon Society"—in which Buonaiuti shows, successfully we think, that while Gnosticism had a certain influence upon Christian thought, it is not true that it was directly or indirectly responsible for every phase of sacramental and ecclesiastical development, as Harnack would have us believe. The author further shows that the growing church soon becoming aware of this treacherous force within its borders, ejected it and fought the issues out in the open. Throughout his book, Buonaiuti sticks to facts and is remarkably free from anything like preconceived theories. He gives enough of the old philosophy, theology and prayer system, to allow the reader to form his own conclusions.

Were Gnosticism only a matter of early history, there might perhaps be little to gain by disturbing its ancient slumbers. There has however been a recrudescence of the system to-day. One has but to read such books as the Theosophical societies are publishing to realize that Gnosticism is not dead, and that Dr. Buonaiuti has done the cause of Christianity a true service by studying on Catholic and scientific grounds this powerful phantasm of the past.

Wm. F. Hughes.

A Critical and Exegetical Commentary on The Book of Psalms—by Charles Agustus Briggs, D. D., D. Litt. and Emilie Grace Briggs, B. D. Vol. II. Charles Scribner's Sons, New York, 1907.

Excepting the omission of general introductory topics, and the addition of the indexes, this volume is similar in its makeup to the one preceding; the text is first given, then the notes, exegetical and critical. The translation is clear, and is for the most part finished and graceful. Occasionally, however, we meet with inelegant expressions which grate on the literary sense; e, g. "O Hear my yell" (Ps. 61). "O Give us help because of straits," (Ps. 60). "To Thee a song of praise is recited" (Ps. 65). "The heavens dripped a copious rain" (Ps. 68). "To the ground they profaned the dwelling place of Thy name" (Ps. 74). "My soul doth cleave after Thee" (Ps.). "Cleave to Thee" or "unto Thee" would seem a better rendering than "cleave after Thee."

Ps. 51, our "Miserere," which tradition ascribes to David repenting after his sin with Bethsabee, is placed by Dr. Briggs in the post-exilic period. The literary form of the Psalm, and its theological conceptions, he says, demand this date. For the same reasons he ascribes the De Profundis (Ps. 130) to the Greek period, and the Domine exaudi (Ps. 143), which tradition places in the mouth of David when being pursued by Absalom, to the troublous times before Nehemiah. The Messianic character of Pss. 72, 80, 101, 110, 118 and 132 as they now stand, is upheld.

As in the first volume, clearness, fullness, and scholarship mark the exegetical and literary notes. What some would term the ultra-arbitrary nature of some of the textual criticism is in marked contrast to the reverent conservatism of the exegesis. This latter feature of the commentary makes it of value and helpfulness to all devout students of the Bible.

Three indexes, of Hebrew words, Proper names, and Subjects greatly facilitate the use of the commentary. Greater completeness in them however, would add to their value. Omissions are especially noticeable in the index of Proper names; many names used throughout the volumes are not recorded, (e. g. Bomberg, Toy, Gietmann, Knabenbauer, Zwingli, Pagnius, Bleek, etc.) and little effort is made to give all the references to the names that are recorded.

Despite some minor defects, which a work covering such a difficult field cannot entirely hope to escape, the completion of this commentary is a contribution of the highest merit to critical Biblical literature.

and is moreover, a wholesome and distinctive impulse to the cause of reverent criticism.

J. F. M.

Folia Fugitiva—Edited by the Rev. W. H. Cologan, (Hon. Secretary English Catholic Truth Society). Benziger Bros. New York, etc.

Some time ago, in the *Ecclesiastical Review*, a suggestion was made that priests in any particular city or district might associate themselves together for purposes of study and conference, meeting at stated times to hear papers read on assigned or selected subjects, and in other ways imparting to one another the fruits of their thought and reading. Such a plan seems to have been in operation among the clergy of a certain deanery in the County of Essex, England, and we have in the volume before us a selection of the papers read at some of these meetings. The editor himself provides five out of the eighteen papers presented; of the remaining writers there are only two whose names are at all widely known—the late Bishop Bellord, whose paper on "The Number of the Saved" opens the series, and the Rev. Thomas Gerrard, whose thoughtful article on "The 'Grammar of Assent' and the Sure Future" has already seen the light in the pages of the *Dublin Review*. According to Dr. Bellord, in the paper just referred to, it would be a rather difficult matter for any one to lose his soul. The tendency towards more lenient views on this subject, widely prevalent of course amongst Protestants, is noticeable also amongst modern Catholic writers, but we do not remember to have read anything which shows it more markedly than this paper. The article on "Americanism," by Rev. A. Fortescue, is merely a resumé of the incidents here and in Europe, connected with the rise of the tendency—we can hardly say "movement"—known under this misnomer. It aims at being colorless and dispassionate—and succeeds. It is perfectly "safe."

On the whole, a volume like this is to be welcomed. Some of the papers indeed do not attain to any very high level, but the appearance of such a collection will doubtless act as an incentive to priests elsewhere to further by work of this kind their own intellectual and spiritual improvement.

Samuel P. Macpherson.